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ARTICLE

A THEORY OF PREFERRED STOCK

WILLIAM W. BRATTON† & MICHAEL L. WACHTER††
Should preferred stock be treated under corporate law as an equity interest in
the issuing corporation or under contract law as a senior security? Should a
preferred certificate of designation be subsumed in the corporate charter and treated
as an incomplete contract filled out by fiduciary duty, or should it be treated as a
complete contract with the drafting burden on the party asserting the right, as would
occur with a bond contract? Is preferred stock equity or debt? This Article shows
that preferred stock is both corporate and contractual—neither all one nor all the
other. It sits on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate and
contract law, and draws on both. The overlap brings two competing grundnorms to
bear when interests of preferred and common stockholders come into conflict: on the
one hand, managing to the common stock as residual interest holder maximizes
value; on the other hand, holding parties to contractual risk allocations maximizes
value. When questions arise concerning the relative rights of preferred and common
stock, the norms hold out conflicting answers. Delaware courts have taken the lead
in confronting these questions by seeking to synchronize the law of preferred stock
with the rest of corporate law—a project that has led to both innovation and stress.
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Tilburg University Anton Philips Fund Conference on Institutional Investors, and the Penn Law
Institute for Law & Economics Roundtable for their comments and questions.
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This Article examines recent cases about preferred stock to show two facets of
Delaware law coming to bear as the synchronization process proceeds: first, reliance
on independent directors for dispute resolution, and second, the common stock–
value maximization norm. These trends cause the law to tilt toward corporate
norms, thereby disrupting allocated risks in heavily negotiated transactions,
particularly in the venture capital sector. The Article makes three recommendations
that would promote the goal of restoring balance between the corporate and contract
paradigms. First, the meaning and scope of preferred contract rights should be
determined by courts, rather than by issuer boards of directors. Second, conflicts
between preferred and common should not be decided by reference to a norm of
common stock–value maximization. Instead, the goal should be the maximization
of the value of the equity as a whole. Third, independent-director determinations of
conflicts between preferred and common should not be accorded ordinary business
judgment review. Instead, a door should be left open for good faith review tailored
to the context. This review would require a showing of bad faith treatment of the
preferred where the integrity of a deal has been undermined, with the burden of
proof on the board.
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INTRODUCTION
Preferred stock is undertheorized. The most recent comprehensive study
appeared almost six decades ago.1 Commentary on the subject since then has
been sporadic.2 Yet preferred stock’s economic salience has increased notably
1 See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock—Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L.
REV. 243, 243 (1954) (attempting to analyze the rights of preferred stockholders “to see the extent
to which the share contract creates and protects them and the extent to which the law details them
when the share contract is defective”). One of us frequently consulted Professor Buxbaum’s article
when practicing law during the 1970s. We have it on good authority that corporate lawyers
continue to refer to it.
2 There are two leading subsequent articles on preferred stock. See Victor Brudney, Standards
of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445, 448-49 (1973)
(examining judicial standards of fairness in weighing the rights of preferred shareholders);
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in recent decades. The volume of new preferred offerings outstrips both
that of initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock and of new public
common offerings by seasoned issuers.3 Preferred also is the favored mode
of investment in the venture capital sector.4 Finally, it is much utilized in
the financial sector.5 For example, the U.S. Treasury purchased more than
$200 billion of preferred under the Troubled Asset Relief Program.6
It is time for a new look at preferred. There are three reasons why such a
review is warranted—the first theoretical, the second institutional, and the
third normative.

Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (and Why We Should Care About It), 51
BUS. LAW. 443, 445 (1996) (analyzing “the question of when fairness standards are to be applied
in assessing the effects of corporate transactions upon preferred stockholders”). There has also
been legal scholarship on venture capital preferred. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson,
Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1313 (2008) (finding that “fiduciary duties are
becoming more harmful than helpful,” and that courts should require directors to follow “the
course that, in their judgment, maximizes the value of the firm as a whole” instead of strict
reliance on “the idea that fiduciary duties are owed shareholders”); William W. Bratton, Venture
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 891 (2002)
(“examining the law and economics of downside arrangements in venture capital contracts”); Jesse
M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
967, 971-72 (2006) (analyzing the “unique” corporate governance structure that startups with
venture capital funding typically employ, in part due to preferred rights and interests); D. Gordon
Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 318 (2005) (looking at how
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs “ensure optimal allocation of decisionmaking authority while
preserving the venture capitalists’ exit options”).
3 From 1999 to 2005, U.S. firms issued over $868 billion in preferred stock while raising only
$374 billion through common equity IPOs and only $590 billion through seasoned equity offerings.
Jarl G. Kallberg et al., Preferred Stock: Some Insights into Capital Structure, 21 J. CORP. FIN. 77, 78
(2013). Three-quarters of the preferred equity took the form of trust preferred securities, thus
implying that $217 billion was traditional preferred, which is the form discussed in this Article. See
Jarl G. Kallberg et al., Preferred Stock: Some Insights into Capital Structure 8 (Feb. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=1108673.
4 See Bratton, supra note 2, at 914-16 (discussing reasons venture capital contracts typically
involve preferred stock versus debt or common stock).
5 See Jennifer Salutric & Joseph Willcox, Emerging Issues Regarding Trust Preferred Securities,
SRC INSIGHTS (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Philadelphia, Pa.), First Quarter 2009, at 8, 8
(describing trust-preferred securities as “a very popular vehicle for raising capital throughout the
past decade”).
6 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 4 (2011),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/12-16-TARP_report.pdf; see
BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41427, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
(TARP): IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS 2-8 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R41427.pdf (detailing the costs of various TARP programs).
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A. Corporate Legal Theory
The theoretical interest concerns the problem of defining the corporation’s
boundaries, asking the “who’s in and who’s out” question regarding the line
dividing fiduciary beneficiaries from contract counterparties. The problem has
been traversed extensively in corporate legal theory7 without anyone noticing
the special case of preferred. Preferred stockholders are the only corporate
constituents who straddle the line—their participation being both corporate
and contractual. It therefore follows that resolving problems relating to
preferred stock offers special information about the corporation’s borderland.
The classic common stockholder surrenders capital to the company with
no right to pull it back out: the stockholder takes the residual financial risk
on both the downside and upside and gives up direct input into business
decisions in exchange for a vote at an annual election of the board of
directors. The interest can be viewed contractually, but the contract that
emerges is almost entirely incomplete, with open-ended fiduciary duties
substituted for negotiated financial rights. Whether viewed through the lens
of corporate or contract law, common stockholders are seen as “insiders.”
Lenders also contribute capital to corporations, often for long periods, but
they do so under contracts that create enforceable financial priorities. The
contracts approach completeness, and courts balk when asked to imply
additional rights in cases where lenders find themselves in vulnerable
positions.8 Lenders sit “outside” of the corporation, and look to specific,
bargained-for rights to protect their interests rather than the apparatuses of
governance and fiduciary duty.
Stockholders are corporate, lenders are contractual, and a wellunderstood wall separates their legal treatments. Preferred stock straddles
the wall. The holder receives a share of stock issued pursuant to the same
corporate code and charter as a share of common stock. The stock, viewed
7 Compare Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2010, at 32, 33 (arguing that enlightened stakeholder–
value maximization, in which “maximization of the long-run value of the firm” is the goal used to
determine which tradeoffs among stakeholders are permissible, is the most appropriate corporate
objective), with Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1268 (1999)
(stressing that “shareholders’ [position as] the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties is the
default rule”).
8 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(“Accordingly, this Court holds that the ‘fruits’ of these indentures do not include an implied
restrictive covenant that would prevent the incurrence of new debt to facilitate the recent LBO.”).
Employees are treated similarly by the courts. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen, Corp., 668 N.E. 2d 351,
355 (Mass. 1996) (refusing, as a matter of course, to find a breach of fiduciary duty following a
corporation’s firing of an employee-stockholder).
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in isolation, carries the same vulnerabilities as a share of common stock and
exists in the same regime of rights and duties. The issuer then adds contract
rights to the stock—either financial preferences or a debt-like right to be
paid certain sums on set dates—thus rendering it preferred stock.9
So is preferred stock equity or debt? Is it stock subject to the rules of
corporate law or a senior security governed by contract law? Is it an incomplete contract filled out by fiduciary duty or a complete contract with the
drafting burden on the party asserting the right? These are the central
questions of the law of preferred stock. This Article provides answers and
thus fills the void of corporate legal theory.
Preferred stock sits on a fault line between two great private law paradigms, corporate law and contract law. It is neither one nor the other; rather,
it draws on both.10 The overlap involves two grundnorms and brings them into
conflict. On the one hand, the corporate paradigm instructs that managing to
the common stock, since stockholders are residual interest holders, maximizes
value; on the other hand, the contract paradigm instructs that holding parties
to contractual risk allocations maximizes value. When questions arise concerning the relative rights of preferred and common, the paradigms can hold
out conflicting answers. Decisionmakers choose between the two, sometimes
applying corporate law principles, while at other times opting instead for the
framework of contract law. As a result, the law vacillates.
This observation does not mean that the law never draws lines. Sometimes, clear categorical placements must be made, and preferred is effectively
pigeonholed on one side or another of the debt–equity line. For example, bank
capital rules treat preferred as equity (sometimes, on par with common).11
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require some preferred

9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2011) (setting the parameters of stock issuance under
Delaware law and permitting preferred stock).
10 Thus, there is a clear contrast between preferred stockholders on one hand, and convertible
bondholders and warrantholders, who are treated contractually, on the other. See, e.g., Aspen
Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1262-64 (Del. 2004) (refusing
appraisal rights to a warrantholder and holding that such rights are “narrow statutory right[s] that
[are] available only to stockholders”); Harff v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133, 134 (Del. 1975) (denying
convertible bondholders the right to bring a derivative action “because they are not ‘stockholders’”
(internal citation omitted)).
11 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, BANK CAPITAL RULES: FEDERAL RESERVE
APPROVES NPRS ADDRESSING BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION AND SUBSTANTIAL REVISIONS TO B ASEL I-BASED RULES FOR ALL BANKS AND FINALIZES AMENDMENTS TO
MARKET RISK RULES 2-5 (June 8, 2012), available at http://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SCPublication-Bank-Capital-Rules-June-10-2012.pdf (describing the Federal Reserve proposal to treat
noncumulative preferred issued by REIT subsidiaries of banks as Tier 1 capital but phase-out trust
preferred and cumulative preferred from Tier 1 status).
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to be booked as debt, even though formally it is stock, while other preferred
is booked as equity.12
Things get harder and neat results prove elusive when courts address cases
in which the economic interests of preferred and common stockholders come
into conflict. The Delaware courts have attempted to effect a clean paradigmatic split by referencing corporate law when the matter concerns “a right
shared equally with the common” and referencing contract law when the
matter concerns special rights and preferences.13 But this line of demarcation
proves too vague and the area of paradigmatic overlap proves too extensive
to permit easy compartmentalization. Decisions are not remitted to the law
of debtor–creditor on the “rights and preferences” side of the split; rights
shared with the common are not defined by exclusive reference to corporate
law. Preferred sits on the line; it is both. Therefore, coherence in treatment
cannot follow from black-and-white references to contract or corporate law.
Both paradigms come to bear and decisionmakers need to synchronize their
simultaneous application.
This is not easy to do. This Article clarifies the field with a close examination of four recurring points of dispute—equity recapitalizations, allocations
of merger proceeds, enforcement of payment mandates, and fundamental
changes effected by preferred in control. We show that dispute resolution in
all four categories requires negotiation between the two paradigms rather
than unwavering reliance on one or the other.
B. Institutional Posture and Normative Concerns
The Delaware courts have emerged as the dominant arbiters of preferred
stock disputes.14 What was once a disparate, multistate case law on the
12 See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE:
ACCOUNTING FOR REDEEMABLE EQUITY INSTRUMENTS (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.fasb.
org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175819483183&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=url
data&blobtable=MungoBlobs (requiring mandatory redemption preferred to be booked as debt on the
balance sheet); Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Summary of Statement No. 150: Accounting for Certain
Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Both Liabilities and Equity, FASB: PRE-CODIFICATION
STANDARDS (May 2003), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum150.shtml.
13 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-95 (Del. Ch. 1986).
14 Since 1980, 60% of the cases keyed by West as involving preferred stock were decided in
Delaware. New York came in a distant second with 20%. From 1940 to 1950, Delaware cases
comprised only 12.7% of the set. Preferred Stock Key Numbers, WESTLAWNEXT,
www.next.westlaw.com (ensure that search is for all federal and state cases; click “Tools” link; click
“West Key Number System”; click “101: Corporations and Business Organizations”; under “V.
Capital and Stock, k1280-k1499,” click “(A) Nature and Amount Of Capital and Shares, k1280-k1309”;
under “1288 Division of Capital into Shares” click “1292: Preferred Stock”; verify total number of
cases in above time periods; add up number of Delaware and New York cases in this key number
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subject is now articulated by the Delaware judiciary in a closed, selfreferential context—a context highly sensitive not only to each case’s facts
but also to its implications for the overall framework of Delaware corporate
law. That framework has undergone notable developments over the past
several decades. As ever, the Delaware courts accord respect to boards of
directors’ business judgments, but they now push boards to remit dispute
resolution to independent directors and temper their board centrism by
recognizing a norm of shareholder-wealth maximization.
Recent Delaware cases strive to integrate the law of preferred within this
framework. The integration project both inspires innovation and causes
stresses and strains. Unfortunately, the latter effects have been in ascendance
recently as the courts have reset the balance between corporate and contractual
treatment. Although framed in contractual terms, the rebalancing has the
effect of pushing preferred deeper into corporate territory. Board decisionmaking primacy has that effect: because courts review processes leading to
outcomes rather than the outcomes themselves, questions about substantive
rights that a half century ago were seen as matters for judicial determination
now devolve to corporate boards.15 In addition, challenges to board judgments now can be viewed through the lens of common stock–value maximization.16 The two frames, taken together, tend to assure that preferred
stockholders lose their cases. Taken alone, this outcome would not be problematic, but destabilizing implications follow for the financial markets,
particularly the venture capital sector. Arm’s length deals are being undercut
due to overemphasis of preferred’s corporate character and under-emphasis
of transactional context.
We propose a contrasting framework built on three principles. First,
courts, rather than issuer boards of directors, should determine the meaning
and scope of preferred contract rights. Second, conflicts between preferred
and common should not be decided by reference to a norm of common
stock–value maximization. Instead, the goal should be the maximization of
over given time periods; repeat for “1475: Preferred or Other Special Stock”; add totals from both key
numbers and calculate percentages). Buxbaum cites a total of 381 cases in his article. New York leads
that set with 20.7% (79); Delaware came second with 9.5% (36). See generally Buxbaum, supra note 1.
15 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 681-83 (2006) (describing the transition from substantive
fairness review to process review of cashout mergers).
16 See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (requiring directors to maximize short-term value once they have decided to sell a company for cash). Of course,
Revlon deals with a narrow fact pattern. This Article shows that its spirit now motivates judicial
responses in preferred stock cases. For an example of such a response, see HB Korenvaes
Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *746 (Del. Ch. June 9,
1993); infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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the value of the equity as a whole, with the enterprise rather than the
common stock as the value yardstick. Third, independent-director determinations of conflicts between classes of preferred and common should not be
accorded ordinary business judgment review. Instead, a door should be left
open for good faith review tailored to the context—a rule leading to judicial
intervention when there has been a showing of bad faith treatment of the
preferred that undermined the integrity of a deal.
C. Structure of This Article
Part I describes the corporate–contract balance set during the first half of
the twentieth century. The courts confronted downside situations in which
preferred stockholder claims interfered with corporate equity recapitalizations
that would have enhanced enterprise value. Preferred holders played the
contract card, analogizing to the claims of bondholders. The companies
insisted that the preferred, as stock, be made to sacrifice for the good of the
enterprise. The companies won; preferred henceforth would irretrievably be
stock, and the corporate law paradigm would limit claims to contractual priority.
Part II addresses problems arising from acquisitions of preferred stock
issuers. Although a corporate charter can fix an allocation of merger proceeds
for a preferred class in advance, such a term often is omitted. It follows that
a merger creates an allocational issue for decision by the issuer board of
directors, a body elected by common stockholders. The preferred holders
frequently complain about the conflicted result. We show that a plausible
case can be made for either corporate or contract treatment—the former
meaning fiduciary scrutiny along majority-to-minority lines and the latter
limiting the preferred to rights explicitly reserved by contract and the
statutory appraisal remedy. We go on to show that both approaches have
influenced Delaware decisions, thereby creating a classic case of mixed
signals in mutual tension due to paradigmatic overlap. The tensions recently
came to a head in a Delaware Chancery Court decision, LC Capital Master
Fund, Ltd. v. James, in which the court forcefully resolved them by treating
the charter as a complete contract, effectively expanding the board’s zone of
allocational discretion.17 But we read the contract in question differently
than did the Chancery Court. In particular, we show more generally that
preferred stock contracts cannot presumptively be modeled as complete and
that the common stock–maximization norm has no productive role to play
in merger allocation disputes. At the same time, we share the Chancery
Court’s aversion to full-dress fiduciary review and agree that statutory
17

990 A.2d 435, 447-48 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing HB Korenvaes, 1993 WL 205040, at *744-45).
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appraisal usually affords an adequate remedy.18 We think that some minor
boardroom process adjustments and minimal judicial scrutiny under the
good faith rubric can both finesse the problem of paradigmatic ambiguity
and accommodate the interests at stake.
Part III considers the paradigmatic overlap occasioned by preferred with
mandatory dividend and redemption rights—debt-like promises to pay
preferred holders. The promises take second-order status because their
performance is conditioned on the presence of “legally available funds” as
defined by corporate legal capital rules, fraudulent conveyance law, and an
open-ended and conflicting body of old cases. The Delaware Chancery
Court has taken a new look here as well. In SV Investment Partners, LLC v.
ThoughtWorks, Inc., it resolved ambiguities in favor of corporate treatment
by leaving the decision whether to pay to the business judgment of issuer
boards of directors.19 We agree that ambiguities need resolution but suggest
that the modern legal framework better accommodates resolution in the
opposite, contractual direction.
Part IV addresses the venture capital context, where preferred stockholders often control the board of directors but also operate under pressure
to monetize their equity investments. The Chancery Court, at the behest of
complaining minority common, recently reviewed a sale engineered by
exiting venture capitalists.20 The In re Trados court opened a wide door to
intrinsic fairness review on the common’s behalf21—in our view, too wide.
Part IV looks critically at Trados and projects that the case will negatively
impact the venture capital business model. We trace the problem to the
court’s application of the common stock–maximization norm and recommend,
first, that enterprise value maximization be substituted as the fiduciary
yardstick and, second, that a door be opened to waiver by common of
fiduciary protection in venture deal documentation.
Part V reviews the Article’s sequence of analyses and asks whether a
more consistent regime of across-the-board corporate or contract treatment
would improve matters. We find that a paradigmatic harmonization initiative
would disturb both transactional risk allocations and corporate governance.
Rather, preferred is dual and works only when both paradigms are consulted.

18
19
20

See James, 990 A.2d at 438-39 (favoring relief for preferred stockholders through appraisal).
See 7 A.3d 973, 988-89 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).
See generally In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1
(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).
21 Id. at *5 (“If the presumption of the rule is rebutted, then the burden of proving entire
fairness shifts to the director defendants.”).
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I. THE PARADIGMATIC BACKDROP: CORPORATE TREATMENT
IN DEPRESSION-ERA EQUITY RECAPITALIZATIONS
Courts confronted the choice between the corporate and contract paradigms in stark terms during the first half of the twentieth century. In those
days, American industrial firms routinely financed with priority, cumulative
preferred.22 “Priority” means that a set preferred dividend must be paid
before a dividend may be paid to the common, but that the preferred
dividend may be skipped at the discretion of the board of directors.23
“Cumulative” means that past skipped preferred dividends must be made up
before the common can receive dividends.24 Although there is no promise to
make a payment, the cumulative priority can constrain the issuer board’s
freedom of action.
The priority arrangement works well in prosperous times. The enterprise
creates free cash flows and the preferred gets its dividend at a rate of return
higher than that on the same issuer’s bonds. However, even moderate
distress alters the situation in the following manner: The enterprise pays its
bondholders and even turns a small profit, but the board needs to reinvest
every cent to keep the business functioning; therefore, it withholds preferred
dividends. Under the cumulative feature, dividend arrearages gradually build
up. The arrearages in turn prevent the company from making periodic
payments on its common, thus inhibiting the sale of additional common to
raise new equity capital. As more arrearages accumulate, the issuer’s equity
capital structure becomes increasingly dysfunctional, with the lion’s share of
the marginal economic interest appended to the preferred even as the votes
for the board of directors stay with the common.25 Under this scenario,
preferred rights look increasingly like barriers to progress for the enterprise
as a whole.
During the Great Depression, such capital structures crowded the corporate landscape.26 The project of clearing the wreckage triggered disputes
22 See 1 ARTHUR S TONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 133-36
(4th ed. 1941) (providing an overview of the characteristics of industrial preferred of the early
twentieth century); BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 378 (4th ed. 1962) (describing early twentieth century–corporate financing patterns).
23 See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 609-10
(7th ed. 2012).
24 Id. at 610.
25 Cf. Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that separation of the
marginal economic gain and loss from the interests of the principals who elect the board is
inefficient).
26 See Robert M. Blair-Smith & Leonard Helfenstein, A Death Sentence or a New Lease on
Life? A Survey of Corporate Adjustments Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 94 U. PA. L.
REV. 148, 149-52 (1946) (describing dysfunctional utility capital structures, in which utilities, as

1826

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1815

that posed fundamental choices between contract and corporate treatment.
Contract law privileged preferred fixed claims and reinforced barriers, while
corporate law facilitated the barriers’ removal. The early twentieth-century
courts emphatically endorsed corporate treatment, and the choice has stuck.
The result is a curious hybrid legal status for the preferred: contract rights,
no matter how thickly applied, are potentially subject to diminution for the
good of the enterprise.
This Part recounts the Depression-era choice set. Section I.A describes
the problem confronting the issuer of preferred in arrears more fully than
the brief overview above. Section I.B sets out the solution of a cramdown
recapitalization and the resulting legal questions and finishes by looking at
the courts’ move to corporate treatment in resolving these issues. Section
I.C considers the paradigmatic implications of this Part’s points.
A. The Recapitalization Problem
Consider hypothetical ABC Corporation, which has a total market equity
capitalization of $100 million. There are one million preferred shares
outstanding and two million common shares, with the preferred trading for
$80 per share and the common for $10 per share. The preferred carries a
cumulative dividend preference plus a liquidation preference under which
its holders will be paid $100 per share along with all accrued dividends
before the common receives any liquidation proceeds. The liquidation
preference plus dividend accruals total $150 per share.
An infusion of new capital into ABC will facilitate a turnaround. Money
is tight and no loans are available; therefore, a new equity offering makes
sense. The preferred arrearages, however, block this option, since a new
common issue holding out no prospect of cash returns will not sell for much
in the market. Alternatively, if the preferred can be transformed into common
through a recapitalization, the arrearages will disappear. A successful recapitalization to an all-common structure will increase the company’s equity to
$120 million.
An allocation question arises: Recapitalization increases the pie’s size to
$120 million and then slices it and hands the pieces to the preferred and the
common by any of a range of possible splits. At one end, the entire gain
could be allocated to the preferred, which would follow if the preferred
received eight common shares for each preferred share (eight million to the
preferred, valued at $100 million; two million to the common, valued at $20
part of elaborate holding company structures, lost much of their earnings through “expenses, fixed
charges, and preferred stock dividend requirements”).
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million). At the other end, the entire gain could be allocated to the common,
which would follow from a four-to-one allocation to the preferred (four
million to the preferred, valued at $80 million; two million to the common
valued at $40 million). Directly in the middle, an exchange ratio of six-toone evenly splits the $20 million gain (six million to the preferred valued at
$90 million; two million to the common valued $30 million).
Assume that the board decides to split the gain equally and recapitalize
on a six-to-one basis. How does it successfully structure the recapitalization?
The board could set up a voluntary exchange offer, asking the preferred to
tender back their shares and, in turn, receive six common for each preferred
tendered. Unfortunately, the offer creates a hold-out problem. The preferred can refuse to tender and insist on a more favorable ratio. Even if a
majority of the preferred cooperate, a minority will likely stand pat. If 80%
of the preferred holders accept, the 20% holding out retain their stock with
liquidation preference and arrearages intact at $150. If their ploy works, the
holdouts eventually get their arrearages paid down, coming out significantly
ahead of the others. This holdout possibility destabilizes the transaction.
B. Cramdown
The ABC board needs to cram down a recapitalization. Under the contract paradigm, strictly applied, cramdown is impossible. To see why,
compare an issue of bonds that stands in the way of progress. To scale back
the bondholders’ claims, the issuer must either procure their unanimous
consent to a direct amendment of the bond contract27 or get a supermajority
to consent to an exchange offer.28 Either way, the issuer must confront the
aforementioned holdout problem.29 The debt claimant can face an involuntary
haircut only in a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding,30 and then only if
every junior claimant is wiped out.31

27 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (2006) (requiring unanimous
consent to amendment of payment terms).
28 See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 462-63 (providing an overview of exchange offers).
29 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest
of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 56-60 (2004) (describing the holdout problem of the division of
surplus between creditors); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232,
241-42 & n.29 (1987) (discussing a case in which a single bondholder held out and destroyed a deal
to which 80% of bondholders had agreed).
30 See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 529-31 (observing that some reorganization plans “are
judicially ordered to be crammed down on nonconsenting classes”).
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006) (making absolute priority treatment of a reorganization plan
available on a contingent basis); BRATTON, supra note 23, at 530-31 (describing the role the
absolute priority rule continues to play in bankruptcy).
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Preferred stock worked the same way during the Victorian era. The Victorians took contract law seriously; amendments to corporate charters could
not proceed without unanimous consent.32 But the unanimity rule was
relaxed during the early twentieth century when corporate codes were
revised to permit charter amendment by majority vote.33 This relaxation
opened a route to an involuntary out-of-bankruptcy cramdown against
preferred. Although the preferred’s obstructive priorities are contract terms,
they are embedded in the issuer’s charter rather than in a freestanding
contract (as occurs with debt securities). Once corporate codes allowed
charter amendment by majority vote, it logically followed that the boards
and common stockholders could join together to impose mandatory exchanges on preferred issues.
To see how, we return to ABC Corporation and note that the preferred
holds only one-third of the votes. So, preferred shareholders accordingly
cannot block an amendment approved by the board and submitted for
shareholder ratification. At the same time, the common can be expected to
vote in favor of an amendment only if it holds out a clear-cut gain. The
board, concerned about this threat, takes a hard look at the six-to-one
exchange ratio, and decides that the allocation favors the preferred enough
that it could trigger possible resistance among the common. To avoid that
undesirable outcome, it adjusts the ratio to five-to-one (71.5% or $85.7
million to the preferred and 28.5% or $34.3 million to the common) and
submits the amendment to a vote.
The corporate–contract issue is joined at this point. Assume no preferred issuer has ever attempted such an amendment. The revised corporate
code, read literally, not only permits it, but, indeed, contains a reservation
clause that permits legislative amendments to alter existing rights.34 Still, it
is likely that a wall of conceptual resistance to the proposed amendment will
exist. Preferred rights are widely assumed to be contractual and vested,35
32 John F. Meck, Jr., Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine, 55
HARV. L. REV. 71, 79 (1941) (describing the doctrine of unanimous consent as a “carry-over from
partnership law”). The unanimity rule originated in early- to mid-nineteenth-century judicial
opinions that filled gaps in corporate charters and state codes. See Edward O. Curran, Minority
Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 MICH. L. REV. 743, 744-45 & nn.10-12 (1934).
33 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886–1936, 50
HARV. L. REV. 27, 43-50 (1936) (describing the 1933 Illinois statute, which moved in the direction
of the current state of the law by requiring approval by two-thirds of shareholders for most
changes, and comparing it to the Massachusetts and Delaware statutes in effect at the same time).
34 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. A CT § 1.02 (2011) (granting the state legislature the “power
to amend or repeal all or part of the Act at any time”).
35 Note that the vested-rights approach runs parallel to absolute priority in bankruptcy. See
Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), (b)(2) (allowing for bankruptcy plans that classes
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just like the rights of bondholders. However, when one views the preferred
contractually, the amendment makes no structural sense: What stops the
company from transferring value from the preferred to the common by
cramming down a recapitalization on a one-to-one basis or a one-fourth-toone basis? What is the value of a promise that can be unilaterally amended
away by the promisor? Arguably, such rights are illusory and without value.
Allowing the amendment, then, undercuts the financial transaction that
created the preferred in the first place, particularly given a class of preferred
issued and sold before the amendment of the corporate code.
The reviewing court faces a stark choice. Contract treatment ensures the
consent of the preferred, but also leads to holdup and a dysfunctional capital
structure. On the other hand, corporate treatment undercuts the deal but
also applies the corporate code as written and facilitates a fresh start in the
best interests of the corporate community.
Depression-era courts split on the question. Some, including the Delaware Supreme Court, held that the amended code’s majority vote provision
could only be applied prospectively—that is, to preferred created after the
enactment of majority amendment.36 Courts in most states, including New
York, both in the Depression era and the decades following it, held that no
such vested rights existed.37

have accepted or that do not impair those classes, and ensuring that holders of junior claims do not
recover before holders of senior ones). Both follow from the notion that a contract right cannot be
impaired without its holder’s consent. Unfortunately for the preferred, an absolute priority
objection is structurally ill-suited to the context of an out-of-court equity recapitalization. These
recapitalizations require a shareholder vote, and a common stock majority has no incentive to vote
in favor of a recapitalization that eliminates or reduces the value of its participation. The bottom
line is simple: no preferred haircut, no recapitalization. Ruling the transaction unfair for traversing
absolute priority would, in effect, reinstate the vested-rights barrier. Adjudicated recapitalizations
present a different case, and the SEC effected a series of them under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) § 11, 49 Stat. 803, 820 (repealed 2005). See Otis & Co. v. SEC,
323 U.S. 624, 633-35 (1945) (sanctioning an absolute priority violation in an SEC recapitalization
proceeding under PUHCA).
36 See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115, 116-17, 125-26 (Del. 1936) (invalidating recapitalization
pursuant to charter amendment made following Delaware code procedures promulgated after
creation of the preferred because the amendment could only be applied prospectively); see also
Consol. Film Indus. v. Johnson, 197 A. 489, 493 (Del. 1937) (“There is nothing in the language to
suggest that the section, as amended, was intended to have a retrospective operation.”); NORMAN
D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 578 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing “judicial battles” in
Delaware courts “over the status of accrued but undeclared dividends on preferred shares where
the legislature has authorized their alteration or elimination”).
37 See Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, Inc., 35 N.E.2d 618, 622-23 (N.Y. 1941) (rejecting
the vested-rights doctrine); see also, e.g., Bove v. Cmty. Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89,
94-98 (R.I. 1969) (discussing and rejecting vested-rights analysis and confirming that reserved
power gives the legislature authority to affect rights of the preferred).
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The vested-rights era did not last long, even in Delaware. A few years
after recognizing vested rights, the Delaware Supreme Court encountered a
case in which an issuer used a different technique to the same end: Federal
United Corp. v. Havender.38 This time, instead of directly amending its
charter, the issuer effected a “dummy” merger in which it created a wholly
owned shell subsidiary and then entered into a merger agreement with the
subsidiary pursuant to which the subsidiary was the surviving corporation.39
Typically in these mergers, the merger agreement provides that the existing
shares of the issuer, both preferred and common, will be “converted” into
common shares of the surviving corporation.40 The conversion strips the
arrearages. Significantly, different sections of Delaware’s corporate code
governed mergers and charter amendments at the time; this practice
continues even today.41
In Havender, the Delaware Supreme Court found the statutory difference
to be determinative.42 The code’s merger section permitted the transaction
in question and had always done so.43 The preferred argued that the section’s
employment in the present case amounted to a formal ruse, in that it
accomplished what the court had forbidden by direct charter amendment.44
The court rejected this argument, along with a “vested contract rights”
claim to unpaid dividends45: transactional limitations found in one section
of the code do not constrain a party’s use of another section of the code to
reach the same substantive result that the first section prohibits.46 The point
survives as Delaware’s “bedrock” doctrine of independent legal significance.47
Henceforth, recapitalizations would be easily effected with or without
the voting support of the preferred—so easily, in fact, to have prompted the
38
39
40

11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
Id. at 333-35.
See id. at 334 (noting that, in a variation on the traditional dummy merger, the old preferred stock was converted into both new preferred stock and Class A common stock).
41 Id. at 338-39.
42 See id. at 338 (finding Keller to have “no application beyond its philosophy” since it did not
deal with a merger).
43 Id. at 338.
44 See id. (noting that the preferred shareholders saw this case as essentially identical to Keller).
45 See id. at 339 (contrasting preferred shareholders from those who do hold vested rights,
such as creditors or lienholders).
46 Id. at 338.
47 See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 853 (Del. 1998) (“[A]ll parties
agree that [statutory] pure amendment protection available to the First Series Preferred stockholders . . . does not—absent the very phrase at issue here—apply to this merger.”); Warner Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 583 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1989) (“Our bedrock doctrine of
independent legal significance compels the conclusion that satisfaction of the requirements of Section
251 is all that is required legally to effectuate a merger.” (citation omitted)).
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legislature to make a concession to the preferred. Now, in Delaware and
elsewhere,48 a charter amendment that alters or changes “the powers, preferences, or special rights” of a given class must be approved by a majority vote
of that class.49 The class vote mandate holds out a veto of a one-sided
amendment while substantially diminishing the holdout problem. But Part II
demonstrates that the dummy-merger route to cramdown remains open.50
C. Summary
To create an absolute contractual claim against a corporation in exchange
for an infusion of $1 million of capital, an authorized officer simply needs to
write, “The corporation promises to pay you $1,000,000” on a piece of paper
and sign it. Absent the holder’s consent, the claim can be impaired only in
the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. Resistance to unconsented impairment persists even there, manifested in the absolute priority rule.51
Preferred stock is stock issued under a corporate charter and is therefore
more vulnerable than debt. The Depression-era courts removed the contract
paradigm’s protection to make way for enterprise value enhancement under
the corporate paradigm. A question arises: Is there any way to invoke
contract and draft the preferred into the same absolute contractual status
enjoyed by debt? Parts II and III will show that such status is not possible.
With preferred, corporate and contract inevitably overlap.
II. PREFERRED STOCK AS FIDUCIARY
BENEFICIARY: MERGERS
When a corporate bond issuer merges into another corporation, the
bonds, by operation of law, carry over to the surviving corporation’s capital
structure with their rights untouched.52 It is different with preferred stock.
48 See, e.g., MODEL B US. CORP. A CT § 10.04(a)(3) (2011) (giving the holders of a separate
class of stock the right to vote, as a group, on amendments that would “change the rights,
preferences, or limitations of all or part of the shares of the class”). Delaware followed other states
in making this concession. See Dodd, supra note 33, at 44-49 (describing a class vote provision
modifying majoritarian amendment in the Illinois statute of 1935).
49 DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2011).
50 However, many states have merger statutes that require a class vote in the merger when
one would be necessary if the corporation had instead chosen to amend its charter. See, e.g.,
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.04(f )(1)(ii).
51 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2006).
52 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (“[A]ll property rights, privileges, powers and franchises and all and every other interest shall be thereafter as effectually the property of the
surviving or resulting corporation as they were of the several and respective constituent corporations.”). Trust indentures customarily require the surviving corporation to formally assume the
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When a preferred issuer merges into another company, the preferred lies on
the corporate side of the line, and corporate law makes it possible for
merging companies to effect top-to-bottom rewrites of their equity capital
structures. What comes into the merger as a fixed interest security can come
out the other end as cash, common stock, preferred with different rights and
preferences, or debt, and, in any case, in an amount with a value determined
by the issuer’s board of directors. A merger also can be structured to leave a
target company’s preferred’s rights unaffected, as would occur with a bond.
But nothing requires such treatment. Mergers thus hold special risks for
minority preferred. It would seem to follow that the preferred, as a minority
voting class, should benefit from the same fiduciary protection extended to
common stock minorities cashed out in parent–subsidiary mergers.53
It is not so simple, however. Preferred stock, as stock, does enjoy the protection of the duties of care and loyalty. Given, for example, injurious
management self-dealing, a holder of preferred has the same standing as a
holder of common to enforce the duty of loyalty in a derivative action.54 But
once we get past cases in which the preferred and the common share an
interest in good, clean management, tensions between the contract and
corporate paradigms undermine the preferred stockholder’s case for fiduciary beneficiary status.
There are three countervailing considerations, the first two of which are
corporate. First, the preferred’s financial interest is defined by contract
rights that conflict intrinsically with the interests of the common, and
corporate law generally resists attempts to bring adverse contract counterparties inside the fiduciary tent.55 Second, it is thought that a single-minded
focus on the common interest keeps management better focused on value
bonds. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture et al., Am.
Bar Ass’n, Revised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 Bus. Law. 1115, 1134-35 (2000); see also Dawson
v. Pittco Capital Partners, L.P., C.A. No. 3148-VCN, 2012 WL 1564805, at *17-19 (Del. Ch. Apr.
30, 2012) (addressing the question of whether a debt claim should be attached to a preferred stock
interest or considered separately).
53 For the first in a line of important majority–minority cash-out merger cases in Delaware,
see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-12 (Del. 1983) (noting that the “transaction [did not
satisfy] any reasonable concept of fair dealing,” due to a lack of disclosure of key factors to the
minority stockholders).
54 See, e.g., MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, at *6 (Del. Ch. May
5, 2010) (“Nothing in the statutes, rules of procedure, or case law of this state expressly prevents
preferred shareholders, as opposed to common shareholders, from pursuing a derivative action.”).
55 See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 791 (Del. Ch. 1987) (refusing to extend fiduciary
protection to convertible bondholders); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(refusing fiduciary protection to bondholders subject to an exchange offer, and noting, more
broadly, that it is “[t]he terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts
such as fairness [that] define the corporation’s obligation to its bondholders”).

2013]

A Theory of Preferred Stock

1833

maximization.56 The third consideration is contractual: protective contract
terms are available to preferred while publicly traded common tends to draw
its rights from corporate law’s background default regime.
However, the Delaware courts do entertain preferred claims of unfair
treatment in the context of divisions of merger proceeds. This line of cases
dates back to the early twentieth century but consists of cases that, at best,
tentatively recognize these preferred rights.57 These cases take such a tentative
approach that the Delaware Chancery Court recently expressed second
thoughts about the whole enterprise in LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James.58
This Part conducts a de novo review of preferred stockholders’ rights in
the merger context. Section II.A lays out the policy alternatives: (1) fiduciary scrutiny for preferred (which poses a difficult follow-up question about
the proper standard of review) versus (2) the complete rejection of fiduciary
scrutiny for preferred on the grounds that their rights are contractual and
that the statutory appraisal remedy always provides adequate protection
against oppressive treatment. Section II.B reviews Delaware precedent and
shows that its reliance on both of the foregoing alternatives imbued it with
internal contradictions. Section II.C considers the James opinion, which
pushes in the direction of the contractual alternative in looking negatively at
the fiduciary precedent without explicitly overruling it. We conclude that
fiduciary review remains a necessary part of the law surrounding preferred
rights in mergers, held in reserve for extreme cases. More particularly, given
a merger allocation effected by a preferred issuer’s independent directors,
good faith suffices as the standard of review, but the issuer’s board of
directors should bear the burden of proof on the good faith question. Our
treatment follows from a critical legal conclusion: preferred shareholders
have no corporate law right to share in merger gain.
A. The Problem and the Alternative Solutions
Mergers of preferred issuers tend to create allocational problems on the
moderate downside. To see why, compare the downside and upside extremes.
On the extreme downside, the issuer’s debt load is unsustainable and any
56 See, e.g., Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(noting that board imposition of risk upon preferred combined with “board action . . . taken for
the benefit largely of the common stock . . . do[es] not constitute a breach of duty”).
57 See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
58 See 990 A.2d 435, 438 (Del. Ch. 2010) (asserting that a board’s duty regarding allocating
consideration between common and preferred in a merger is “gap-filling” and is only present
where “there is no objective basis to allocate consideration,” and further, that a board need only
“allocate[] consideration in a manner fully consistent with the bottom-line contractual rights of the
preferred”).
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acquisition is likely to be through a Chapter 11 reorganization where the
preferred’s contract rights will be transformed into a matured claim with
priority over the common.59 On the upside, there is plenty for everybody so
there is not much about which to fight. The preferred’s dividends are paid
up. If the preferred shareholders are fortunate enough to have a conversion
privilege, they can protect themselves by converting. If they have no
conversion privilege, the preferred’s share of the issuer’s value likely is
capped at the stated liquidation amount, and there will be no serious
argument that the preferred is worth less.60 If the acquiring corporation
wants the preferred out of the surviving corporation’s capital structure, it
can redeem the issue at the principal amount stated in the charter. If the
acquiring corporation deems the preferred’s financial terms favorable, it can
leave the preferred in place.
Things are less clear-cut when a merger occurs on the moderate downside. To set up the problem, let us return to ABC Corporation and its $100
million market capitalization comprised of 1 million preferred shares trading
for $80 and 2 million common shares trading for $10, with the preferred’s
liquidation preference and dividend arrearages totaling $150 per share.
Assume that ABC’s board of directors has entered into a merger agreement
with XYZ Corporation for a consideration of $140 million. Further, assume
that the board has fulfilled its duty to obtain a beneficial merger price61 and
that the acquirer wishes to cash out the preferred along with the common. A
question arises regarding the preferred’s share of the merger proceeds of
$140 million—a share to be assigned by the issuer’s board of directors.
We pose three possible results: Allocation 1 splits the $40 million merger
gain evenly (if not pro rata)62 with $100 million to the preferred and $40
million to the common; Allocation 2 splits the proceeds with $80 million to
the preferred and $60 million to the common, thereby leaving the preferred
in its premerger market position and allocating the entire gain to the
common; and Allocation 3 gives $70 million to the preferred and $70 million
59 See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 544-45 (“The maturing of the claim results either from
the express terms of the investment contract, which typically accelerate maturity on the default, or
from the formal ‘sale’ of the debtor’s property and liquidation of the debtor . . . .”).
60 Cases in this area address the other, related question of whether the preferred is worth
more than the liquidation value, a matter of charter interpretation. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ford
Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698 A.2d 973, 977 (Del. Ch. 1997) (interpreting Delaware law to
allow charters to establish the value of preferred stock outside of the appraisal process).
61 See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (describing a
duty to search for “the best value reasonably available” given a sale of control).
62 A pro rata split of the merger gain by number of shares would be $93.33 to the common
and $46.67 million to the preferred. A pro rata split by reference to premerger market value would
be $112 million preferred to $28 million common.
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to the common, thus transferring $10 million of the preferred’s ex ante
market value to the common.
The corporate and contract paradigms suggest contrasting responses
when the preferred come to court and argue that a board’s allocation is
unfair. Under the corporate paradigm, the court entertains the fiduciary
claim—a decision that requires articulating a standard of review. Under the
contract paradigm, the court withholds fiduciary scrutiny on the ground that
the preferred could have contracted for protection; preferred shareholders,
having failed to do so, have left only the statutory appraisal remedy. We will
show that both approaches are plausible but also problematic.
1. Fiduciary Treatment and Standards of Review
A decision to subject a preferred–common allocation of merger proceeds
to fiduciary review follows from a rough analogy to duties for majority–
minority common shareholders. Although the preferred stock contract
might have specified a merger payout in advance (for example, liquidation
value or liquidation value plus arrearages), it does not. This omission leaves
the preferred in a vulnerable position—members of a board of directors who
owe their positions to the votes of common stockholders fix the value of its
participation. The common thus in some sense “control” the board. If the
board, instead of proceeding in an even-handed way, skews the allocation of
merger gain to the common, the situation arguably is one of a majoritydominated board using its control power to exclude the “minority” preferred to its detriment.63
The claim is stronger under Allocation 3, with its negative-sum wealth
transfer, than under Allocations 1 and 2. No action can be grounded on the
fact that an allocation falls short of the preferred’s $150 liquidation preference.
The Depression-era courts rejected such an absolute priority theory of
fairness64 and the Delaware courts have maintained that view in the cashout merger context.65 The law thus does not provide an objective calculus of
fair allocation. Indeed, contemporary courts avoid such pie-slicing inquiries
and instead review the boardroom process that resulted in the merger.
With process as the focus, courts must choose a standard of review. Corporate law offers a choice between the strict intrinsic fairness test and the
63 The classic Delaware case is Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720, 723 (Del. 1971),
in which the court found that slow liquidation through dividend payments did not constitute selfdealing, and thus was subject only to the more deferential business judgment standard.
64 See supra notes 36-37.
65 See Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 137 (Del. 1984) (“Moreover,
the measure of ‘fair value’ is not ‘liquidation value.’”).

1836

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1815

less strict good faith standard, with variations within the two categories.
Formulating and then sticking with a given standard will prove difficult
because the analogy to majority–minority fiduciary duties may be stronger
or weaker depending on the issuer’s shareholding configuration. Accordingly,
we analyze the standard of review question through two shareholding
lenses—first, from the perspective of a blockholder-dominated board, and
second, from the perspective of an independent-director board elected by
dispersed shareholders.
a. Blockholder Domination
We begin with a board dominated by a blockholder, in which the blockholder owns a majority of the common shares and its agents comprise a
majority of the company’s board of directors. The merger allocation thus
deeply implicates the blockholder’s financial interests. Indeed, the situation
strongly resembles the well-worn fact pattern of a parent–subsidiary merger
where the parent company merges the subsidiary into itself using its control
power to effect a lowball payment to the subsidiary’s minority shareholders.66
The best the preferred can expect is Allocation 2, yet they should be
prepared for Allocation 3.
Analogizing this blockholder-dominated board situation to parent–
subsidiary mergers should result in intrinsic fairness as the standard of
review, with the burden of proof on the controlled board.67 Under the
parent–subsidiary merger cases, the fairness burden of proof can be shifted
to the challenger if the subsidiary board appoints a special committee of
independent directors to negotiate the merger price on the minority
shareholders’ behalf and accords the committee veto power.68 It would seem
to follow that the preferred here should have a veto-wielding special
committee of disinterested directors appointed to negotiate its merger
allocation.
However, the analogy is imperfect. In the parent–subsidiary context, intrinsic fairness review and the resulting special committee force a negotiation
66 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Del. 1977) (finding that a merger
executed “solely to eliminate the minority” is a violation of the corporation’s fiduciary duty),
overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); see also Weinberger 457 A.2d at 715
(eliminating the extra protection provided shareholders by the business purpose requirement of
the Singer line of cases and its progeny, and instead noting that “the expanded appraisal remedy,”
coupled with the Chancellor’s broad discretion, is adequate protection for shareholders).
67 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) (explaining the
entire fairness standard and its burden of proof ).
68 See, e.g., id. at 1117 & 1121 n.10 (noting the burden shift but emphasizing that the standard
remains “entire fairness”).
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over a single point—the value of the subsidiary. Once the value is set, the
relative proportions of stock ownership determine its allocation. The
preferred’s place in a merger is more complicated. The issuer, its majority
stockholder, and its board negotiate the company’s value with a third-party
acquirer. A committee of independent directors may take the lead in that
process on the issuer’s behalf.69 A second special committee representing
the preferred would address an ancillary allocational matter—a matter
unlikely to admit of a clear answer. The appearance of such an additional
committee in the merger process would be cumbersome at a minimum. It
also could be disruptive where the primary negotiation with the third-party
acquirer (or group of potential acquirers) is ongoing. For instance, assume
that a tentative price is on the table, but that questions remain open about
the mode of payment (cash or stock) and acquirer financing (whether it will
borrow money or issue new preferred). A second negotiation between the
target issuer and its own preferred could raise valuation questions with
spillover effects on valuation at the primary negotiation.
If the company deemed salient the potential negative consequences associated with a second preferred committee, it would refuse to form the
committee, thereby remitting the preferred allocation to the special committee charged with approving the terms of the merger. The refusal would
be significant, for independent-director negotiation is sufficient to shift the
burden of proving unfairness, whether as to process or to price, to the
complaining preferred.70
b. Dispersed-Common Standard of Review
Contrast the above with a case where both the common and preferred
are widely held and a majority of the board is independent, and the independent directors own some common, either awarded as incentive compensation or purchased as a bonding exercise. Assume the merger leads to
69 The independent committee rule originated in the cashout merger context. See Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (suggesting an independent committee as a best practice and noting that
“fairness . . . can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent board of directors”).
Today, companies most often form special committees when the interests of the sell-side
corporation’s managers are tainted by conflict. See, e.g., Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc.,
993 A.2d 497, 504 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting creation of a special committee of “non-management
directors” where “the cross-holdings” and shared interests of some members of the board of the
two firms may have presented conflicts of interest). Though common, such special committees are
not ubiquitous. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237-39 (Del. 2009) (detailing
acquisition negotiations between two CEOs).
70 See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (“[A]n approval of the transaction by an independent committee
of directors . . . shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or
dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.”).
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Allocation 2. One can still draw an inference of self-interest—the preferred
get no share of the merger gain—but one also can give the independent
board members the benefit of the doubt. Dispersion of the set of voting
principals arguably relieves the board of pressure to skew the distribution in
the common’s favor. If the directors’ holdings of common do not comprise
significant portions of their personal wealth, we can imagine them as
credible independent decisionmakers constrained by reputational interests.
From this perspective, these directors are no less able to dispose of their
financial conflict than to handle a conflict posed by a self-dealing transaction
between a top manager and the company, a job they are routinely called on
to perform. Leaving the decision to the business judgment of independent
directors therefore seems more reasonable than in the blockholder case,
discussed above in subsection II.A.1.a.
Thus, for the standard of review in this situation, we abandon the analogy
to parent–subsidiary mergers that applied in the blockholder context and
instead adopt an analogy to independent-director review of a management
self-dealing transaction. In recent years the courts have relaxed the standard
of review for these determinations. Under the former standard, the test was
intrinsic fairness with the burden of proof on the plaintiff as long as disinterested directors had approved of the transaction.71 More particularly, a
board defending its approval of a self-dealing transaction would have the
burden of proving its own disinterestedness and inquiry into the terms of
the transaction.72 If the board satisfied this burden, the plaintiff still would
have a chance to prove that the value allocation was substantively unfair.73
Such a showing would seem easy to make under Allocation 3, arguable
under Allocation 2, and quite difficult under Allocation 1. Under the
current, relaxed standard, however, the business judgment standard of
review applies once a majority of the board’s informed, disinterested
directors approve the transaction.74 At this point the plaintiff loses his direct
71 See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, Civ.A. No. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997)
(“It is now clear that even if a board’s action falls within the safe harbor of section 144, the board is
not entitled to receive the protection of the business judgment rule. Compliance with section 144
merely shifts the burden to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the transaction was unfair.”).
72 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2011) (eliminating a presumption of invalidity
for interested transactions provided that the director’s or officer’s interests are disclosed to the
board and it “in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a
majority of the disinterested directors”).
73 Id. § 144(a)(3); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 757 (Del. Ch.
2005) (“If plaintiffs succeed in rebutting the presumption of the business judgment rule, the
burden then shifts to the defendants to prove . . . that the challenged transactions were entirely
fair to the corporation.”); supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74 Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006).
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shot at showing substantive unfairness and instead must show that the board
acted in bad faith.75
2. Contract Treatment
This subsection examines the possibility of full-dress contract treatment. Under this approach, courts will refuse entirely to conduct fiduciary
review, leaving complaining preferred holders with only the statutory
appraisal remedy.
a. The Preferred Contract as Complete
A contractarian could defend corporate fiduciary law on the ground that
common stockholders invest pursuant to an incomplete contract.76 The
common takes the residual interest along with the right to elect the board,
but beyond that relies on the board’s capabilities and fidelity along with the
backstop terms of corporate law. Protecting that reliance with fiduciary
principles is thought to be more efficient than forcing common stock investors to specify their rights ex ante.77 Indeed, the set of possible contingencies
for the common is so large as to make ex ante contractual specification
unfeasible.78 Since stockholder interests are so broad as to be noncontractible, incomplete transactions are inevitable, and therefore make
fiduciary protection necessary.
Preferred stock arguably differs because its preferences are contracted
for and presumably can be protected with explicit provisions. Indeed, there
are well-known means of dealing with skewed merger allocations. The
75 See id. (“[T]he business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision,
the directors of a corporation acted . . . in good faith.” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984))).
76 Marco Becht et al., Corporate Governance and Control 9-10 (European Corporate Governance
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, 2005); cf. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93
YALE L.J. 1197, 1205-06, 1210-11 (1984), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=343461 (describing
shareholders as those who own “numerous and ill-defined [assets, which] cannot be protected in a
well-focused, transaction-specific way”).
77 For an example of the contemporary view of fiduciary duty as a default “gap-filler,” see
Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 503-04 (2012). This basic
proposition notably appeared in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1432-34 (1989). Recent experience with other forms of
business organization provides a basis for questioning this assumption. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele,
Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 233-36 (2009) (discussing Delaware’s contractual
treatment of LLCs and LPs and contending that the default standard of conduct should be
contract good faith rather than fiduciary duty).
78 See Williamson, supra note 76, at 1210-11 (discussing various protections necessary to safeguard the rights and interests of shareholders).
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charter can dictate a merger price or otherwise provide that a merger
constitutes a liquidation event and condition the transaction’s effectiveness
on payment of the liquidation preference.79 Alternatively, the charter can
require a class vote of the preferred to approve any merger, according the
preferred a veto-group veto.80 As a further alternative, the charter can
require that the preferred be left unimpaired in the issuer or merger
survivor’s capital structure.81
Given the availability of contractual protection, fiduciary review can be
withheld on a penalty default theory.82 Under this theory, a skewed outcome
in individual cases is acceptable on the assumption that withholding scrutiny
in the long run causes the preferred to insist that merger contingencies be
dealt with in the charter. Incorporating a penalty default here thus leads
contractibility to trump fiduciary treatment.
This approach arguably fits in well with the corporate law paradigm that
dominates our “shareholder value” era. As between the preferred and the
common, today’s regime of value enhancement signals the common as the
appropriate fiduciary beneficiary because it holds the residual interest.
Managing to the common is thought to encourage risk-taking, thereby
creating value. The preferred, with its fixed income features, is a more
financially conservative interest; therefore, it is best to keep preferred
79 See Matthews v. Groove Networks, Inc., Civ.A. No. 1213-N, 2005 WL 3498423, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 8, 2005) (“Article IV [of the charter] clearly expresses that the Liquidation Preference
will apply in the event of a merger.”); In re Appraisal of Ford Holdings, Inc. Preferred Stock, 698
A.2d 973, 974 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“[P]roperly expressed terms . . . may establish the consideration to
which holders of the [preferred] stock will be entitled in the event of a merger . . . .”).
80 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2011) (“Every corporation may issue 1 or more classes of
stock[,] . . . which classes or series may have such voting powers . . . as shall be stated or expressed
in the certificate of incorporation . . . .”).
81 Such a provision might allow a survivor other than the original issuer to issue a substantively equivalent class of stock. In the preferred stock contracts collected and reviewed for this
Article, the alternative of leaving the preferred in the issuer capital structure showed up as a
condition excusing application of a class vote provision; that is, if the preferred is left untouched,
the preferred holders get no class vote. For information on the contracts we examined, see infra
notes 85-87.
82 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-99 (1989) (“Penalty defaults, by definition, give at least one
party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default.”). Cases applying business
judgment review to board allocations between holders of common and tracking stock (the returns
of which are tied to the performance of a subdivision of a larger corporate group) provide support
for a penalty default approach. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Class H S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611,
619 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“This case is thus substantively indistinguishable from those in which . . . a
board’s alleged evasion or breach of a charter provision for the benefit of a particular class of
stockholders could be asserted only as a contract claim, not as a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty.”); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1118 (Del. Ch. 1999) (denying plaintiffs’ claims that
the board violated its duty of loyalty by “load[ing] the process against the Class E shareholders”).
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holders’ interests out of the boardroom and instead force them to make
their rights explicit on paper. In short, if the legal regime should stress
maximizing value for the common, then any judicial intervention against a
merger allocation that favors the common traverses a grundnorm, and is, by
definition, inefficient.
A penalty default thus makes theoretical sense. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that it makes cost sense in the real world, even to a common
stockholder. Penalty defaults, as mooted in law and economics, do not force
contracting for its own sake. Rather, by fixing the default at a result neither
party is likely to want,83 the rule compels parties to adjust by negotiation,
thereby causing them to achieve an efficiency goal, such as the disclosure of
more information or the invention of superior contract terms.84 The
additional information and new terms facilitate a more efficient allocation of
risk in the contract. However, in the merger context, it is not clear that any
efficiencies could be gained through the use of a penalty default. Nor is it
clear that judicial intervention respecting merger allocations somehow
constrains boardroom discretion to take risks. The intervention questions
only an end-period decision, and does not envision preferred stock–value
maximization as a going-concern fiduciary proposition.
More importantly, penalty default treatment of the preferred could disserve the common stock interest. For an illustration of this disservice,
consider the following question: Why do preferred stock charter provisions
often fail to provide for a merger class vote? We located new issues of
preferred registered for public offering since 2009 on the SEC’s EDGAR
database and surveyed their certificates of designation.85 Fifty percent of the
certificates provided for merger class votes (or otherwise included effective
protection in the event of a merger), while the other 50% left the preferred
unprotected.86 We also examined the certificates of preferred stock privately
placed during the second quarter of 2011 and filed in EDGAR as disclosure
exhibits. Only 29% of these certificates provided for merger class votes (or

83 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 82, at 97 (“The U.C.C.’s zero-quantity default is . . . a
‘penalty default’ . . . that neither party would want . . . .”).
84 Id. at 97-99.
85 Historical SEC EDGAR Archives: Company Search, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srchedgar (last visited May 6, 2013). Using EDGAR’s advanced search function, we queried “certificate
of designation,” sorted results to isolate reports of newly filed preferred stock financings, and
omitted filings of poison pill preferred certificates of designation.
86 The dataset contains twenty-two certificates of designation. But cf. Jeffrey S. Stamler,
Note, Arrearage Elimination and the Preferred Stock Contract: A Survey and a Proposal for Reform, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 1335, 1352 (1988) (observing in a survey of New York Stock Exchange–listed
preferred that only 14% of the issues had the benefit of a class vote in a merger).
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otherwise included effective protection in the event of a merger).87 Issuers
have a legitimate reason to resist the inclusion of merger class vote provisions in their charters. Class votes give preferred the ability to hold up a
merger in moderate distress situations. Return to our ABC Corporation
hypothetical, where a class vote would hand the preferred a bargaining chip
for a premium price above $80. The preferred would only vote in favor of
the merger when the allocation so favored the preferred as to cause the
merger to lose the common’s voting support. If the preferred stock lies in
institutional hands, an aggressive negotiation is likely. Omitting the class
vote makes it easier to sell the company and avoids a possible allocational
skew that favors the preferred.
The same analysis applies to clauses that treat mergers as liquidations.
The issuer has every reason to resist this concession. For example, with
ABC Corporation, the preferred’s liquidation preference soaks up the entire
merger proceeds.88 Under that scenario, ABC would have to negotiate with
the preferred to get them to agree to the company paying less, using its
privilege to walk away from the deal as a lever. Liquidation preference
payment provisions thus make merger negotiations much more timeconsuming and potentially less remunerative. From the issuer’s point of
view, then, a legal regime that pushes investors toward insisting on liquidation
treatment makes little sense.
Alternatively, the preferred could contract for the right to remain in the
capital structure of the entity surviving the merger, but such an approach also
ties the issuer’s hands. A potential acquirer of ABC Corporation is unlikely to
favor retention of a preferred class with $50 in arrears. If it acquires ABC
anyway, the price it pays to the common will have to be adjusted downward
due to the cost of the preferred’s accumulated contractual baggage.89
The contractual back-and-forth bolsters the case for fiduciary review.
The best explanation for a preferred stock contract that omits to specify a
merger price or provide for a class vote is the issuer’s interest in avoiding a
commitment to pay the preferred a premium over premerger value on a

87
88
89

The dataset contains sixty-eight certificates of designation.
See supra Section II.A for an overview of the potential merger terms for ABC Corporation.
We also note that the preferred could contract for across-the-board appraisal rights. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(c) (2011) (“Any corporation may provide in its certificate of
incorporation that appraisal rights under this section shall be available for the shares of any class
or series of its stock as a result of an amendment to its certificate of incorporation, any merger or
consolidation in which the corporation is a constituent corporation or the sale of all or substantially
all of the assets of the corporation.”). Such a move would blunt, but not reverse, the negative
effects on preferred investors of a penalty default regime. Still, if fiduciary scrutiny is to be
withheld, across-the-board appraisal rights would be better effected as a legislative adjustment.
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moderate distress fact pattern. The omission expands the issuer’s zone of
freedom of action and so facilitates enterprise value enhancement. While
the omission is thus clearly rational for the issuer, it is only rational for the
preferred if fiduciary duties cover merger allocations made by the issuer
board of directors.
b. Appraisal Rights
The availability of statutory appraisal strengthens the case for contract
treatment.90 Under this remedy, dissatisfied shareholders can dissent from
unfavorable mergers and demand a judicial appraisal of the value of their
shares.91 Let us imagine that the ABC Corporation merger payout goes to
appraisal. The inquiry concerns the “fair value of the shares exclusive of
any . . . value arising from . . . the merger”92 and so is not about reaping a
share of merger gain. Assuming that the $80 premerger market price
reflected the value of the preferred, appraisal looks attractive only given
Allocation 3. If, under Allocation 2, the preferred holders see the $80 market
price as inaccurately low, they must marshal experts who can plausibly
project increasing future ABC cash flows to show that the preferred is
cumulatively worth more than $80 million. A successful challenge to Allocation 1 is highly unlikely, for the preferred’s $150 million liquidation preference
is relevant only to the extent it contributed to its premerger fair value.
Appraisal as the exclusive recourse available to holders of preferred presents several problems. First, virtually no recent case law exists on judicial
valuation of preferred,93 so the substantive parameters of such proceedings

90 In a parent–subsidiary merger case, the plaintiff secures fiduciary review only on a showing
of process unfairness. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (“The appraisal
remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, particularly [those of] fraud, misrepresentation, [or] self-dealing . . . .”). If the complaint goes only to price, it generally must be made in an
appraisal. See id. at 714-15.
91 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (appraisal rights).
92 Id. § 262(h).
93 But, for a recent appraisal proceeding of preferred, see generally In re Appraisal of
Metromedia Int’l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893 (Del. Ch.), aff ’d, 985 A.2d 389 (Del. 2009). That case,
however, was not relevant to our question since the court decided it by reference to conversion
value, rather than to the expert reports. See id. at 901-02. See also Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., C.A.
No. 5233-VCP, 2012 WL 1569818, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (holding that the preferred stock
should be treated as converted in appraisal for a venture capital investee pursuant to a charter
provision allowing the company to convert preferred shares to common if a merger occurs).
Historically, however, valuation of preferred was litigated under PUHCA. See, e.g., E. Gas & Fuel
Assocs., PUHCA of 1935 Release No. 9633, 30 SEC Docket 834, 850 (Feb. 3, 1950) (analyzing “the
rights attaching to the securities with respect to earnings, dividends, and assets” in determining if
allocations are fair); Note, A Standard of Fairness for Compensating Preferred Shareholders in Corporate
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are a matter of speculation. Preferred holds out daunting problems for
appraisers. Not only must they project a company’s future cash flows under
uncertainty, but the appraisers also must assess the probability that the
issuer board will exercise its discretion to direct the projected flows to a
future preferred dividend or redemption payment. Second, the process
context in appraisal is not plaintiff-friendly. Appraisals may not be framed
as class actions.94 Appraisal plaintiffs accordingly must be large stockholders
acting for their own accounts. This problem is less important today than it
was formerly, due to the proliferation of hedge funds as strategic investors
in publicly traded equity95 and preferred’s position as the vehicle of choice
in venture capital finance.96 Preferred stockholders thus increasingly tend to
be large institutions with the wherewithal to undertake expensive appraisal
litigation.97 Third, the Delaware statute makes appraisal available only for a
subset of mergers. Appraisal rights obtain if the preferred is privately held,
as is the case with venture capital financing or a rule 144A offering98 resulting
in fewer than 2000 holders of record.99 Appraisal also is available if the
preferred stock is publicly traded and the merger consideration is cash or
debt securities.100 But there are no appraisal rights if the preferred is
publicly traded and the merger consideration is publicly traded stock.101
To show how the three problems can combine to undermine the proposition
that appraisal is an “adequate remedy,” let us return to the dummy merger.
Recall that dummy mergers provide a means to cram down an equity

Recapitalizations, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 102-03 (1965) (discussing the valuation method used in
PUHCA cases).
94 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (requiring appraisal claimants to file individually).
The Delaware courts apply this individual filing requirement literally. See, e.g, Nelson v. Frank E.
Best Inc., 768 A.2d 473, 479 (Del. Ch. 2000) (observing “Delaware Supreme Court case law
requiring a strict construction of 8 Del. C. § 262”).
95 See Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, M&A DEAL COMMENTARY (Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 2007, at 1-2, available at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubcontent/_pdf/pub1883_1.pdf (suggesting that hedge fund plaintiffs could
make appraisal rights a more salient legal procedure for investors dissatisfied with merger proceeds).
96 See Bratton, supra note 2, at 914-16.
97 See, e.g., MARK J. ANSON ET AL., THE HANDBOOK OF TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT VEHICLES 328-29 (2010) (discussing hedge fund strategies involving preferred).
98 See generally BRATTON, supra note 23, at 297 (summarizing rule 144A offerings).
99 DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1).
100 See id. § 262(b)(1)–(2) (blocking appraisal rights where stock is publicly traded except in
cases where holders are required to accept “[s]hares of stock of the corporation surviving or
resulting from such merger or consolidation . . . [or s]hares of stock of any other corporation . . .
which . . . will be either listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than
2,000 holders”).
101 Id.
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recapitalization against preferred, and that the Delaware courts sanctioned
the technique in Havender.102
Let us turn back the clock at ABC Corporation to the time of the preferred’s original public issue for $100 per share, for a total consideration of
$100 million. Assume that times were good and that the 2 million shares of
common trade for $100 per share. Two months later, an investment banker
approaches ABC with a recapitalization plan under which the board engineers
a dummy merger on a one-for-two basis. This merger would divide ABC’s
market capitalization, allocating one-fifth to the preferred ($60 million) and
four-fifths to the common ($240 million). ABC submits the merger to its
stockholders, and the common uses its majority to cram down the deal.
ABC’s preferred will not have the right to seek appraisal—the premerger
preferred is publicly traded and the stockholders receive publicly traded stock
as consideration in the merger, so the appraisal statute’s exceptions apply.103
The ABC preferred’s goose is cooked unless it can persuade a court to
enjoin the transaction on fiduciary grounds. Although the hypothetical is
unrealistic, it makes an important structural point regarding the vulnerability
of the preferred: the level of exposure is more severe than often recognized,
potentially permitting even this quasi-conversion of newly raised capital.
Indeed, even if appraisal were available in this dummy merger, it would be
unreasonable to leave it as the exclusive remedy for the preferred. The
transaction is in manifest bad faith, and an ex ante injunction is the cleanest,
most appropriate mode of intervention. Interestingly, an old line of Delaware
cases waives appraisal exclusivity and permits injunctions against dummy
mergers following from “acts of bad faith, or a reckless indifference to the
rights of others interested, rather than from an honest error of judgment.”104
It bears noting that dummy mergers still occur,105 if not in the particularly

102
103
104

See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 150-51 (Del. Ch. 1943); see also Hottenstein v.
York Ice Mach. Corp., 45 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Del. 1942) (“In actions to enjoin the operation of a
plan of merger . . . the Court may afford relief only if it finds that the plan is so unfair as to shock
the conscience of the court and to amount to fraud.” (citation omitted)); Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit
Ass’n, 156 A. 183, 187 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“Furthermore, if consent to the merger be induced by fraud
practiced upon a consenting company, a stockholder is under no duty to elect whether he will
abide by a merger so induced or take his money.”). For a seminal discussion of the exclusivity of
appraisal as the preferred shareholder’s remedy in a merger context, see James Vorenberg,
Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder’s Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1208-10 (1964).
105 See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 844 (Del. 1998) (describing a
wholly owned subsidiary into which the parent corporation announced its plan to merge one day
after creating it).
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crude mode hypothesized here. We can likely attribute corporate restraint
to the prospect of judicial scrutiny.
3. Summary
A plausible case can be made for both corporate and contract treatment
for preferred in the merger context. At the same time, each paradigm leads
to excess when applied full dress. Intrinsic fairness review under the
corporate paradigm could unravel negotiations and in any event would
occasionally hold up lawsuits by institutional preferred holders. Complete
contract treatment coupled with appraisal exclusivity is untenable in
extreme cases. A door needs to be left open for judicial scrutiny of the
motivation for and effect of mergers. This qualified conclusion confirms our
point about the intrinsic legal instability of preferred stock—because it
straddles the corporate–contract divide, every problem admits a range of
solutions. The next section turns to Delaware law and illustrates, through
analysis of decided cases, this conceptual instability in action.
We note a point of contrast between the equity recapitalizations discussed
in Part I and the mergers under discussion in this Part. Both involve
transactions that create gain and trigger the carving of corporate pies. In
both cases the pie can be sliced either (1) to split the gain between the
preferred and the common; (2) to leave the preferred at its pretransaction
value and allocate all the gain to the common; or (3) to transfer pretransaction value from the preferred to the common along with all of the gain.
Assuming corporate treatment and fiduciary scrutiny, two questions arise:
First, does the preferred have a right to gain-splitting in a recapitalization, a
merger, both, or neither? Second, does a transfer of pretransaction value
from the preferred to the common breach a right owed to the preferred in a
recapitalization, a merger, both, or neither? We think that with regard to the
gain-splitting question, the two transactional modes can be distinguished.
A recapitalization strips rights from the preferred to enhance enterprise
value. The transaction makes everybody better off only so long as the gain is
shared; a class vote imports a circumstantial guarantee that such sharing
occurs. Given no gain sharing and absent class consent, the preferred
surrenders rights without any return. Leaving the preferred holders stuck
with their shares’ pretransaction value differs from an affirmative transfer of
value from the preferred to the common only as a matter of degree—either
way, pure exploitation occurs.
Third-party mergers are different. The gain comes from an outside purchaser rather than from a sacrifice by the preferred. Moreover, there are fact
patterns on which it is quite clear that the preferred has no right to share
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the gain. In an upside scenario where the company has grown and the
preferred stock’s premerger value is higher than its face value (whether due
to an attractive dividend payout or a conversion privilege in the money), the
merger parties will likely exercise their option to take out the preferred at
its redemption price before any question about gain sharing arises. In other
words, the preferred are treated as senior claims with a capped upside. In
downside patterns, where the preferred’s market value is below its liquidation
value, the holders have a right to liquidation value in a merger only if the
charter explicitly so provides.106 A preferred stockholder’s right to share
merger gain in the downside fact pattern—an amount higher than the
stock’s premerger value but lower than its liquidation value—could be
implied by analogy to the rights of minority common stockholders. But it is
not at all clear that such an analogy should be drawn here. Nothing compels
it, and reference to the contract paradigm undercuts it: if the preferred
holders want a premium, all they have to do is negotiate a class vote.
B. Delaware Law
In this section, we put the hypothetical ABC Corporation preferred
through a modern cashout merger, applying Delaware cases decided prior to
the recent decision, LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James.107 Section II.C
reconsiders matters in light of James.
We will start the ABC Corporation cashout merger with one changed
fact from our previous discussion of the company—the preferred’s liquidation
price plus arrearages now adds up to only $110 per share. XYZ Corporation
proposes a $140 million cash merger to the ABC board, offering $110 per
share for the preferred and $15 per share for the common. As has happened
in litigated cases, XYZ makes its bid under the impression that the preferred
must be paid its liquidation preference in order to be cashed out in a
merger.108 ABC’s investment banker points out the error to XYZ at the same
time that ABC’s CEO suggests that the bid should allocate more to the
common. XYZ reformulates the bid accordingly. The new bid is for the
same total consideration, but now the offer is $80 per share for the preferred

106 See Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 137 (Del. 1984) (holding
that “the stockholder is entitled to be paid for . . . his proportionate interest in a going concern,”
not liquidation value (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950))).
107 990 A.2d 435 (Del. Ch. 2010).
108 See, e.g., id. at 441 (noting the preferred’s “mistaken view that they had a right to their
liquidation preference” and the bidders’ initial offers in light of that view); Dalton v. Am. Inv. Co.,
490 A.2d 574, 576 (Del. Ch. 1985) (observing that the bidder offered a “$25 redemption and
liquidation value . . . [for preferred shares] trading for about $9”).
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and $30 per share for the common. ABC’s top executives collectively hold
15% of the common and no preferred. A majority of ABC’s directors are
independent, and all of these directors hold trivial amounts of the common
and no preferred. After the reformulation of the bid, ABC organizes a
committee of independent directors. The committee negotiates the merger
and secures $10 million additional consideration. The added consideration is
distributed between the common and the preferred in proportion with the
existing allocation, making the final price $85.70 per share for the preferred
and $32.15 per share for the common. The special committee determines the
preferred–common allocation to be fair—a conclusion in line with that of its
investment banker. At no point, however, does the committee consider the
origins of the allocation or inquire further into the value of the preferred’s
claim. Nor does the committee request a valuation report addressing the
allocational question from the investment banker. The preferred will not
have a class vote because the charter does not provide for one, but in this
case it will have appraisal rights.109
Claiming a breach of fiduciary duty by the ABC board, the preferred bring
an action in the Delaware Chancery Court to enjoin the merger. The Delaware
cases do not entirely reject this line of argument, but it is unlikely to succeed.
We already have seen that old dummy merger cases express a preference
for the appraisal remedy but hold out the possibility of an injunction against
a bad faith cramdown.110 The modern precedent begins with the standard
Chancellor Allen announced in 1986 in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.:
[W]ith respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its
directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is appropriately
defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that contract; where
however the right asserted is not to a preference as against the common
stock but rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of
such right and the scope of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable
as well as legal standards.111

At a minimum, this standard means that the preferred will not be able to
base a fiduciary claim on the merger’s failure to yield its $110 liquidation

109 See DEL. CODE A NN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2011) (granting appraisal rights where the
shareholders are cashed out).
110 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
111 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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preference plus arrears.112 But it also stands for the proposition that a merger
allocation between preferred and common is subject to fiduciary scrutiny.
A question nonetheless arises regarding the standard’s division of the field
into a contractual zone and a fiduciary zone. This approach could operate as a
filter, dividing merger fact patterns into two groups, one subject to judicial
scrutiny and the other immune from it. A specific question would be, if the
preferred receive at least what the common receive, have they been treated
equally under Jedwab? In ABC’s case, such a scenario would mean taking the
$150 million consideration and distributing it pro rata to the common and
preferred at $50 per share. If such a division is “equal,” the reason is that any
consideration paid to the preferred beyond $50 by definition compensates it
for its “contractual” rights and thus lies outside of fiduciary territory. If
dissatisfied, the preferred can seek appraisal.
The Jedwab court did not directly address the above question,113 but
Chancellor Allen himself impliedly rejected the above narrow reading in a
later opinion, In re FLS Holdings Shareholders Litigation.114 In that case, the
preferred received slightly more than the common.115 The board of directors,
dominated by representatives of the common, had steadily carved out a
larger share for the common in the course of an extended negotiation.116
Chancellor Allen asserted that the directors still had a duty to both classes
and were “obligated to treat the preferred fairly,” even though the standard
of review was “somewhat opaque.”117
Both the Jedwab and FLS Holdings courts discuss boardroom process.
Jedwab suggests that a special negotiating committee for the preferred,
composed of independent directors, is an important factor in a fairness
determination,118 while FLS Holdings implies that the presence of “a truly
independent agency on the behalf of the preferred” plays an important role
in figuring out if a transaction was fair.119 In FLS Holdings, Chancellor Allen
added that a valuation study prepared ex post by the board’s investment
112 See Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 137 (Del. 1984) (rejecting a
fairness claim based on the preferred’s expectation that they would receive their liquidation
preference in a cashout merger).
113 In Jedwab, the preferred received less than the common, because the preferred’s preferences limited its upside potential. 509 A.2d at 597-98.
114 Civ. A. No. 12623, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *13-15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1993).
115 See id. at *10 (noting that the preferred received $18.124 per share and that the common
received $17.998 per share).
116 Id. at *2-3.
117 Id. at *14.
118 509 A.2d at 599. The opinion also suggests that the existence of a class vote for the transaction is a factor in the fairness analysis. Id.
119 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *14.
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banker amounted to a “relatively weak” protection.120 Yet, ultimately the
cases rejected a rule-based approach to process protections, concluding that
while “such factors typically constitute indicia of fairness; their absence . . .
does not itself establish any breach of duty.”121
Jedwab and FLS Holdings therefore stand for the proposition that the
preferred can get more per share than the common and still get a hearing, but
the cases do little else to add details to our understanding of preferred rights.
Chancellor Allen later characterized the cases as providing a sort of backstop
protection for preferred—they get the hearing when in an “exposed and
vulnerable position vis-a-vis the board of directors.”122 Just what makes for
exposure and vulnerability is unclear, although it bears noting that Jedwab
and FLS Holdings involved issuers and boards under the immediate control
of majority blockholders.123 ABC Corporation, by contrast, has dispersed
shareholders and a majority independent board.
Jedwab and FLS Holdings are not the only modern cases about the scope
of fiduciary duties for preferred stock in the Delaware canon. In HB
Korenvaes, Chancellor Allen later voiced a contractual view of preferred:
[T]o a very large extent, to ask what are the rights of the preferred stock is
to ask what are the rights and obligations created contractually by the certificate of designation. . . . In most instances, given the nature of the acts
alleged and the terms of the certificate, this contractual level of analysis will

120
121
122

Id.
Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 599-600.
HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040, at *745
(Del. Ch. June 9, 1993).
123 Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 587; FLS Holdings, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *5 (noting that senior
management of the company owned 33.78% of the voting stock and Goldman Sachs held 45.56%).
A case closer on the facts to ABC’s situation is Dalton v. American Investment Co., 490 A.2d 574
(Del. Ch. 1985). In Dalton, an initial offeror proposed an eventually aborted merger that would
have paid a class of perpetual preferred its liquidation value of $25 and $12 for the common. Id. at
576. The issuer’s CEO then shopped the company and hinted that $13.50 would be an appropriate
price for the common. Id. at 577. The eventual acquirer paid $13 for the common and suggested the
preferred, which had a low dividend payout rate, be left untouched in the issuer’s capital structure
as “cheap debt.” Id. at 577, 581. The court found that the acquirer’s interests were the determining
factor in the fiduciary analysis. Id. at 582-83. Since the acquirer had “its own [legitimate] economic
justification” for the way it structured the merger, it followed that there was no breach of duty. Id.
at 585. The court’s emphasis on causation and culpability implies that it was not using the intrinsic
fairness standard but rather a standard of review closer to the good faith standard invoked in
dummy merger cases and applied by the court in Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 150-51
(Del. Ch. 1943), with its emphasis on “bad faith” and “reckless indifference to the rights of others.”
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exhaust the judicial review of corporate action challenged as a wrong to
preferred stock.124

Finally, in the last case in the series, Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams,
Chancellor Allen gestured to common stock–value maximization:
[G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is
to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock—as the good faith
judgment of the board sees them to be—to the interests created by the special
rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock, where there is a conflict.125

The applicable Delaware law appears to include the following five principles: (1) fiduciary intervention is possible where the preferred are in an
“exposed and vulnerable position;”126 (2) fiduciary duties are owed regarding
rights shared equally with the common but not regarding preferences; (3)
boards should prefer the common when exercising discretion; (4) the
preferred should generally look to appraisal for a remedy; and (5) the
preferred should protect themselves contractually.
This summary reveals that the relevant Delaware law is more than openended. It incorporates elements of both of the hard-edged alternatives laid
out in Section II.A—fiduciary scrutiny and the view of preferred as a
complete contract with appraisal as its exclusive remedy. The various
components of the doctrine seem to stand in mutual tension; they do not
“synthesize.” If the board’s duty is to favor the common when making
discretionary decisions, it is hard to see how a boardroom process could
breach a duty to the preferred, even on Allocation 3. Yet, if the default rule
is explicit contractual protection with appraisal as the exclusive remedy for
preferred, it is hard to see how vulnerability of the preferred and exploitation
of its rights can ever be actionable. The tension follows from preferred’s
dual corporate and contractual character. Given the long list of choices, the
judge in effect must make a menu choice, deciding which paradigm to stress
given the facts of the case.
Let us now state a case for why the ABC preferred should receive fiduciary
protection. This argument builds on four points about the process surrounding the merger. First, the allocational shift from the preferred to the
common came at the insistence of ABC’s CEO, who owned a significant
chunk of common. Second, the subsequent deal management by ABC’s
124 1993 WL 205040, at *745 (citations omitted); see also In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int’l
Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899-900 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“A preferred shareholder’s rights are defined in
either the corporation’s certificate of incorporation or in the certificate of designation . . . .”).
125 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997) (citation omitted).
126 HB Korenvaes, 1993 WL 205040, at *745.
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independent directors failed to correct the allocational mishap because they
did not inquire into the causal chain, the acquirer’s business interests, or the
relative values at stake. Third, all of the independent directors owned
common, thus raising a question regarding their actual independence.
Finally, the process did not include an independent agent to negotiate for
the preferred. The question is whether the four points, taken together, show
that the preferred’s position was “exposed and vulnerable.”
ABC will argue in response that Jedwab and FLS Holdings do not mandate
a special committee127 and that the availability of appraisal weighs against a
request that a merger be enjoined.128 To the extent the preferred seeks to
show that its share of the merger price falls below the stock’s intrinsic value,
it should seek an appraisal. More importantly, a class of preferred walking
away with a premium over market price has no cause to complain; if anyone
has a complaint, it is the common whose merger gain has been diverted.
C. James Analysis
In LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, then–Vice Chancellor Strine
tilted emphatically toward the contract paradigm. The preferred in question
had been issued in a rule 144A offering for $25 per share, an amount equal to
its liquidation preference.129 The charter provided for a $1.375 discretionary
but cumulative dividend.130 The stock was convertible into common at a
conversion price of $15.50.131 The initial $3.10 conversion price was set at the
high end of the trading range of the issuer’s common stock for the second
quarter of 2004.132 The common’s price promptly declined; during the life of
the preferred issue, there were only two quarters in which the stock price
briefly, and slightly, exceeded the conversion price.133 In the merger, the

127
128

See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
See LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 454 (Del. Ch. 2010) (denying
an injunction and citing appraisal rights as an “important factor” in making that decision).
129 Id. at 440; QuadraMed Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 & exhibit 99.1 (June 17, 2004).
130 James, 990 A.2d at 440.
131 QuadraMed Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 4 (June 5, 2008). The price was revised
pursuant to the charter in the wake of a reverse stock split by the issuer. The original conversion
price was $3.10. Id.
132 See QuadraMed Corp., Pre-Effective Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement, at 18 (June 14, 2004) (noting that the stock price ranged from $2.70 to $3.55 during the
second quarter of the year through the date of the report).
133 This conclusion follows from an inspection of the quarterly stock price charts in the issuer’s
10-K reports filed in 2006 and 2009. The two quarters discussed above are the second quarter of
2004, when the price peaked at $3.55, and the first quarter of 2007, when the price peaked at the
equivalent of $3.29, taking into account the one-to-five conversion. QuadraMed Corp., Annual
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common were cashed out at $8.50 and the preferred at $13.71.134 The $13.71
was derived by applying the conversion ratio (1.6129) to the common’s
merger consideration135—as if the charter provided (though it did not) that
a merger triggered a mandatory conversion.136
The deal process had been tense. There were discussions with several
suitors; one negotiation started out at a $25 per share figure for the preferred.137 A committee of independent directors then took charge.138 All
members of the committee owned common, four out of five in trivial
amounts, but with one holding an 8% block worth over $5.6 million.139 The
committee found itself between a rock and a hard place. The preferred
would likely sue if its price was not raised above $13.71. But if the committee
was to raise the preferred payout, it would run the risk that the deal would
lose the voting support of the common,140 83.4% of which was owned by five
hedge funds.141 The committee also may have been wary of an additional
potential lawsuit: counsel advised the committee that it needed to be
“careful” about allocating more to the preferred, absent “special reasons,”
due to fears of a suit by common holders.142 As it navigated these shoals, the
committee dragged anchor on cashing out the preferred and tried to cut a
deal with a second merger partner that would leave the preferred in the
issuer’s capital structure untouched, a result that apparently would have
satisfied both the common and the preferred. Unfortunately, the second
potential merger partner wanted to replace the preferred with debt that
torpedoed the deal.143 In the end, the committee approved the original
merger, which cashed out the preferred at $13.71, without the support of a
fairness opinion from its investment banker.144
The preferred, whose discretionary dividends appear to have been paid
up to date,145 took the position that its financial rights entitled it to a good
Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Mar. 10, 2009); QuadraMed Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29
(Mar. 16, 2006).
134 James, 990 A.2d at 439.
135 See id. at 439, 444 & n.36 (explaining the committee’s reasoning in approving price terms).
136 Id. at 440.
137 Id. at 441.
138 Id. at 442.
139 Id. at 442 & n.26.
140 Id. at 444.
141 See QuadraMed Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 85 (Feb. 8, 2010)
(listing major beneficial owners of common stock).
142 James, 990 A.2d at 443.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 443-44.
145 The corporation made open market common stock repurchases, which would have been
forbidden by the charter provisions protecting the preferred. See QuadraMed Corp., Annual
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bit more than $13.71. It saw $13.71 as the functional equivalent of Allocation
3. Then–Vice Chancellor Strine, however, refused to enjoin the merger and
remitted the preferred to appraisal.146
The Strine opinion stoutly resisted invoking Jedwab and FLS Holdings.147
The court in James could have rejected the preferred’s claim to a second
special committee on the facts of the case—the deal was fragile and a second
special committee might have disrupted the negotiations148—but it went
further by invoking both the complete contract and the common stock–
value norm. The court asserted that the preferred, having passed up the
opportunity to address merger pricing contingencies in the charter and
negotiate a class vote or liquidation treatment, could not later call on the
Chancery Court’s solicitude.149 Summarizing his attitude towards fiduciary
protection of preferred holders, Chancellor Strine stated, “Our law has not,
to date, embraced the notion that Chancery should create economic value
for preferred stockholders that they failed to secure at the negotiating
table.”150 Indeed, fiduciary law, far from requiring the board to make a fair
allocation, prevents the board from doing so: the duty to favor the common
could lead to liability for a director who intervenes to protect the preferred.151
Thus, the James court undertook to abrogate Jebwab and FLS Holdings. But
it did so in dicta, and therefore should be read more narrowly. Taking a cue
from the board committee, the court deemed the conversion price to be a
contractually designated merger payout.152 Where the charter fixes a merger
payout, there is no basis for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, since the
board has no allocational decision to make. Indeed, given a fixed merger
payout, any board that had allocated more than the fixed payout for the
preferred would indeed be left open to a lawsuit by the common.
Report (Form 10-K), at 23 (Mar. 10, 2009) (describing these stock repurchases in 2008); QuadraMed Corp., Certificate of the Designation, Powers, Preferences and Rights of the Series
Cumulative Mandatory Convertible Preferred Shares (Form 8-K), exhibit 3.1, § 3(d) (June 17,
2004) [hereinafter QuadraMed Certificate] (preventing repurchase of certain types of shares).
146 James, 990 A.2d at 454.
147 See id. at 447 (“The broad language in FLS Holdings and Jedwab must, I think, be read
against [their] factual backdrop. . . . Without this factual context, those opinions are otherwise in
sharp tension with the great weight of our law’s precedent in this area.”)
148 See id. at 444 (describing how the committee unanimously approved the merger in part
due to fears about how altering the deal would upset holders of common).
149 See id. at 449. The court even questioned the discretionary dividend preference. Despite
the facts that the dividend was cumulative and in fact was paid, and that the issue was deemed
financially burdensome by potential acquirers, the court suggested that given only a discretionary
dividend there was no value to allocate. Id. at 450 n.56.
150 Id. at 451 n.56.
151 See id. at 447.
152 Id. at 451.
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The court, however, did not indicate where and how the charter effects
this result. Our review of the charter finds no express merger price designation. The charter’s conversion provisions mention mergers, but only to set
conversion rights going forward in a case where the preferred remains in the
capital structure of the corporation surviving the merger.153
Since the charter does not expressly designate a merger price for preferred, the contractual allocation on which the court relies must be implied.
It is hard to fathom an economic basis for such an implication. A conversion
privilege is an option that gives a fixed interest holder an opportunity for
upside gain. It does not have the converse effect of dragging the fixed
interest holder down with the issuer—on the downside, the convertible
holder relies on its fixed payment stream to preserve the value of its
interest.154 This heads-I-win-tails-you-lose result is not a free lunch; the
conversion privilege’s value is incorporated in the interest rate on the
security.155 Given this tradeoff, it makes no sense to have the convertible’s
value in a merger decline in lockstep with the issuer’s common stock.156
Indeed, it undercuts the deal. Nothing in the charter in James signals
anything other than such a conventional arrangement. Any implications in
the charter go in the opposite direction: it did provide for mandatory
conversion, but only in the event the common stock sustained a price of
$25.50,157 an event that had never occurred. Otherwise, this conversion

153
154

QuadraMed Certificate, supra note 145, at exhibit 3.1, § 7(f ).
See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 684-87 (describing the upside and downside market
behavior of convertible bonds).
155 Id. at 684.
156 Since we read the James conversion privilege in this conventional way, we are unpersuaded
by Chancellor Strine’s argument that James is consistent with Jedwab and FLS Holdings. See James,
A.2d at 447-49 (“When, by contract, the rights of the preferred in a particular transactional
context are articulated, it is those rights that the board must honor . . . . When, however, . . . there
is no objective contractual basis for treatment of the preferred, then the board must act as a gapfilling agency and do its best to fairly reconcile the competing interests of the common and
preferred.”). In reconciling James with the earlier cases, the Chancellor relied on HB Korenvaes
Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., Civ. A. No. 12922, 1993 WL 205040 (Del. Ch. June 9, 1993). HB
Korenvaes points out that the existence of a fiduciary duty to preferred is situational and finds, on
the facts, that the charter had allocated the risk in question. Id. at *745-46. We find the contract in
James every bit as incomplete as those in Jedwab and FLS Holdings. Moreover, HB Korenvaes is
distinguishable from James since it did not involve a merger. It was a straightforward application of
an anti-dilution clause. See id. at *741-42 (“Thus, among other things, plaintiffs complain that the
planned transaction constitutes a breach of the terms of the certificate of designation that defines
the relative rights of the Series A Preferred Stock.”).
157 QuadraMed Corp. Certificate, supra note 145, at exhibit 3.1 § 8(a). The $5.10 figure therein
provided has been adjusted in the text for the company’s later one-to-five reverse stock split. See
supra note 131.
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privilege was drafted as an option paid for by the holder to be held in
reserve for the holder’s benefit.
We do not read James to require this subversive reading of standard conversion provisions. The court would have had no reason to mention the
appraisal option if the charter had in fact specified a merger payout, for such
an appraisal would have yielded $13.71 and not a penny more.158 We read the
court’s insistence on an ex ante contractual settlement the same way we read
its rejection of Jedwab and FLS Holdings. In our opinion, the court, having
determined on the facts to go the contractual route, emphasized contractual
items in the doctrinal toolbox at the expense of fiduciary ones. Jedwab and
FLS Holdings are still in the toolbox, even as the court’s refusal to bring
them to bear in James makes their future use less likely.
We have no quarrel with the result in the case, if only due to several specific facts in it. First, there was a large risk that an injunction might have
caused the acquirer to walk away from the deal. Second, appraisal was
available.159 Additionally, as we read the facts, the preferred was not necessarily claiming a share of merger gain, but only the economic value of its
participation. Roughly speaking, the preferred in James allege that they were
forced into the most unfavorable division of value, Allocation 3. In this
posture, given the risk of deal disruption, appraisal sufficiently vindicates the
claim. Finally, as the court notes, the struggling board acted in good faith.160
D. Summary
The overlapping contract and corporate paradigms come to bear on
James with more than their usual dysfunction. This is because the law, in its
present posture, poses a stark dichotomy, asking the court whether the
preferred’s vulnerability and the board’s exploitation of that situation combine
to trigger intrinsic fairness scrutiny. If the preferred was vulnerable and
exploited, heavy, potentially disruptive process obligations fall upon the
board. If the preferred failed to satisfy those criteria, however, contract and
appraisal determine the result. We believe courts can avoid this doctrinal
sturm und drang by using the good faith standard of review employed in the
old dummy merger cases.161 Under this standard, the court asks whether the

158 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int’l Grp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907-08 (Del. Ch.
2009) (fixing appraisal recovery at the price set in the charter).
159 The merger consideration for the preferred was cash. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(b)(1)–(2) (2011) (providing for appraisal rights in cases of cash consideration).
160 James, 990 A.2d at 451-54.
161 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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board acted in bad faith with reckless indifference to the rights of the
preferred, as opposed to making an honest business judgment.162
The good faith standard opens a big tent that accommodates the results
of all of the cases along with the overlapping paradigms. While James’s
contractual aspirations are understandable, a totally contractual posture is
unsustainable. A pattern of incomplete contracting remains embedded in
preferred stock drafting, leaving a door open for conscience-shocking
opportunism by boards. Moreover, boards are more likely to exercise great
care in making these allocational decisions if counsel advises them of the
possibility of judicial second-guessing. Indeed, to assure scrupulous adherence
to the standard of independent-director determination on a well-informed
basis, we would specify that the burden of proof on the issue of good faith
fall on the board of directors.
For the board to meet that burden without much trouble, we offer the
following suggestion: the independent committee should include at least
one director charged with representing the interests of the preferred. Such
an approach is potentially disruptive because a dissenting vote by a committee
member would virtually ensure future litigation. But we believe that the
possibility of litigation would be minimized if courts clarified the law on the
basic distributional point. We know of no principle according the preferred
a right to Allocation 1 that would provide it with a share of the gain in a
third-party merger. The corporate–contract paradigms would overlap more
peacefully if courts explicitly announced the following proposition: the
preferred’s rights are capped at premerger value.
To the extent an issue of preferred wants a shot at gain in a merger, it
should negotiate a class vote. Given this clarification, the preferred’s
representative would have the limited task of avoiding Allocation 3, one that
looms large only in the absence of a market price establishing premerger
value. Absent such a price, the representative should force the committee to
confront evidence of premerger value in the form of a neutral investment
banker report—something that does not appear to have occurred in James.
Good faith review thus would serve to direct the board to Allocation 2
and away from the temptation of Allocation 3. Absent bad faith, objecting
preferred should have only appraisal as a remedy. Delaware corporate law
should also be amended to make appraisal universally available to preferred
forced to accept anything other than their existing stock.
We would make one additional change in the law. Courts need to remove
common stock–value maximization from the doctrinal toolbox used to
162 Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 150-51 (Del. Ch. 1943). We suspect that the court
in James asked precisely this question sub silentio when choosing among the competing paradigms.
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evaluate preferred’s claims in mergers. The concept is analytically unsuitable.
To see why, let us return to ABC Corporation and ask how a common
stock–maximizing board should make the allocation. The answer is easy: it
should employ Jedwab’s core equity-versus-contract-rights distinction163 and
allocate the same $50 per share to everybody, transferring $20 million of
premerger value from the preferred to the common. Carrying the point to
its logical conclusion, the ABC board never should have allowed preferred
arrearages to accumulate in the first place. Rather, it should have effected a
one-to-one dummy merger against the preferred immediately upon issuance.
The board in James should have done the same thing. With the preferred
convertible into common at $15.50, an immediate dummy merger after sale
of the preferred for $25 would have created $9.50 of shareholder value!
These contracts can be incomplete and make no business sense if a
common-maximizing board has sole responsibility over their performance in
the absence of backstop judicial scrutiny. Meanwhile, the law can satisfy the
intuition that motivates the common-maximization principle by clearly
blocking any preferred claim to a share of merger gain.
Finally, we note that the overlap of the two paradigms raises an alternate
route to fairness review: the contractual duty of good faith. The analysis
starts with Jedwab’s division between contractual preferences and rights in
common.164 As the value impaired in the merger stems from the preference,
the contract treatment arguably is appropriate. A party can trigger a
contractual good faith constraint by exercising a contract right in such a way
as to deprive a counterparty of core expectations,165 which arguably is the
case with the ABC proposal to allocate $50 per share to everyone in the
merger. One could frame the case objectively and analyze the degree of
deprivation, or subjectively and look at the culpability of the actors who
effected the injury.166 In the subjective framing, the contract case roughly
tracks the corporate good faith case.
But some sticking points impede application of the contract variant. A
special formulation of contractual good faith applies to financial contracts
163 See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del. Ch. 1986) (stating
that the corporation’s duty “with respect to matters . . . that distinguish preferred stock from
common . . . [is] contractual,” whereas when “the right asserted is . . . shared equally . . . the scope
of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards”).
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) (“[I]n
every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).
166 Cf. Quadrangle Offshore (Cayman) LLC v. Kenetech Corp., No. 16362NC, 1999 WL
893575, at *9-10 (Del Ch. Oct. 13, 1999) (entertaining the suggestion that the board of a distressed
issuer may have taken a series of actions with an intent to frustrate the preferred’s right to a
liquidation preference), aff ’d, 751 A.2d 878 (Del. 2000).
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governing senior securities, under which good faith comes to bear only
when the issuer traverses rights explicitly created in the contract.167 In cases
concerning bonds, this formulation tends to cut off good faith review.168 The
preferred can contend that this barrier does not apply because the merger
has the effect of stripping its contract rights, but this theory is untested.
Delaware precedent raises an additional barrier: good faith claims require a
counterfactual finding as to whether the parties would have drafted for the
right asserted by the preferred had they considered it.169 If the right asserted
is defined as a class vote, then a counterfactual finding cannot be made. If
the right is defined more broadly as a right to have the preferred’s going
concern value considered in the merger allocation, then the contractual good
faith case should lie.
Thus sketched, a contractual good faith case differs little from the corporate
alternative, but for the two sticking points. An issue arises as to whether the
corporate or contract good faith route is more “appropriate.” In our view,
the corporate path makes more sense. The courts opted for corporate
treatment of mergers and charter amendments long ago, so a shift to
contract only confuses matters further.
III. THE PAYMENT STREAM
Financial preferences, the basic rights making up the core of preferred
stock’s value, can be structured as priorities or as promises to pay. Either
way, they exist in an ambiguous, unstable legal environment. We have seen
that priority dividends in arrears can be stripped in a dummy merger. This
Part turns to mandatory preferred to examine the strange, second-order
status of an issuer’s promise to pay a preferred dividend or redeem a
preferred issue at stated value. Second-order status follows from preferred’s
dual nature. The promise to pay is, of course, contractual. But, because it is
attached to a corporate equity interest, the law refuses to enforce preferred
payment rights if doing so would impair the interests of contract creditors.
The parameters of the enforceability of preferred’s financial preferences
remain unclear and admit of a narrow approach that enhances the promise’s
contractual power and a broad approach that emphasizes corporate status
and makes enforcement difficult. One reason the doctrine is murky is that
most of the cases in this area are old.
167 See Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (en banc)
(“[T]his implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot give the holders of Debentures any
rights inconsistent with those explicitly set out in the Indenture.”).
168 Id. at 958.
169 Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880-81 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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More recently, in SV Investment Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc.,170
the Delaware Chancery Court radically expanded the zone of enforcement
constraint, stripping away a promise’s contractual vitality by remitting the
decision to perform the promise to pay to the discretion of the issuer’s
board, thereby subordinating the preferred’s payment rights not only to the
interests of the issuer’s creditors, but to those of its common stockholders.171
This Part sees ThoughtWorks as an updating exercise. The old cases are not
only unclear but institutionally dated, relying on judicial business judgments
about issuers’ ability to pay.172 The ThoughtWorks court, by submitting the
matter to board discretion, aligns the legal treatment with the modern
corporate law approach. The case also imports clarity by minimizing the old
cases’ dualistic use of the corporate and contract paradigms, pushing the
treatment deep into corporate territory.
This judicial updating, however, swings the pendulum so far in one direction that it virtually knocks the promise out of the contract. Therefore, in
this Part, we experiment with the converse approach, asking whether it is
feasible to push the treatment of financial preferences deep into contract
territory by minimizing the enforcement constraint. We show that this
approach holds out no danger to corporate going concerns and protects
transactional integrity.
Section III.A describes the doctrinal inheritance. Section III.B analyzes
the ThoughtWorks opinion and the changes it made to the doctrine in the
area of financial preferences. Section III.C accounts for the approach taken
in the case and outlines an alternative. Section III.D provides a conclusion.
A. The Promise to Pay on Preferred
We have seen that dividend and liquidation priorities remit considerable
payment discretion to issuer boards of directors. Making a preferred issue
redeemable only at the board’s option is another way to expand board
discretion. One-way redemption permits the board to pay down the preferred
at its stated value when an alternative means of financing becomes more
desirable or the preferred issue otherwise becomes burdensome.173 The
stated amount, even though it bears a more-than-passing resemblance to the
170
171
172
173

7 A.3d 973 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).
See infra Section III.B.
See generally, e.g., Mueller v. Kraeuter & Co., 25 A.2d 874 (N.J. Ch. 1942).
Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 265 (“The option to redeem preferred shares . . . enable[s] the
corporation to retire an obligation or a claim on the earnings . . . when it becomes advisable for
purposes of corporate financing.” (quoting HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON
CORPORATIONS 509 (rev. ed. 1946))).
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principal amount of a bond, does not otherwise “come due” pursuant to a
preset repayment schedule. The issuer can leave the preferred in its capital
structure indefinitely.174 The matter of payment being largely vested in the
board’s business judgment, the financial rights of priority-preferred holders,
while created contractually, very much lie within the corporate paradigm.175
Preferred also can be drafted to look like debt, with a promise to pay a
fixed dividend (paralleling the payment of interest) and a promise to redeem
the issue on a fixed date or series of dates (paralleling the repayment of
principal). This discretion-constraining alternative has long been available,
but companies have only sporadically used it.176 When companies have
taken this route, historically there has been a residuum of legal hostility.
Some states have imposed statutory barriers to fixed redemptions,177 and
courts have resolved interpretive doubts respecting constraints on boards’
payment discretion in issuers’ favor.178
There also was (and remains) a doctrinal barrier to enforcement of preferred payment mandates. Promises to pay dividends on stock or redeem stock
for cash cannot be made absolute in the same sense as promises to pay interest
and to repay principal on a bond. Because preferred is stock, the promise takes
a second-order status. It is enforceable with respect to the common,179 but
carries a claim junior to claims of the corporation’s creditors. The law embeds
this junior status when it makes payments to preferred stockholders subject to
state law legal capital rules and fraudulent conveyance law, both of which
protect creditors of distressed corporations from opportunistic payouts to

174 See Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 265 (“Rarely does a corporation fail to express in its articles
that redemption shall be in the board of directors’ discretion.”).
175 See W.Q. O’Neall Co. v. O’Neall, 25 N.E.2d 656, 657, 659 (Ind. Ct. App. 1940) (in banc)
(ordering a dividend for preferred stock on grounds of oppression of the heirs of one of two
shareholders of a family corporation); cf. Channon v. H. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397, 401 (1920)
(ordering a dividend on common in a family corporation on grounds of an arbitrary refusal to pay).
176 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 265 (describing compulsory redemption clauses as “seldom
used” and “somewhat anomalous to the nature of preferred stock”). But see DEWING, supra note
22, at 155-56 (noting that mandatory redemption preferred fell out of favor after mandatory terms
resulted in some of the issuers’ financial distress in the 1920s).
177 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (West 2013) (restricting redemption to sinking fund out of
earnings).
178 See, e.g., Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 53 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Mass. 1944) (noting “reluctance on the part of the courts to construe provisions relative to the declaration of dividends in
such a way as to hold that it is mandatory . . . to declare dividends”).
179 See Ammon v. Cushman Motor Works, 258 N.W. 649, 651 (Neb. 1935) (describing an
undertaking between the issuer and the holder, noting that “such [an] agreement is valid and
enforceable where it appears that the redemption and retirement of the stock will not impair the
rights of the corporate creditors”).
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stockholders.180 The former prohibit dividend or redemption payments that
render the corporation’s balance sheet insolvent or reduce a stated capital
figure booked on the balance sheet as shareholder equity.181 The latter
protects corporate creditors on a going-concern basis by blocking payments
on stock that leave the corporation with an asset base that is too small to
sustain its business or that would disable it from paying its debts as they
come due.182
The law of preferred could simply refer to these well-articulated doctrines,
block payments to preferred that violate them, and stop there. Some courts
do simply state that the payment may not render the issuer insolvent.183
Other courts, however, articulate a variety of unclear, open-ended limitations.184 These cases prohibit redemptions that impair,185 “prejudice,”186 or
“injure”187 interests of creditors, thus suggesting a barrier that is higher than
the legal capital rules and fraudulent conveyance otherwise create. Whatever
180 Thus, a preferred acceleration provision triggered by skipped dividends is ineffective
against creditors. See Allied Magnet Wire Corp. v. Tuttle, 154 N.E. 480, 483 (Ind. 1926) (construing
an acceleration provision conditioned on a shipped dividend to apply only when the amount of the
dividend actually had been earned to preserve the provision’s legality).
181 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 170 (2011); see BRATTON, supra note 23, at 498-500 (discussing different legal standards available to a corporation to establish distribution constraints).
182 UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a) (1984); cf. BRATTON, supra note 23, at
518-21 (discussing the risk of fraudulent conveyance claims in the leveraged buyout context).
183 See, e.g., In re Greenebaum Bros. & Co., 62 F. Supp. 769, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (“[T]he
obligation to redeem cannot be enforced after the corporation becomes insolvent.”); Hurley v. Bos.
R.R. Holding Co., 54 N.E.2d 183, 198 (Mass. 1944) (“It is an implied limitation upon the contract
for the redemption of ‘preferred stock,’ created by the issuance of such ‘preferred stock,’ that such
contract for redemption ‘cannot be enforced if the effect is to render the corporation insolvent.’”
(citation omitted)); McIntyre v. E. Bement’s Sons, 109 N.W. 45, 46 (Mich. 1906) (“[T]here is no
theory permitting a recovery by the plaintiff which does not require him . . . to establish affirmatively
the solvency of the corporation . . . .”); Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 171 N.W. 307, 309 (Minn. 1919)
(noting that if “the rights of creditors [are] not affected” then “the agreement to redeem was valid”).
184 Compare Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, 195 S.W. 477, 481 (Ky. 1917) (“[I]f [the stockholders] contract in such a way as to be legally bound to appropriate a portion of the capital to
redeem the share of the preferred stockholder, the contract may be enforced, if the enforcement
does not affect the collection of the claims of the creditors of the corporation.”), with Rider v. John
G. Delker & Sons Co., 140 S.W. 1011, 1013-14 (Ky. 1911) (refusing a receivership that a preferred
stockholder who alleged that the company was insolvent had requested in an attempt to collect his
dividends, “absent of some charge that its officers were guilty of some illegal, fraudulent, or other
wrongdoing in the conduct of the business”).
185 See Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 228 N.W. 130, 132 (Wis. 1929) (“The general rule is
that a corporation cannot give holders of preferred stock any preference, either in respect of
payment of principal or dividends which will be superior to the rights of creditors . . . .”).
186 See Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co., 183 N.E. 674, 677-78 (Ind. App. 1932)
(“[R]edemption may be made only in case the rights of creditors are not thereby prejudiced and
the stock is held valid . . . if creditors’ rights are not prejudiced by the payment.”).
187 See Burnett, 195 S.W. at 479 (“[A] court is authorized to declare [a contract] to be void . . .
[where] the agreement has a tendency to injure the public . . . .”).
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the phrasing, the burden of proof is on the preferred seeking to enforce its
promise.188 It is accordingly the drafting custom to condition preferred
payment mandates on the presence of “funds legally available therefor.”189
The payment constraint’s meaning is clear only at the extremes. On one
side stands an issuer in severe financial distress. Here, the promise to pay
on preferred is clearly unenforceable. On the other side stands an issuer in
excellent financial health. Assume that a large mandatory redemption is
coming due and the company has the cash or sources of financing to fund it.
If the company nonetheless misses the payment, its easily verifiable ability
to pay puts the preferred in a position to meet their burden of showing
“legally available” funds and thus to bring a successful enforcement action.
Even in this extreme situation, although the payment constraint’s meaning
is clear, the mandate itself is problematic. If the preferred sue on the
unperformed promise, get a judgment, then levy execution on the judgment,
they technically bootstrap themselves to the status of secured creditors,
jumping over preexisting unsecured creditors.190 However, given a healthy
issuer, presumably no creditors will raise an objection.
Between the two extremes, where the issuer is not in distress but does
operate under financial constraints, the validity of preferred redemption
claims is not clear at all. Board discretion starts to matter, despite the
existence of an enforceable promise. To see why, consider two scenarios.
Assume first that the board actually wants to make a promised payment to
the preferred and that there would not be a fraudulent conveyance, but the
company’s balance sheet presents an obstacle under the legal capital rules.
The willing board can surmount that obstacle because the legal capital rules
provide it with discretion to alter the balance sheet numbers by revaluing
assets, subject only to good faith review of its decision.191 A heavy burden
then falls on objecting creditors to show bad faith.
Now turn to the more likely case in which a class of preferred comes due
for redemption, and the board, which does not have the cash in a sock under
188
189

See, e.g., Hurley, 54 N.E.2d at 198.
See C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Drafting a Mandatory Put Provision for
Preferred Stock After ThoughtWorks, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 23, 2012, http://apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/blt/content/2012/01/delaware-insider.shtml (quoting SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks,
7 A.3d 973, 978 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011)).
190 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5202 (McKinney 2013) (granting priority the moment the
judgment is delivered to the sheriff ). But see David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment (Part
Two: Liens on New York Personal Property), 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43, 51-74 (2009) (describing two
New York exceptions to the validity of execution liens: pre- and post-levy transfers).
191 See Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 154 (Del. 1997) (“[W]e . . .
allow . . . corporations to revalue properly its [sic] assets and liabilities to show a surplus and thus
conform to the statute.”).
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the bed, resists the payment. As we have seen, the promise to honor the
financial preferences held by the preferred is conditional: payment comes
due only if funds are “legally available.” The board, however, can defend by
claiming that payment would “impair, prejudice, or injure”192 creditor
interests. The standard thus leaves impairment in the eye of the beholder,
and it can be applied tightly and contractually or loosely and corporately.
On a contractual reading, the enforcing court would aggressively push
the recalcitrant issuer to the limit of fraudulent conveyance law by forcing it
to liquidate assets to raise the cash. Alternatively, concern for creditor
interests can lead to an expansive, corporate approach, in which the court
would open up a discretionary envelope for the issuer’s board of directors
and thereby relieve the common stock interest of the payment burden.
What began as creditor protection turns into common protection.
Until recently, the leading promise-to-pay case was Mueller v. Kraeuter &
Co., decided by the New Jersey Chancery Court in 1942.193 The court there
took the contractual route and pushed the limits in favor of a payment to
the preferred against a board that had been stalling while reinvesting
earnings to expand the business.194 But the preferred did not get a judgment
for the entire amount the company owed them, because the issuer did not
have the cash on hand; therefore, an immediate payment might have injured
creditors.195 The court instead drew on its equitable powers and ordered
counsel to prepare a schedule of installment payments.196
Other cases, however, have taken more of a corporate route. At the
extreme is an 1879 Pennsylvania case, in which the court held that the
preferred have no right to enforce the promise if it would cripple the
issuer’s business and impair the interests not only of creditors but also of
common stockholders.197
Unsurprisingly, financial practice has changed significantly since these
cases were decided. Preferred dividends remain discretionary in many
contexts, particularly in venture capital deals.198 But mandatory dividend

192
193
194
195
196
197

See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
25 A.2d 874 (N.J. Ch. 1942).
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id. at 876-77.
Culver v. Reno Estate Co., 91 Pa. 367, 375 (1879); see also Warren v. Queen & Co., 87 A.
595, 597 (Pa. 1913) (conditioning redemption on an affirmative showing that no injustice would be
done to the existing rights of other stockholders or creditors).
198 BRATTON, supra note 23, at 741.
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provisions are not uncommon.199 Redemption provisions also depend on the
deal. Perpetual preferred still is issued, but mandatory redemption terms
are also not uncommon.200 Indeed, with venture capital, exit via mandatory
redemption is hardwired into the business model.201
B. The ThoughtWorks Solution
Thus sat the law and the practice until 2010, when a hard-fought litigation
between a venture capitalist seeking to enforce a redemption right against a
recalcitrant, but not insolvent, investee reached the Delaware courts.202 That
case, SV Investment Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., resulted in a new
and leading pronouncement on the enforceability of promises to pay
preferred.203 The Chancery Court’s decision forcefully pushes the law in the
corporate direction, implying that the preferred will not be able to get a
judgment unless the issuer has cash on hand (or the equivalent).204
The issuer in question sold $26.6 million of preferred to a venture capital
firm in 2000, at the peak of the dot-com bubble.205 The goal was to put the
company in a position to go public at an early date, but the bubble’s burst
dashed those upside hopes.206 Meanwhile, the charter provision creating the
preferred contained a heavily negotiated five-year redemption provision,
which contained the standard “out of any funds legally available” clause,207
but otherwise took steps to put the screws on the issuer. The issuer got a
year of grace in the event its working capital proved insufficient to redeem
the preferred.208 Once the one-year period expired the charter specified that
redemption would be “continuous,” that is, that the issuer would divert cash to
preferred redemption on a going-concern basis.209 The charter also provided
199 In our EDGAR-based survey of recent preferred issues, 23% of the registered issues had
mandatory dividend provisions and 70% of the unregistered issues had mandatory dividend
provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
200 In our EDGAR-based survey of recent preferred issues, 14% of the registered issues had
mandatory redemption provisions and 36% of the unregistered issues had mandatory redemption
provisions. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
201 See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 742 (describing how venture capitalists typically exit
investments).
202 SV Inv. Partners, LLC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 976 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37
A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).
203 See generally id.
204 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery’s ruling, confirming the standard of
review applied, but otherwise adding no new law, in ThoughtWorks, 37 A.3d at 212.
205 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 978.
206 Id. at 978-79.
207 Id. at 978.
208 See id. (describing the “one-year working capital carve-out”).
209 Id. at 978-79.
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that the company would value its assets at “the highest amount permissible
under applicable law” when determining funds “legally available.”210
The issuer, a services company with a volatile earnings stream, took
advantage of the grace year and thereafter consistently took the position
that there were minimal or no significant funds available.211 Duly prepped
by counsel, ThoughtWorks’ board of directors discussed the matter of
redemption payment on a quarterly basis. It took into account a list of
factors, and developed a plan “for the Board to follow:”
[T]he Board must (a) not declare an amount that exceeds the corporation’s
surplus . . . , (b) reassess its initial determination of surplus if . . . a redemption
based on that determination . . . would impair the Company’s ability to
continue as a going concern, thereby eroding the value of any assets . . . that
have materially lower values in liquidation than as part of a going concern,
such that the value assumptions underlying the initial computation of surplus are no longer sustainable and the long term health of the Company is
jeopardized, [and] (c) exercise its affirmative duty to avoid decisions that
trigger insolvency . . . .212

In all, the company redeemed $4.1 million through 2010, while the total
principal amount owing on the issue, including cumulated, unpaid dividends,
rose to $45 million by 2006.213 The board also looked for takeout financing
but only found it in the amount of $30 million, conditioned on repurchase
of all of the preferred for no more than $25 million.214 The preferred
rejected the haircut and went to court.215
The preferred argued that the court should order redemption so long as
it implicated no invasion of surplus within the meaning of the legal capital
rules,216 and introduced valuation evidence showing that ThoughtWorks had
more than enough balance sheet equity to sustain the payment.217 Vice
210
211

Id. at 979.
Id. at 980-81. The board’s actions included going to court and proposing a charter interpretation that would have made the working capital carve-out permanent. The Delaware Chancery
Court rejected this argument in ThoughtWorks, Inc. v. SV Investment Partners, LLC, 902 A.2d 745,
754 (Del. Ch. 2006).
212 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 980.
213 Id. at 980-81.
214 Id. at 981.
215 Id.
216 The argument reflected the general view among practitioners that “legally available”
derived its exclusive meaning from reference to the legal capital rules. See Bigler & Barrett, supra
note 189. We wonder how this interpretation ever found its way into corporate practice. We
suspect it entered circulation because it reduces uncertainty. Unfortunately, it is utterly lacking in
support from the cases.
217 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 982-83.
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Chancellor Laster rejected this argument; he reckoned that a balance sheet
showing did not suffice to satisfy the creditor impairment limitation, which at
least required an additional showing addressing going-concern insolvency.218
The Vice Chancellor reckoned correctly. A ruling favoring the plaintiff ’s
position implies that the issuer has the burden to show negative going
concern effects of a judgment for plaintiffs. That has never been the law.
The opinion, however, goes on to make broad pronouncements beyond what
was necessary to resolve the case.
The Vice Chancellor took the occasion to flesh out the legal standard for
redemption with a two-part inquiry. The first half is substantive—a definition
of “funds legally available.”219 The court stressed dictionary definitions of
“funds” and “available”220 so that “funds legally available” emerges as ready
cash—“accessible, obtainable, and present or ready for immediate use,”
which are not otherwise subject to any legal prohibition on their use.221 The
“not otherwise illegal” leg of the test subsumes the longstanding creditor
injury condition, which in turn is jacked up to a liquidation standard—the
preferred has no entitlement to “any part of the corporate assets until the
corporate debts are fully paid.”222 The result is significant: ready cash must
be on the table first; once it is, the board asks whether its payment to a
stockholder would impair the creditor interest. Impairment seems possible
even when there is only a small, outstanding piece of open-account debt.
The second leg of ThoughtWorks sets out a standard of review keyed to
boardroom process: “the plaintiff must prove that in determining the
amount of funds legally available, the board acted in bad faith, relied on
methods and data that were unreliable, or made a determination so far off

218
219

Id. at 983-86.
In Delaware, “funds legally available” derives partly from a statutory constraint keyed to
the legal capital rules, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2011), and partly from common law. See
In re Int’l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 255 (Del. Ch. 1914) (“[W]hen at the time the bargain is made
the rights of creditors of the company are, or would be, affected by it, then clearly such an
agreement is unenforceable . . . .”); Farland v. Willis, No. 4888, 1975 WL 1960, at *475 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 12, 1975) (prohibiting stock repurchases that defraud or injure creditors). Taken together, the
statute and the cases amount to a mandate; preferred stock provisions that do not contain a
limitation that is not otherwise illegal do not reflect a contractual, negotiated choice. See Buxbaum,
supra note 1, at 263-64 (“[A] contract to purchase shares . . . is subject to avoidance if at the time of
payment or performance the company is insolvent, the payment would harm creditors or capital
would be impaired.” (footnotes omitted)). Contractual constraints are not unheard of; however,
half a century ago, it was not uncommon to see negotiated financial tests that blocked dividend
payments. See id. at 255.
220 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 983-84.
221 Id. at 984.
222 Id. at 986 (citation omitted).
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the mark as to constitute actual or constructive fraud.”223 The court drew
this good faith standard from Delaware’s legal capital cases.224 As noted
above, those cases concern shareholder payouts that the board wants to
make,225 and they accord wide discretion to board asset valuations.226 It is
ironic, to say the least, to see a standard intended to facilitate payments to
stockholders redeployed to protect a board wishing to duck a contractually
undertaken stockholder payment. In any event, the court found the
ThoughtWorks board’s process to have been “impeccable,” since the board
undertook a “thorough investigation” and relied on detailed analyses
developed by “well-qualified experts.”227
Add up the test’s two parts and you get a change in the law that takes a
giant step away from contract into corporate territory. We started out with a
contract enforcement case that called on the court to determine whether a
board breached a promise. The precedent presupposes direct appraisal of
the issuer’s ability to pay; it does not remit the decision regarding payment
to the business judgment of the issuer’s board of directors.
Here, in contrast, we get a substantive test emphasizing the availability of
ready cash that then uses a good faith standard of review and focuses on the
board’s informational base. The reference to board process displaces the
contract paradigm and restates the issue in corporate terms: the question is no
longer, “Can the issuer pay?” but, “Did the issuer’s board do an adequate
job of justifying its decision not to pay?” Thus, ThoughtWorks undercuts the
redemption promise: a promise to pay is not meaningful if its performance
is left to the promisor’s discretion.
C. An Explanation and an Alternative
The court’s approach can be explained as an effort to integrate the law of
preferred stock with the wider framework of corporate law, a framework
223
224

Id. at 988.
The court cited Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997), which
we previously discussed in the context of boards’ abilities to alter their balance sheets. See
ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 988; supra text accompanying note 191. Additionally, the court cited Morris
v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 63 A.2d 577, 584-85 (Del. Ch. 1949), which also approves of board
discretion in valuation.
225 Klang, 702 A.2d at 152; Morris, 63 A.2d at 578.
226 Historically, courts have set the zone of discretion liberally. Notably, as the zone of board
discretion widens, the creditor-protective properties of the rules diminish. See BAYLESS MANNING,
A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 61-64, 71-72, 84-90 (2d ed. 1981). Note also that
directors who make payouts in violation of the rules face personal liability. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 174(a) (2011) (“In case of any wilful or negligent violation of § 160 . . . the directors under
whose administration the same may happen shall be jointly and severally liable . . . .”).
227 ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 989.
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that changed during the seventy years that followed the decision of Mueller
v. Kraeuter.228 Judicial review now goes to the quality of the processes
directors employ when making decisions rather than to the substance of the
decisions themselves.
The old cases invite messy litigation. Suppose that the plaintiff in
ThoughtWorks, instead of going for a judgment for the whole hog of $45
million,229 had played it differently, seeking a decree that holds the obligor’s
feet to the fire without threatening the going concern. In this scenario, as in
Mueller,230 the court decides that the issuer has the ability to pay more than
it has demonstrated and sends the parties back to negotiate a payment
schedule, in effect, reallocating bargaining chips to the preferred in an
ongoing negotiation. Such an approach holds out a cognizable threat of
continuing judicial involvement with the defendant’s business operations,
which is just the sort of involvement that Delaware’s process-based standards
seek to obviate. The preferred’s second-order promise cannot be enforced
without somebody, presumably the court, making a business judgment
concerning the issuer’s ability to pay, and the Delaware courts are allergic to
such decisionmaking environments.231
Further, the ThoughtWorks standard could prove less liberal in application
than its bare statement suggests. The issuer, as depicted by the court, was
asset- and cash-poor;232 it tried to refinance but could raise only $20 million.233

228
229

25 A.2d 874 (N.J. Ch. 1942).
A $45 million judgment might indeed have injured creditors (although the opinion makes
no reference to any evidence on the issuer’s debt load). Judgment leads to levy and secured
creditor status for the preferred, with execution on the lien threatening the issuer’s producing
capacity. The creditor injury limitation, see supra note 222 and accompanying text, bars that result,
as does the Bankruptcy Code with its automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) (providing an
automatic stay in various actions against the debtor after a petition for bankruptcy has been filed).
230 See 25 A.2d at 876 (noting that the profit received during a previous five-year period was
“enough of itself to pay two-thirds of the amount required to retire the preferred stock”); id. at 877
(instructing counsel to “employ their ingenuity in devising proper means to accomplish the
redemption of the preferred stock”).
231 The courts’ reluctance to engage in such decisionmaking is a result of the tradition of
respect for board business judgments, which the Delaware courts traverse only on a showing of
breach of fiduciary duty. Exceptions are limited. Courts, for example, exercise their own business
judgment in reviewing litigation settlements. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279,
1285 (Del. 1989) (describing courts’ broad discretion in evaluating the fairness of a settlement).
There is also an exception in the case of enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1986), in which the court describes the higher
standards used to assess board action in a hostile takeover. Even under Revlon, however, a court
may not “second-guess reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have made in good
faith.” In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005).
232 See ThoughtWorks, 7 A.3d at 976 (“ThoughtWorks does not have and cannot obtain the
cash to redeem the Preferred Stock in full.”).

1870

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1815

Let us hypothesize a harder case: the preferred issuer has a large cash
balance; debt finance is available to pay down the preferred. The board
determines, on an extensive record, that redemption would interfere with its
business plan; it reasons that the cash balance fortifies the company against
its competitors and that credit lines need to be husbanded in the interest of
the enterprise. Accordingly, it redeems 20% of the preferred, leaving the
rest outstanding and awaiting a later exercise of board discretion. Payment
is feasible, but inconvenient. Would this redemption amount to bad faith
under ThoughtWorks? One hopes so. Delaware courts are, above all, fact
sensitive and adept at avoiding disruptive applications of their standards, but
the matter is far from clear.
ThoughtWorks imports coherence by pushing the treatment of the promise
to pay out of the awkward territory of paradigmatic overlap and over to the
corporate side. We wonder whether the opposite adjustment might be
feasible—a push to the contract side. The old cases also predate modern
bankruptcy reorganization234 and bespeak a fear of crippling levy and
execution at the behest of the preferred. That fear is no longer justified.
If the ThoughtWorks preferred got a $45 million judgment, the execution
of which would dismember the going concern, either the issuer or one of its
creditors would solve the problem with a bankruptcy filing. Bankruptcy’s
automatic stay provision235 prevents destructive levy and execution. Negotiations respecting the issuer’s ability to pay claims against it would be
remitted to the bankruptcy proceeding, where the preferred, as a junior
claimant, would have to take its chances.236 Admittedly, this counterfactual
treatment cuts against the precedent every bit as much as the ThoughtWorks
opinion. It treats the redemption as a first-order promise and, rather than
attempting to thread the needle with a decree in the case, remits the issuer
to the machinery in place that obviates value-destructive effects of enforcement of first-order promises.
Interestingly, Vice Chancellor Laster’s ThoughtWorks opinion makes a
gesture in the direction of our alternative scenario, suggesting that the
233 See id. at 979 (“ThoughtWorks had hoped to secure at least $30 million in debt financing,
but the largest proposal was for $20 million.”).
234 The first statutory corporate reorganization procedure dates from 1934 with the enactment of section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 912-22, which was
replaced by Chapter X of the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938).
235 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
236 In bankruptcy, the preferred is junior to debt claimants. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(B), (c). It
bears noting that bankruptcy does not necessarily follow from the fact that the preferred hold an
enforceable promise and the issuer lacks the cash to pay on demand. The parties could simply
work it out at the negotiating table with the preferred holding enforcement of the judgment and
bankruptcy as a potential trump card.
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whole problem would go away if the preferred’s contract specified an
upstream conversion—that is, on the redemption date, the stock would be
automatically convertible into a note due in one year.237 The note, assuming
that its issue survived fraudulent conveyance scrutiny,238 would provide the
preferred the enforcement cudgel it presently lacks, triggering a liquidity
crisis and a bankruptcy filing. A question arises: Is this formal ruse really
necessary? It certainly has no creditor protective properties, for it promotes
the preferred to equal status with preexisting creditors. Nor does it import
added certainty regarding the parties’ intent that the preferred be paid. The
charter provisions in ThoughtWorks already were quite clear about that.239
The upstream conversion ploy clearly accomplishes one thing—it takes
the lawsuit out of the messy corporate law framework into the more clearly
outlined contractual context of debt versus equity; indeed, it might even
take the lawsuit out of the Delaware Chancery Court and into a bankruptcy
court. Whether it would work as advertised in practice is a more difficult
question. Upstream conversion from equity to debt is permitted by corporate
codes.240 But the issue of the debt is constrained by fraudulent conveyance law
just as is the payment of redemption cash.241 Presumably, the earlier the cash
comes due on the debt, the greater the risk of invalidation as a transfertriggering insolvency; if the principal amount of the note were greater than
shareholders’ equity listed on the issuer’s balance sheet, the conversion would
trigger balance sheet insolvency and would be invalid as of occurrence.
If the parties themselves can lift the burden with an upstream stock-todebt conversion, then a proactive court can save them the trouble. All it has
237 See 7 A.3d at 991 (noting that investors can request penalty provisions to take effect where
a “[c]ompany’s available cash flow does not permit . . . redemption—e.g., the redemption amount
shall be paid in the form of a one-year note to each unredeemed holder” of the preferred stock
(quoting NVCA, Model Term Sheet For Series A Preferred Stock Financing 6 n.14 (Apr. 2009)
available at http://businesslaw.ncbar.org/media/6018628/nvca_term_sheet.doc)); id. at 992 (noting that
the existence of the one-year note penalty, among other solutions, shows that the investor “easily
could have protected its investment and avoided its [losses] through any number of means”).
238 See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
240 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 519(a) (McKinney 2003) (“[A] corporation may issue
shares or bonds convertible into . . . indebtedness or other securities of the same or another
corporation.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(c)(2) (2007) (recommending that articles of
incorporation authorize shares that are “convertible . . . for . . . indebtedness, securities or other
property”). In Delaware, the result follows from an interpretation of the sections allowing
redemption at the option of the stockholder and payment for redeemed stock in debt as well as
cash. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 151(b), (e) (2011) (redemption provision). The logic is that
the power to redeem in exchange for debt implies authorization of stock convertible upstream into
debt. See Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Conversion Rights and the Design of Financial
Contracts, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231, 1242-43 (1994).
241 See Triantis & Triantis, supra note 240, at 1240-44.
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to do is resolve the ambiguities created by the old cases on the contract side.
The promise is presumptively enforceable and creditor protection thus
becomes an affirmative defense. The preferred get a judgment absent a legal
capital violation or a fraudulent conveyance; the issuer bears the burden of
proof of “legally available funds” with “legal availability” defined in terms
of actual creditor interests rather than the interests of the going concern.242
No roof would cave in as a result of any subsequent insolvency, for chapter
11 is there to reinforce the underlying corporate structure in such an event.
Meanwhile, uncertainty (that the court aggravates when it remits the
preferred to the stock-to-debt drafting ploy) is avoided. This is a late date
on which to impose such a formality as an enforcement requirement.
Additionally, doing so substantially diminishes the value of the existing
generation of mandatory redemption preferred stock and creates enforcement
uncertainty for the next generation.
D. Summary and Analysis
ThoughtWorks takes a promise historically treated as second order and
downgrades it to third order. The historical treatment attempts to walk the
corporate–contract divide with a foot in each paradigm. The results are
awkward; further, when ThoughtWorks rejoins the issue, it is not clear exactly
what enforcement of a second-order promise means. Clarity follows only if
one plants both feet on one side or the other. ThoughtWorks opts for the
corporate side: it permits the corporate board to tie up the preferred in the
black box of business judgment.243 The contractual enforcement alternative
does not map onto the old cases any better than does corporate treatment.
But it is every bit as feasible. It would not, as a practical matter, turn the
holder of preferred into a judgment creditor who tears the producing enterprise apart in the course of levy and execution, compromising the interests of
preexisting creditors along the way. Instead, the practical result is a negotiation
at which the board of directors no longer controls the marginal dollar, and
the preferred’s interest in repayment assumes a primary place in business
planning. Either choice is reasonable. Left to our own devices, we would err
on the side of enforcement, making it harder for the issuer to avoid its own
promise to pay.

242 To the extent the regime described causes discomfort on the part of creditors of a preferred
issuer, the issuer easily could draft back into the old regime by including traditional “no creditor
impairment” language.
243 See supra notes 219-27 and accompanying text.
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We note two factors that are not implicated by the foregoing choice.
First, contract treatment does not traverse a meaningful norm of common
shareholder value maximization. Making a costly corporate obligation
unenforceable always enhances shareholder value, at least in the short term.
But there is no normative case to support a value bump from nonenforcement,
for the contract paradigm comes to bear with full, trumping force. It is true
that to the extent enforcement gets the preferred a seat at the table to share
or take control, its incentives may not be consistent with enterprise value
maximization. Alternatively, the preferred, once seated, could have every
incentive to maximize. It would depend on the case.
Second, the enforcement question raised in ThoughtWorks cannot meaningfully be resolved by allocating a drafting burden or conducting default-rule
analysis. Vice Chancellor Laster suggests the contrary when he faults the
preferred for failing to protect itself with a built-in promissory note exchange.244 We construe the reasoning in the opinion to follow a four-step
sequence: (1) both the corporate and the contract paradigms put the burden
on the claimant to procure a contract right expressly—“no right” is the
default rule; (2) an express right could have been procured here but was not;
(3) therefore the claimant has no right; and (4) the claimant is forced to
procure the right explicitly next time, prompting information revelation or
otherwise making the transaction more certain.245 The logic is sensible in
many situations, but it is unhelpful here. The preferred holder here did
negotiate for an express right—the right to be paid out of funds legally
available, and for ought that appears to be the highest payment right known
to be appropriate for preferred stock. The Vice Chancellor, in imposing a
contract burden to procure an even higher right—the right to be paid
unconditionally—simply restates the holding in chief, which is the refusal to
enforce the right actually bargained for. The ascription of fault on a “could
have/should have procured” basis has no bite, for the tables can be turned. If
more specificity would have been useful at the drafting table, particularly
given this negotiation’s emphasis on the construction of a promise with
teeth, the burden to include such specificity can be placed just as easily on
the issuer’s shoulders. That is, if the issuer’s board intended ex ante to make

244
245

See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
Cf. SV Inv. Partners, LCC v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 992 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“SVIP
easily could have protected its investment and avoided its current fate through any number of means.
SVIP decided not to, and that choice was rational at the time. . . . Now, with hindsight, SVIP
understandably wishes it had additional rights, but ‘it is not the proper role of a court to rewrite or
supply omitted provisions to a written agreement.’” (quoting Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v.
Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998))), aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).

1874

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1815

payment a matter of business convenience, should not an express condition
to that effect have been placed in the contract?
Finally, it bears noting that ThoughtWorks is a venture capital case. Venture
capital is a high-risk, high-return corner of the world of finance with special
characteristics.246 The financial economists who explain its contractual outlines
and productivity contribution teach that venture capitalists contribute substantive discrimination and monitoring capability lacking in other financiers. Such
contributions are not made for free. The deal makes sense only if the venture
capitalist gets contingent control power.247 Redemption rights are a prominent means of exercising that power. Therefore, a court that inhibits their
enforcement not only diminishes the utility of preferred, but also disables a
productive mode of financing.
IV. PREFERRED IN CONTROL: VENTURE CAPITAL UNDER
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW
There is something hapless about the preferred plaintiffs we have seen
so far. They take minority stock positions in reliance on special contract
rights only to find that they cannot enforce the rights because the contract is
embedded in a stock issue. When for the same reason the rights prove
vulnerable to elimination by common stock majorities, the preferred
stockholders get little backup protection from the majority–minority
stockholder branch of corporate fiduciary law.
A preferred stockholder in control doesn’t have these problems. Historically, such an actor was the exception—preferred was about finance, not
246 See Andrew Winton & Vijay Yerramilli, Entrepreneurial Finance: Banks Versus Venture Capital,
88 J. FIN. ECON. 51, 52 (2008) (“[F]irms with venture capital finance tend to have very risky and
positively skewed return distributions, with a high probability of weak or even negative returns
and a small probability of extremely high returns.” (citation omitted)).
247 See generally Masako Ueda, Banks Versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and
Expropriation, 59 J. FIN. 601, 601-02 (2004) (positing that venture capitalists are specialists and do
a better job than do banks of screening good and bad projects, but use their position to extract
rents from projects that have less collateral but higher risk, growth, and profitability); Winton &
Yerramilli, supra note 246, at 51-53 (positing that venture capitalists work with high risk projects
and demand significant control). Venture capitalists wield this control to effect results within the
company, often in the form of control changes when performance metrics are not met. See Michael
T. Hannan et al., Inertia and Change in the Early Years: Employment Relations in Young, High
Technology Firms, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 503, 526 fig.1 (1996) (displaying in Figure 1 that
40% of founder CEOs are replaced within the first 40 months and 80% within 80 months); Steven
N. Kaplan et al., Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms
from Early Business Plans to Public Companies, 64 J. FIN. 75, 78, 91, 98 tbl.VI (2009) (finding that a
majority of firms that go public, including venture-backed firms, tend to maintain the same line of
business while frequently replacing managers, and concluding that venture capitalists back ideas
rather than individuals).
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governance, and preferred rarely controlled the board or held a majority of
the votes.248 Modern venture capital financing changed the pattern. Venture
capital is about both finance and governance and preferred stock is the
investment vehicle of choice.249 Venture capitalists holding preferred
sometimes take voting control and can dominate the boards of directors
even when holding a minority of the votes.250
The controlling venture capitalist poses a new question for the law of
preferred stock: Does fiduciary law come to bear to protect a common stock
minority when a preferred stockholder in control exercises its contract
rights to impair the common’s interest?
This question, like others regarding preferred, tends to arise on the
moderate downside, where the issuer is viable but has not generated enough
value to go around. Things are markedly easier on the extreme downside:
where there is no value, there are no allocational issues worth pressing.
Similarly, there is not much to fight over on the upside either, assuming a
minimum of ex ante planning. In this case, the venture impresses the
market and proceeds to an initial public offering (IPO).251 The venture
capitalist converts its preferred into common, sells into the offering, and
makes a killing.252 The venture capitalist’s counterparty, the “entrepreneur,”
shares the jackpot and resumes control of the company in the wake of the
venture capitalist’s sale.253
Contrast the preceding two extreme cases with the moderate downside,
wherein the interests of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur can
sharply conflict. There is value in the enterprise but not enough to facilitate
the venture capitalist’s exit by IPO. The venture capitalist in control, under
248 A few charters allocated a majority of board seats to preferred given a set number of
missed dividends. See GRAHAM, ET AL., supra note 22, at 472-73. For the exceptional case on this
fact pattern, see Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 655 (Del. Ch. 1975) (“[A]t
any time six or more quarterly dividends . . . on the Preferred Stock shall be in default . . . the
holders of the Preferred Stock, voting as a class, shall have the right . . . by plurality vote to elect a
majority of the Directors of the Corporation.” (quoting Allied’s amended certificate of incorporation)).
249 See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 741 (noting that venture capital transactions typically use
convertible preferred stock and that the Stock Purchase Agreement “sets out governance rights for
the venture capitalist, including rights to information and the right to inspect the issuer’s premises”).
250 See infra notes 288-92.
251 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 260 (1998) (“[A]n IPO is available to the
portfolio company only when the company is successful.”).
252 See id. at 261 (“Typically, the terms of the convertible securities held by the venture capital
fund require conversion into common stock at the time of the IPO . . . .” (citation omitted)).
253 See id. (“[T]he venture capital fund’s special control rights end at the time of an IPO . . . .
Control becomes vested in the entrepreneur, who often retains a controlling stock interest and,
even if not, retains the usual broad discretion enjoyed by chief executives of companies without a
controlling shareholder.” (citation omitted)).
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pressure to create cash returns for its investors, brings the conflict to a head
by either exercising its redemption rights or using its board seats and voting
shares to cram down a sale of the venture to a third party who has no room
for the entrepreneur.254 Having discarded the entrepreneur to the scrapheap, the venture capitalist claims a priority share of the merger proceeds.255
How should corporate law treat this transaction? Under the contract
paradigm, there is no basis for intervention. The entrepreneur makes its bed
at the get-go by selling control to the venture capitalist in exchange for
needed capital and a shot at an IPO jackpot. Sale at the venture capitalist’s
insistence is an eminently foreseeable consequence. The corporate paradigm,
by contrast, invites fiduciary review—the fact pattern invites application of
the duty imposed on a majority shareholder who uses its control power to
extract value from a minority shareholder.
The Delaware Chancery Court recently opted emphatically for corporate
treatment and fiduciary review in the common stockholders’ favor in a
venture capital case, In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation.256 Trados contrasts
starkly with James, where, on the converse fact pattern, the court questioned
the very availability of majority–minority scrutiny to protect minority preferred.257 Trados not only proceeds to scrutinize, but breaks the precedential
mold in so doing. Under the traditional doctrinal framework, a majority
shareholder that uses its control power to self-deal at a minority’s expense
violates a fiduciary duty in its capacity as a shareholder.258 Trados switches to a
corporate-level framework, looking not at the venture capitalist and its voting
control, but at its director designees, and treating their boardroom action in
the venture capitalist’s favor as a self-dealing transaction, thereby expanding
254
255
256

See Bratton, supra note 2, at 940.
See id. at 939-40.
See Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (deciding in
favor of common stockholders by denying a motion to dismiss “breach of fiduciary duty claims
arising out of the board’s approval of [a] merger”).
257 Compare id. at *7 (“[T]he factual allegations in the Complaint support a reasonable inference that the interests of the preferred and common stockholders diverged with respect to the
decision of whether to pursue the merger. Given this reasonable inference, plaintiff can avoid
dismissal if the Complaint contains well-pleaded facts that demonstrate that the director
defendants were interested or lacked independence with respect to this decision.”), with LC
Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 448-49 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“When, by contract,
the rights of the preferred in a particular transactional context are articulated, it is those rights that
the board must honor. To the extent that the board does so, it need not go further and extend
some unspecified fiduciary beneficence on the preferred at the expense of the common.”).
258 See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that “[a] parent . . . owe[s] a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there are parent–subsidiary dealings,” and
that in the case of self-dealing, the intrinsic fairness standard applies); id. at 719-720 (“Under [the
intrinsic fairness] standard the burden is on [the parent] to prove, subject to careful judicial
scrutiny, that its transactions with [the subsidiary] were objectively fair.”).
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the intensity of fiduciary constraint.259 Taken together with other Delaware
precedent,260 Trados raises questions about the treatment of venture capitalists
in the Delaware courts.
This Part examines Trados critically, asserting that fiduciary scrutiny
under the intrinsic fairness standard and the common stock–maximization
norm are unsuited to this context. The coupling allows the entrepreneur to
recapture what it has already bargained away; worse, it can inhibit value
maximization. At the same time, we do not think that preferred stockholders
in control should be immunized from fiduciary scrutiny per se, even though
their control may be vested by an elaborate, exhaustively negotiated contract
structure. The moderate downside fact pattern holds out incentives for
preferred in control to sell the company for less than enterprise value, and it
is not clear that venture capital contracting structures contemplate that
result. We turn once again to good faith as the standard of review best
suited to the zone of corporate–contract overlap.
Section A describes venture capital contracting, focusing particularly on
control relationships. Section B turns to Trados, where controlling venture
capitalists effected an exit in apparent good faith, doing their best to get a
good price and settling for less than their liquidation preference, only to be
waylaid afterward by underwater common shareholders using fiduciary law to
extract holdup value. Section C addresses the case’s potential perverse effects.
Read literally, Trados requires venture capitalists to deploy their control to
yield value for the common shareholders even where the deployment impairs
the value of the corporation. The case’s unmitigated rule of common stock
maximization accordingly chills value-maximizing deals. We pose a narrower
rule under which fiduciary review for the common succeeds only where the
venture capitalist deploys control to sacrifice enterprise value: a formulation
that can easily be read together with mainstream fiduciary law. Section D
confronts a follow-up question: Should the contract paradigm be substituted
in the venture capital context to block fiduciary review where enterprise value
is sacrificed? There is a strong case in favor of doing so: an entrepreneur who
transfers control in exchange for venture capital financing arguably waives
the common stockholder’s objection to a sale below enterprise value. Such a
259
260

See generally Trados, 2009 WL 2225958.
See, e.g., Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, 2002 WL 1732423, at *16 (Del.
Ch. July 15, 2002) (rejecting a venture capitalist’s motion for a preliminary injunction, noting that
the venture capitalist’s “claims to a right to vote [on a merger] implicate significant issues of
corporate governance”); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1058-59 (Del. Ch.
1997) (concluding that it was in the board’s discretion to act in pursuit of the “highest achievable
present value”).
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waiver should be effective, but should be express, not implied. Finally,
Section E considers the alternative of relaxed scrutiny under the good faith
standard of review. Although relaxed scrutiny imposes some process costs
on the venture capitalist, they are not nearly as onerous as those that follow
from intrinsic fairness scrutiny. Given the exhaustive background of contractual
risk allocation in venture capitalist cases, relaxed scrutiny is the best fit.
A. Venture Capital Financing
Venture capital deals often are sealed with a thick stack of documents.261
Such “contracts’ primary job is to align the incentives of both the entrepreneur
and the venture capitalist toward success and, in the event of success, to
provide for gain sharing and liquidity for the venture capitalist” while
simultaneously assuring the entrepreneur of control going forward.262 The
contracts also provide for the event of failure by allocating such value as has
been created to the venture capitalist.263 As noted above,264 this is a singular
mode of financing. Venture capital contemplates intense involvement in the
business by the senior security holder, along with actual or contingent control
rights holding out potential destruction of the common stock interest.265
Convertible preferred stock is the dominant financial contract in the sector.266
1. The Upside and the Downside
The expectation is that if the project is successful, the venture capitalist will
realize its investment yield by cashing out in an IPO of the investee company’s
common stock.267 Thereafter the entrepreneur is left in control of the firm.268
The contract secures the venture capitalist its share of IPO proceeds
through the conversion privilege attached to the preferred and facilitates later

261 See BRATTON, supra note 23, at 741-42 (describing the Stock Purchase Agreement and
Investor’s Rights Agreement that enable an issue of venture capital and convertible preferred
stock).
262 Id. at 741.
263 See id. at 742 (“When a particular investment does turn out to be a complete failure, the
contract structures priorities to allocate any crumbs left on the table to the venture capitalist.”).
264 See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
265 Id.
266 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. There are important tax incentives for convertible
preferred stock. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure:
A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 898-901 (showing that
preferred stock provides “favorable tax treatment for the highly intense management incentives that
are central to venture capital contracting”).
267 See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
268 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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exit via the public trading market by providing registration rights.269 Conversion can be made mandatory where an IPO meets a financial qualification
such as an offering price that is a specified multiple greater than the original
selling price.270 Mandatory conversion assures that the venture capitalist does
indeed exit, leaving the entrepreneur in unchallenged control.271
Concerns about the entrepreneur’s incentives also loom large on the upside. These concerns are addressed by allocating the entrepreneur’s equity
interest in the firm’s growth in the form of common stock options that vest
over time.272 Sequential option vesting diminishes any temptation to
abandon the project prior to the IPO phase.273 Where the entrepreneur has
traded away boardroom control, the contingent payoff arrangement also
imports a high-powered incentive to remain in the good graces of the
venture capitalist and any outside directors.
Venture capital contracts treat downside scenarios by shaping priorities.
A startup that creates no value and runs out of capital goes into bankruptcy,
probably to be liquidated. Alternatively, if the startup has no significant debt, it
can be liquidated privately. Either way, contractual priorities will “allocate any
crumbs left on the table to the venture capitalist. But these will not amount to
much.”274 Indeed, “the risk of complete failure is intrinsic to venture capital
investment. Venture capital firms moderate it by staging the entrepreneur’s
drawdowns of capital, diversifying their portfolios of investments in startup
firms, syndicating investments in particular firms, and closely monitoring
their positions.”275
Poor or mediocre performance short of complete failure—the moderate
downside—is not unusual.276 It also presents a less tractable problem. Here
269 BRATTON, supra note 23, at 741; see also NVCA, Model Term Sheet 5 (Mar. 2011), available at
www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=75&Itemid=93 (mandatory
conversion terms); NVCA, Model Investors’ Rights Agreements 6-20 (Sept. 2012) (registration rights),
available at www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=69&Itemid=93.
270 See NVCA, Model Term Sheet, supra note 269, at 5 (mandatory conversion terms).
271 See Black & Gilson, supra note 251, at 261 (noting that following an IPO, the venture
capitalist’s mandatory conversion provisions ensure that its control rights “diminish over time,”
eventually resulting in “[c]ontrol becom[ing] vested in the entrepreneur”).
272 See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 131 (1999).
273 See id.
274 BRATTON, supra note 23, at 742.
275 Id.
276 Under a rule of thumb, “one-third of venture capital-financed companies end up in bankruptcy[;] . . . one-third end up . . . limping along[;] . . . [and o]nly one-third of the companies that
use venture capital financing succeed,” reaching the IPO stage. George W. Dent, Jr., Venture
Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1034 (1992); cf. GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note 272, at 150 tbl.7.3 (showing that in a study of venture capital–backed firms,
22.5% reached the IPO stage, 23.8% either merged with another company or were acquired, 15.6%
went bankrupt or were liquidated, and 38.1% were still private).
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the IPO route fails to open due to indifferent venture performance or adverse
market conditions,277 and the venture capital preferred remains unconverted.
The preferred issue’s duration looms large. “When . . . redemption rights
become exercisable, . . . the mediocre performer still limping along either
finds replacement capital,” is sold to a third party, is liquidated, or defends
itself in court.278 Whichever the case, the interests of the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist can conflict sharply, with the former desiring continuation
and a chance for an upside recovery and the latter desiring termination and
the certain realization of any value on the table.279
2. Control Arrangements
Control in a venture capital relationship need not follow directly from
ownership of a majority of the voting shares. Assume the venture capitalist
owns 55% of the voting stock and the entrepreneur owns 45%. Parties in this
posture often agree to share control of the board. Each party designates a
fixed number of directors, and the parties agree on the remaining director(s).
The third-party director takes the arbitrator’s role in the event of a dispute.
Given shared control, share ownership proportions can break in either
direction with the venture capitalist or the entrepreneur holding a majority.280
Relative stock ownership proportions also can vary over time. For example,
the venture capitalist can take a minority share upon the first drawdown
with its share growing to a majority as drawdowns proceed.281 Contrariwise,
the entrepreneur’s share can grow as performance-based stock allocations
come to vest.282 One study finds that the venture capitalist has a majority of
the votes in most of the cases.283
277 The NVCA reports that from 1996 to 2004, “there were more exits by acquisition than by
IPO in seven of . . . [nine] years.” Thomas Hellman, IPOs, Acquisitions, and the Use of Convertible
Securities in Venture Capital, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 649, 650 (2006).
278 See Bratton supra note 2, at 940.
279 See Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 994-97 (noting that “the divergence of interests between preferred and common shareholders will cause a preferred-dominated board to push for a
liquidity event or other low-risk, low-value strategy that fails to maximize shareholder value,”
whereas “[a] common-dominated board might have an incentive to choose a high-risk strategy
with less expected value for shareholders as a group”).
280 See Stephen N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Study of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 289-90 (2003)
(finding that control is shared between venture capitalist and entrepreneur in 61% of cases; that
control is held by one of the parties in the remaining 39% of cases); id. at 288 tbl.2 (showing that
the venture capitalist controls in two-thirds of cases with single party control).
281 Id. at 287-90.
282 Id. at 295.
283 See id. at 288, 290 (finding a venture capitalist majority in 69% of cases assuming no
vesting of the entrepreneur stock allocations and a venture capitalist majority in 53% of cases given
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There is accordingly no one-size-fits-all control pattern. Sometimes the
venture capitalist controls both the board and a majority of the stock; in a
smaller number of cases, the entrepreneur clearly controls; lastly, in many
cases, control is shared.284 Overall, the implication is that entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists are quite sensitive to control, its value, and the way in
which its allocation interplays with the other terms of their financings.
Note, however, that the venture capitalist–entrepreneur bargaining dynamic
just described is a simplification. Startup funding comes in different modes
and from different sources. Venture capital funds also invest later on, after
an IPO, with the degree of control dependent upon the situation.285 Nor are
venture capital firms the only source of startup capital. “Angel” investors286

full vesting; an entrepreneur majority in 12% of cases assuming no vesting and in 24% of cases
assuming full vesting; and no party control in 19% of cases assuming no vesting and 24% of cases
assuming full vesting); see also Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in
the Sale of VC-Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 388 (2010) (showing that among companies in
the sample, “[a]t the time of sale, 56.5% of all directors are appointed by the VCs and 22.8% are
appointed by common stockholders,” and that the venture capitalist controls the board in 58% of
companies); id. at 385, 388 (finding that in twenty-one out of the fifty firms sampled a combination
of outside directors and common shareholders can block a venture capitalist initiative in the
boardroom). Gordon Smith reviews another database and finds that “[s]ole control provisions
appear in the contracts” of 38% of cases sampled, and that among those cases, the venture capitalist
had control 77% of the time. See Smith, supra note 2, at 327. Smith finds that entrepreneurs tend to
start out in control of the board with venture capitalists taking voting control through the accrual
of board seats in subsequent financing rounds. Id. at 326-27. He finds no evidence of shared
control arrangements because the documents provide for all shareholders voting as a single class
on the open seat or seats. See id. at 326 (“In the contingent control provisions, votes cast by
common stockholders and preferred stockholders typically are lumped together in a single tally,
and formal power thus resides with whichever class of stockholders holds a majority of the
votes.”). Given a conflict, it follows that control ultimately goes to the party that possesses the
voting majority.
284 While the venture capitalist often shares control in the boardroom, this shared control
does not necessarily imply equal power. If the venture capitalist has greater influence over the
tiebreaker director, the venture capitalist can dominate the board without outright control. See
Bratton, supra note 2, at 921 (noting that under some arrangements, where the entrepreneur and
venture capitalist disagree on a tiebreaking director, the party with the larger number of shares
chooses the candidate, and thus, “in the event of disagreement, the party with the share voting
majority controls all significant firm decisions”); Smith, supra note 2, at 320 (“Moreover, in the
event of conflict between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, such outside directors may
have a natural inclination to side with the venture capitalist.”). For evidence that the tiebreaker
director can opt instead to support the common shareholders on the allocation of sale consideration
on fairness grounds, see Broughman & Fried, supra note 283, at 392-95.
285 See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1044, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(describing a corporation already listed on the NASDAQ that received loans from investors in
exchange for preferred stock).
286 The term originally described affluent individuals who financed Broadway plays. See COLLEEN
DEBAISE, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. COMPLETE SMALL BUSINESS GUIDEBOOK 49 (2009).
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provide funding to startups at earlier stages.287 Angels are wealthy (often
retired) individuals who invest personal funds in nearby companies involved
in familiar lines of business.288 Like venture capitalists, though in a somewhat different manner, angels provide entrepreneurs with advice and the
benefit of their experience.289 Amounts invested in “angel rounds” are
smaller than in venture capitalist rounds, ranging only from $100,000 to $2
million, but the number of startups receiving angel capital is much larger
than the number receiving venture capital.290 Further, aggregate annual
angel investment now equals or exceeds that of venture capital.291 Significantly, angels tend to take common stock stakes, foregoing board seats,
negative covenants, vetoes, and exit rights.292 This is in part because angelfunded startups want to hold open a door for later venture capital financing.293
An all-common capital structure amounts to a clean slate open to the
addition of layers of venture preferred.294
B. The Trados Intervention
The leading Delaware case on venture capital preferred, Equity-Linked
Investors v. Adams,295 sends a stark message: The common stock–maximization
norm protects the discretion of boards of directors that take action inimical to
the interests of noncontrolling venture capitalists.296 In re Trados Inc. Shareholder
287 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 1405, 1417-18 (2008) (noting that angel investors fund companies during their earliest stages,
including their first year, while traditional venture capitalists typically wait longer before investing).
288 Id. at 1438-40.
289 See id. at 1419 (“While venture capitalists take a more formal role . . . angels provide
informal advice and counseling.”).
290 Id. at 1418-19.
291 Id. at 1419.
292 Id. at 1422-23.
293 See id. at 1428 (“Th[e] need for venture capital sets de facto limits on the terms of the
angel investment contract.”).
294 See id. at 1429 (“A start-up marred by a complicated angel round is unattractive to venture
capitalists because it requires them to ‘unwind’ the nonstandard angel preferences in order to strike
the venture capitalists’ standard deal. . . . [T]his unwinding takes time, effort, and money . . . .”).
295 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997).
296 A noncontrolling venture capitalist investor sought to block a lowball control sale by an
entrepreneur who was willing to do just about anything to prevent a control transfer to the venture
capitalist. See id. at 1050-52 (describing the entrepreneur’s disapproval of a restricting plan).
Declining to come to the aid of the venture capitalist investor, the court stressed that the duty of
the board was not to maximize the value of the company, as an economist might insist. See id. at
1058-59 (approving the board’s goal to “maximize the possibility of the common stock participating in
some ‘upside’ benefit from the commercial development of the company’s intellectual properties”).
The legal duty was to maximize the value of the common stock; and putting the assets to the
preferred would risk liquidation, which would wipe out the common. Id.
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Litigation297 presents a group of venture capitalists who got the message. They
controlled the board298 and drafted a liquidation preference triggered by a
control transfer.299 But board control vested in a majority shareholder implies
fiduciary responsibilities to the minority. Therein lies the question: Which
trumps, the contract paradigm and the allocation of risk bound up in venture
capital contracting arrangements, or the corporate paradigm and the duty
selflessly to treat the interests of the minority common stockholders?
The company in the case had been building itself up for an IPO for a
number of years without success, in the process issuing several series of
venture capital preferred.300 Control had been surrendered to the venture
capitalists, whose designees occupied four of seven board seats.301 Two other
seats went to the two top officers.302 An independent director occupied the
seventh seat.303
The venture capitalists, realizing no return on their investments, lost
patience and decided to shop the company. They therefore brought in a new
CEO to put the company in salable condition.304 At approximately the same
time, they received a $40 million offer but deemed it too low.305 At their
investment banker’s suggestion, the board instituted a management incentive
scheme designed to give the three top officers a cut of any merger proceeds.306
As a result, within one year, costs were cut, debt financing was secured,
and the company’s prospects were much improved.307 The company was
shopped again and the board approved a merger yielding $60 million.308 The
proceeds were allocated $7.8 million to the executives under the incentive plan
and the rest to the preferred, with nothing to the common.309 The preferred
took the entire remainder because the charter provided that a merger be
deemed a liquidation; therefore, the preferred’s $57.9 million liquidation
preference soaked up the remaining consideration without being satisfied.310
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306

Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. More specifically, the plan consisted of a tiered incentive structure under which the
management pool would receive 6% of a $30 to $40 million deal, 11% of a deal for $40 to $50 million
deal, 13% of a $50 to $90 million deal and so on up to a 15% cut of a deal over $120 million. Id. at *3 n.5.
307 Id. at *3.
308 Id. at *3-4.
309 Id. at *4.
310 Id.
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A common stockholder responded with an appraisal action, but, apparently
disappointed with its prospects, switched over to a complaint for breach of
fiduciary duty.311 The complaint alleged that the defendants had breached
their fiduciary duty to the common shareholders because “there was no need
to sell [the company] at the time,” given that it was “well-financed, profitable,
and beating revenue projections,”312 and because, had the board waited,
there might have been proceeds for the common.313 The plaintiffs also
argued that the common had priority fiduciary status, and yet that the board
failed to take the common’s interest into account.314
The Chancery Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
breach of fiduciary duty claim.315 It analyzed the case as one of director selfdealing. The venture capitalists’ director-designees were interested in the
outcome of the transaction by virtue of their positions at the various
venture firms;316 the two officer-directors were interested under the bonus
arrangement. The interest having been shown, the business judgment
presumption was overcome,317 and under the duty of loyalty, the burden
shifted to the defendants to show entire fairness.318 In other words, when
controlling preferred cause the corporation to enter into a transaction that
realizes their contractual preferences on the moderate downside, approval by
controlled board members will be treated, at the behest of a complaining
common stockholder, as engaging in a self-dealing transaction. The preferred’s
rights get no recognition under fiduciary law because they are contractual; the
interests of the common, by contrast, do get recognition.319
311
312
313

Id.
Id. at *6.
See id. at *7 (“[I]t is reasonable to infer that the common stockholders would have been
able to receive some consideration for their Trados shares at some point in the future had the
merger not occurred.”).
314 Id. at *6.
315 Id. at *10.
316 Id. at *8.
317 Id.
318 Id. at *9 n.56.
319 Id. at *7 (“This Court has held that directors owe fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders
as well as common stockholders where the right claimed by the preferred ‘is not to a preference as
against the common stock but rather a right shared equally with the common.’” (quoting Jedwab v.
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986))); id. (“Where this is not the case,
however, ‘generally it will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be
exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock—as the good faith judgment of the board sees
them to be—to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock,
where there is a conflict.’” (quoting Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042
(Del. Ch. 1997))). Note that both Jedwab and Equity-Linked Investors arose on the converse fact
pattern where a preferred stockholder claimed fiduciary protection against common in control, and
in effect, remitted the preferred to the contract-drafting table to bargain for more protection the
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Apparently, the corporate paradigm trumps the contract paradigm even
where the resulting fiduciary intervention disrupts a power allocation
effected in a heavily negotiated deal between sophisticated parties. This
result is questionable. Venture capital investment is a high-risk, high-return
proposition for all participants.320 The deal structure often allocates to the
venture capitalist the power to detach the assets from the entrepreneur and
deploy them somewhere (or with someone) else.321 Infinite patience is not
expected from the venture capitalist—the venture capitalist has investors of
its own and is under pressures to yield returns in a competitive market. This
all-or-nothing governance framework presumably yields a highly incentivized
entrepreneur. Trados hobbles the incentive structure by handing the entrepreneur a fiduciary backstop in the teeth of the deal’s allocation of risk.
The Sections that follow take up, in two phases, the problems Trados
leaves behind. Section IV.C assumes fiduciary review under an intrinsic
fairness standard and demonstrates the case’s potential perverse effects.
Section IV.D considers whether the contract paradigm should be invoked to
block fairness scrutiny altogether.
C. Trados and the Value-Maximizing Merger
Trados is troublesome in four respects. First, its directive to maximize
common stock value makes economic sense in some situations but not in
others. Second, read literally, the case makes it impossible for preferred in
control to effect a maximizing sale without surrendering holdup value to the
common. Third, the case slaps down fairness scrutiny in the teeth of the risk
allocation bound up in an antecedent bargain. Fourth, it fails to leave open a
door through which parties negotiating future deals can contract out from
under the scrutiny it imposes. This Section takes up these problems in turn.
1. Common Stock Maximization Versus
Enterprise Value Maximization
Sometimes preferred in control has an incentive to sacrifice enterprise
value. Trados scrutiny can make economic sense in such a case. In other
next time around. Trados is a case where the preferred had done exactly that. Significantly, these
precedents had been thought to direct fiduciary duties in accordance with control. See Fried & Ganor,
supra note 2, at 990-93 (“A common-controlled board owes a duty to common shareholders and is free
to take steps to benefit the common, even at the expense of the preferred and of total shareholder
value. However, under the courts’ control-contingent approach to fiduciary duties, a preferredcontrolled board is not obligated to serve common shareholders’ interests.” (footnote omitted)).
320 See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
321 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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situations, maximization of the value of preferred in control also maximizes
enterprise value, while common stock maximization makes the enterprise
less valuable. Here Trados scrutiny creates problems.
Preferred, as a senior claim, will avoid taking value-enhancing risk in a
case where common, as the at-the-margin residual interest, would assume the
risk. This standard incentive-incompatibility story can be told by tweaking
the Trados fact pattern.322 Assume that the venture capitalists’ liquidation
preference is $40 million and wind back the clock to the beginning of the
sale effort. There is a $40 million offer on the table. The preferred can take
it or hire a turnaround expert and try again the next year. There is a 75%
chance that a turnaround will produce an offer of $60 million and a 25%
chance that the turnaround will fail and market conditions worsen so that
the best offer will be $30 million. The expected value of the company given
the turnaround attempt is $52.5 million ($60 million x .75 + $30 million x .25).
The venture capitalist, however, has no incentive to take the risk because its
upside is capped at $40 million. It therefore takes the bird in the hand
because the turnaround carries a $10 million downside risk—a classic case of
a sacrifice of enterprise value stemming from a senior security holder’s
aversion to risk. In this scenario, maximizing for the common, which captures
the risky marginal gain, also maximizes value for the enterprise as a whole.
But that is not always the case. Trados, by insisting on a preference for
the common stock, holds out perverse incentives where maximizing for the
common sacrifices enterprise value. To see why, go back to the case and
assume that the $60 million offer is on the table and that there are two
possible outcomes if the offer is not accepted. There is a 25% chance that a
$70 million offer can be realized in the intermediate term and a 75% chance
that the markets will turn down and $50 million will be the best offer available.
The expected value of delay is $55 million ($70 million x .25 + $50 million x
.75). Delay thus sacrifices $5 million of enterprise value in exchange for a
chance to realize an expected $750,000 ($3 million x .25) for the common.323
The second set of numbers replays the familiar problem of debt and equity
on the downside. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications
322 For another telling, see Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 994-97 (“[T]he debt-like nature of
their cash flow rights may cause preferred shareholders controlling the board to choose lower-risk,
lower-value business strategies over higher-risk strategies that would maximize aggregate
shareholder value.”).
323 Recall that, of the potential $70 million, $57.9 million goes to the preferred to satisfy their
liquidation preference. See supra text accompanying note 310. Further, 13% of the $70 million will
be paid to the management pool per the terms of the incentive structure. See supra note 306.
Subtracting the aggregate of these two distributions ($57.9 million and $9.1 million) leaves $3
million for the common.
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Corp., Chancellor Allen famously suggested that fiduciary law should favor
enterprise value maximization (and the creditor interest) over shareholder
value maximization where extreme financial distress inclines the common
interest to low return, speculative investment.324 The suggestion opened up
the possibility of liability for directors pursuing common stock returns in
the “zone of insolvency,” a possibility minimized by subsequent decisions.325
Trados reminds us that common stock–enterprise value conflicts can arise
incident to any priority claim—senior equity claims as well as debt—and can
arise on the moderate downside as well as in the zone of insolvency. Trados,
however, implicates the converse problem. Credit Lyonnais opens a door to a
creditor action against common-maximizing directors who sacrifice enterprise
value. Conversely, Trados imposes potential fiduciary liability on directors who
pursue enterprise value over suboptimal speculation for the common’s benefit.
It follows that, depending on the facts of the case, Trados can push a preferred-controlled board away from an optimal result. Were that the only
problem, we could stop here and recommend that the duty be reframed in
terms of enterprise value—the common stockholder plaintiff would be
required to plead and prove that the preferred holder’s sale sacrificed
enterprise value (as opposed to common stock value). But it is more
complicated. Trados makes it harder for a venture capitalist in control to
realize on its investment whatever the particular case’s value posture, thus
creating holdup value for the common.326 Worse, Trados leaves no opening
through which a venture capitalist can completely contract around the
problem in advance.

324 See Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“But if we
consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it seems apparent that one
should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than
$15.55 million, and one below that amount should be rejected. But that result will not be reached
by a director who thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only.”).
325 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94
(Del. 2007) (“[T]he creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of
insolvency have no right, as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty
against the corporation’s directors.”).
326 Broughman and Fried show that deviations from contracted allocations in favor of the
common occur in eleven out of the fifty cases examined such that the venture capitalists in those
cases realize eighty-nine cents on the dollar. Broughman & Fried, supra note 283, at 391. Even
absent a fiduciary leg up from Trados, we attribute these findings to independent-director presence
in the boardroom and California’s provision of a mandatory class vote for the common. See id. at
392-95 (finding that lack of venture capitalist board control and incorporation in California are
associated with lower realization rates). For the converse situation, in which a venture capitalist
allegedly uses its control position to enhance its share of cash flows by engineering dilutive stock
issues, see Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Tech., Inc., No. Civ.A. 7301–VCL, 2013 WL 1091048 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 15, 2013) (denying venture capitalist defendants’ motion to dismiss).
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2. Selling the Company Under Trados
For purposes of this discussion, assume the second situation described
above: preferred control, and a $60 million immediate sale maximizes
enterprise value, while common stock maximization dictates delay in search
of a $70 million offer. How, given Trados, can the controlling venture
capitalist effect the immediate sale? The case leaves the venture capitalist
with a Hobson’s choice: either sell into litigation risk or make a side payment directly to the underwater common in exchange for the holdup value
the case creates.
Let us first try to process our way out of the problem. First, the venture
capitalist will engage an investment banker to opine on the fairness of the
sale price. Unfortunately, an opinion on the fairness of $60 million will
afford little comfort given the threat of intrinsic fairness scrutiny under a
common stock–maximization principle. Indeed, a fairness opinion that
reports the numbers in the hypothetical and admits a 25% chance of a $70
million sale makes the plaintiff ’s case under a literal reading of Trados.
Let us accordingly process further and have independent directors manage
the merger. Independent directors are, of course, a normal incident of
today’s fiduciary regime, especially during sale of a company. Even so, we
make a considerable concession. The independent board regime was designed
with public companies in mind, not startups unable to reach the IPO stage.
The cost burden of a constructed negotiation accordingly is not trivial for a
company like that in Trados, with one independent director out of seven.
Let us recruit a couple of new directors for the occasion. Next, a question
will arise as to whether a special negotiating committee representing only
the common interest is necessary, by analogy to the parent–subsidiary
cashout merger cases. If it is necessary, we potentially arrive at the tripartite
negotiation that so troubled the Chancery Court in James, with the venture
capitalists and their designees negotiating the sale price with the third-party
buyer and the common’s directors interposing themselves to look for more
money however they can get it.327 Such a committee will be in an awkward
position in our case: to satisfy the venture capitalist’s liquidation preference
and bring any capital home for the common, it would have to hold out for a
deal priced higher than $66.55 million;328 failing that, it would be negotiating
for holdup value.
327 See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties that a committee of
independent directors faced in satisfying both the common and the preferred in a potential merger deal).
328 Cf. supra note 323. This figure is derived by subtracting 13% of itself (the board’s share),
since it will surely have to be greater than $60 million, but may still be less than $90 million, further
subtracting the $57.9 million preferred liquidation preference, simply to reach the breakeven point
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Any result negotiated by a special committee entails a residuum of litigation risk, even a high-end settlement. Suppose, for example, that the
merger is priced at $70 million after much pushing by the independent
committee. This transaction yields $3 million to the common. The committee,
advised by its own investment banker, finds the price fair. Yet nothing
prevents a lawyer from drafting the same “might have waited” complaint
that survived a motion to dismiss in Trados329—maybe waiting a year would
have yielded $75 million. Such a claim is as hard to falsify as it is easy to
draft. Even so, the process precautions strengthen the venture capitalist’s
hand—given an independent special committee with veto power representing
the common interest, the common are deprived of the claim that the board
engaged in self-dealing, which proved actionable in Trados.330 It would seem
to follow that the burden of proof regarding fairness shifts to the plaintiff.331
Such a shift may suffice to baffle a “might have waited” pleading.
The foregoing amounts to cold comfort for the venture capitalist for all
sale prices under $66.55 million. Under a common stock–maximization
norm, any result that wipes out the common is vulnerable to a “might have
waited” complaint. It follows that the “fair” return negotiated by the special
committee comes out of the venture capitalist’s liquidation preference, or in
other words, holdup value.
Having arrived at this point, we ask whether we should dispense with the
special negotiating committee and negotiate directly with the holder of the
common. Direct negotiation seems sensible given a simple two-party case
with a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur. A successful direct negotiation
leads to a surrender of the fiduciary claim in connection with the payment,
eliminating litigation risk. But suppose the company’s buyer has no further
use for the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur is looking for compensation
for loss of position and will happily kill the deal for any return under $20
million. Here, constructed negotiation through a special committee might
be cheaper for the venture capitalist, even given litigation risk. Alternatively,
suppose that the company has gone through numerous rounds of angel
financing and that a collection of wealthy individuals holds common in
(the point at which the corporation can satisfy its obligations to both the board and the preferred).
Therefore, to reach this breakeven point the price must be at least equal to the sum of 13% of itself
and $57.9 million. Solving using simple mathematics, x = .13x + 57.9; therefore, x = 66.55.
329 See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *10 (Del.
Ch. July 24, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss “with respect to the claim . . . for breach of
fiduciary duty arising out of the board’s approval of the merger”).
330 Id.
331 This burden shifting follows by analogy to the cash out merger cases. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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addition to the entrepreneur. The only way to eliminate litigation risk is to
get all the parties on board. A secondary holdup problem results: less-thanangelic common holders may ask for more than a pro rata share of the
settlement. Finally, it bears noting that common holders have an incentive
to negotiate for more than their due even when they are not underwater.
For example, although a merger priced at $70 million yields the common $3
million net of the venture capitalist’s liquidation preference, nothing stops
the common from negotiating for a higher figure.
In sum, the venture capitalist in control can succeed in selling the investee
company post-Trados, but only at considerable additional cost.
3. Contracting Out of Fairness Scrutiny:
Drag-Along Rights
There is a standard response to the complaint just registered. To the
extent that the venture capitalist is averse to litigation risk or otherwise
dissatisfied with the incentive effects of Trados, it can deflect the risk at the
contracting stage.332 The fiduciary common stock–maximization principle
purports only to fill in a gap in an incomplete contract.333 Typically, the
burden to contract around the corporate law default falls on the preferred.334
The response has superficial credibility, for there is a standard contract
that addresses this problem—a shareholders’ agreement containing “dragalong rights.”335 The credibility is superficial because Trados disrupted the
contracting field, impairing the operation of the drag-along rights. Indeed,
on the facts of Trados, no available contractual circumlocution exists.
Drag-along rights appear in shareholder voting agreements, which are a
standard feature of venture capital term sheets.336 We have seen, for example,
that a shared-control boardroom might consist of two venture capitalist
designees, two entrepreneur designees, and a tiebreaker. A contract between
the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur, entered into by both in their

332 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing broadly classification of shares
and penalty defaults at the contracting stage).
333 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
334 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
335 See, e.g., NVCA, Model Voting Agreement 5 n.11 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter Model Voting
Agreement], available at www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=76
&Itemid=93 (“A drag-along right gives a defined group of stockholders the right to deliver all (or
most) of the shares of a company without the need of effecting a freeze-out merger.”).
336 See id. § 3 (providing a drag-along right provision in a model voting agreement).
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capacities as voting shareholders, assures that both shareholders cast their
votes in the tiebreaker’s favor at the annual meeting.337
Drag-along rights similarly seek to assure fulfillment of expectations
respecting a future sale of the company by allocating the right to force a sale
of the company to a stated threshold percentage of a class (or classes) of
shareholders.338 Assume by way of example a five-seat board with a tiebreaker
director, a venture capitalist with 49% of the voting shares, and an entrepreneur with 51% of the voting shares. Assume that the venture capitalist’s
two directors plus the tiebreaker vote in favor of a merger. The merger, once
approved by the board of directors, requires the confirming vote of a
shareholder majority. Absent a contract, the entrepreneur can use its votes
to veto the deal. The voting agreement avoids that result by securing the
entrepreneur’s advance promise to vote in favor of a merger having the
preferred’s support.339 A promise not to seek appraisal can also be included.340
A caveat must be noted here: a shareholders’ agreement only binds its
signatories. Accordingly, it best suits a simple venture capitalist–entrepreneur
fact pattern. Given layers of angel investors in the shareholder group, more
complicated issues may arise. Assume that a venture capitalist sensibly
conditions its provision of funds on 100% common assent to the shareholders’
agreement. A less-than-angelic common holder might say no and ask to be
removed with some of the proceeds of the financing. Therefore, once again,
avoiding Trados means confronting holdouts.
Let us assume that all common shareholders will sign on. A question then
arises: Does the drag-along just described completely solve the Trados
problem for the venture capitalist? The issue is whether the shareholders’
advance consent somehow obviates or excuses the self-interested breach of the
duty of loyalty that occurs in the boardroom, when the venture capitalist’s
director designees approve a later deal. Arguably, no excuse follows because
Trados situates the breach in the boardroom rather than framing the matter
as a shareholder-level breach by a controller against a minority.341

337 See id. § 1 (providing a shareholders’ agreement that sets out promises to vote for one another’s
designees at elections of directors).
338 See id. § 3.2 (“[A drag-along right provision establishes that in] the event that . . . the
holders of at least [some specified threshold] of the shares of Common Stock then issued or
issuable upon conversion of the shares of . . . Preferred Stock . . . approve a Sale of the Company
in writing[,] . . . then each Stockholder and the Company hereby agree . . . [to] take such . . .
action in support of the Sale of the Company as shall reasonably be requested by the Company or
the Selling Investors . . . .”).
339 Id. § 3.2(a).
340 Id. § 3.2(e).
341 See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
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The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) revised its model
version of the venture capital shareholders’ agreement in response to
Trados.342 The revision seeks to square the circle by forcing the sale while
simultaneously getting the self-interested approving directors off the Trados
hook. The vehicle is a promise made by the issuer corporate entity to the
shareholder parties. Under the promise, a designated threshold percentage
of shareholders can direct the corporation to sell itself.343 The drafter outlines
a series of processes the company must undertake to effect the sale.344 Thus,
the initiation of a sale process triggers corporate-level contractual duties to
take actions that facilitate the deal. Actual performance of these functions,
in theory, cannot be characterized as a “self-dealing transaction.”
But there is only so much a contract can do in advance to get a company
sold. A merger ultimately requires the approval of the transferor’s board of
directors.345 The new NCVA drag-along rights contemplate that this step be
taken, but they provide in the alternative for a case where board approval is
refused.346 Such a situation is possible where directors are unwilling to stick
out their necks and approve a merger threatened by a Trados claim holding
out potential personal liability. Given a refusal, the agreement provides for
redemption of the venture capitalist preferred at a price equal to the amount
that would have been allocated to the preferred had the rejected transaction
been consummated.347 The idea is either to sell the company with the board’s
approval or, failing that, to substitute an automatic redemption obviating
the need for board approval.
This is all very convoluted and clever, but unfortunately, it does not
solve the Trados problem. Redemption in lieu of a merger is not the same as
a merger, for absent the acquirer’s cash, there is unlikely to be money on the
table with which to redeem the preferred. The trigger does give the venture
capitalist a viable threat, and this redemption threat presumably makes the

342 See Model Voting Agreement supra note 335, at add. n.29 (proposing “‘Sales Rights’ provisions . . . designed to insulate the Board from a Trados-type claim”).
343 See id. at add. (“Upon written notice to the Company from the Electing Holders, the
Company shall initiate a process . . . in accordance with this Section . . . intended to result in a
Sale of the Company.”).
344 Id. at add. § 1.2.
345 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2011) (“The board of directors of each corporation
which desires to merge or to consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of
merger or consolidation . . . .”). Absent a charter amendment that remits merger approval to
shareholder governance, the Delaware Code still requires a board decision. See id. § 141(a) (“The
business . . . of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided . . . in its certificate of incorporation.”).
346 Model Voting Agreement, supra note 335, at add. § 1.3.
347 Id. at add. § 1.3(b).
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board members’ action in approving the merger more reasonable. But it is
hard to see how this background contractual maneuvering either makes the
merger any less “interested” if the approving board members are also
venture capitalist designees or makes the merger price intrinsically fair
under Trados. If, in the alternative, the board simply rejects the venture
capitalist’s deal and redemption rights are triggered and exercised, we find
ourselves back at ThoughtWorks, which, read together with Trados, implies a
duty on the board’s part to drag its feet about paying the redemption price!348
4. Summary
Trados burdens venture capital finance. The burden is especially heavy
on deals already in place at the time of the decision that did not have the
benefit of the NVCA’s redrafted shareholders’ agreement. Given a merger
that maximizes enterprise value, there are no cognizable countervailing
economic benefits to justify the costs imposed. Nor does such a lawsuit
vindicate any serious notion of fairness.
“Fairness” in the venture capital context cannot be determined by taking a
snapshot of the board that approved the merger, as the court did in Trados.
The causal chain needs to be considered in the wider transactional context.
The common in the case came away with nothing because (a) venture capitalist
designees dominated the board,349 (b) the company earlier had surrendered a
majority of the board seats to the venture capitalists in exchange for venture
capital, and (c) the company gave up a $57.9 million liquidation preference to
the venture capitalists in exchange for their capital.350 A reference to the
doctrinal framework that formerly came to bear on this fact pattern,351 the
majority–minority fiduciary duty as articulated in Sinclair v. Levien,352 draws
out the implications of the second and third links in the causal chain. Under
Levien, self-dealing by a majority shareholder gives rise to intrinsic fairness
scrutiny, with the burden of proof on the majority shareholder; self-dealing is
implied if the majority takes value to the minority’s exclusion and detriment.353
Value was taken in Trados, but only pursuant to the ex ante contract. There
was no failure to share and no breach up to $57.9 million. Any failure to share
implicated only the timing—the board gave up the value of the option to

348
349
350
351
352
353

See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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delay. But, as we have seen, the option probably had no value from an
enterprise perspective.
The only value protected is doctrinal—the positive (as opposed to normative) place held by the common stock directive, and that is not enough to
justify the result. A common stock–maximization principle not only encourages
sacrifices of enterprise value, but adds costs by encouraging underwater
common to disrupt ex ante bargains in search of holdup value. An enterprise
value–maximization principle presents a much stronger case for fiduciary
scrutiny with a more balanced tradeoff of costs and benefits. It follows that a
common stockholder challenging a sale effected by a preferred holder in
control should be required to plead and prove a sacrifice of enterprise value.
D. Trados and the Suboptimal Merger
We return to the first merger described in the preceding section—a $40
million deal that pays the venture capitalist its liquidation preference but
foregoes the opportunity to realize an expected value of $52.5 million, with
the entire $12.5 differential borne by the common. Here, the litigation threat
performs an efficiency function by ameliorating the structural tendency of
senior security holders to make lowball deals. Investment banker opinions and
independent directors now serve a function, and even a special committee
charged with the common’s interest makes sense—one is less worried about
disrupting a deal that should be killed in any event.
The fairness posture also reverses. A merger below enterprise value is the
archetypical appraisal case. But, by analogy to parent–subsidiary mergers,
appraisal should not be the exclusive remedy and a door should be held
open for a process complaint.354 And, given a sale below enterprise value
engineered by interested directors, there is a serious process complaint.
Traditional majority–minority fiduciary duty applies with full force.
A question arises nonetheless: Is Trados scrutiny undesirable here as
well because it disrupts a settled contractual risk allocation? Professors
Baird and Henderson, in an article that anticipated Trados, opine that
scrutiny is undesirable.355 They advocate a contractual barrier to fiduciary
review and argue that fiduciary law should demand neither common stock–
value maximization nor enterprise value maximization in venture capital
354 See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985)
(stressing that a showing of procedural unfairness supports an action for breach of fiduciary duty
and defeats appraisal exclusivity).
355 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1328-33 (arguing, in light of Orban v. Field, Civ.
A. No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997), that courts should not stand in the way of
venture capitalists deciding when to pull the plug on a struggling company).
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contexts.356 Their theory rests on the assumption that parties can opt out of
the applicable fiduciary duty, an assumption supported by close corporation
cases on the majority–minority shareholder duty.357 Trados, by resituating
the fiduciary breach in the boardroom, blocks the possibility of opting out
of such duty. In Delaware, charters can opt out of the board’s duty of care,
but not the board’s duty of loyalty.358
It is not clear whether opting out would work in Delaware even if Trados
had not moved the duty into the boardroom. Baird and Henderson’s proposition is important nonetheless as a theoretical exercise pushing venture
capital preferred to a contractual extreme. We consider it in this Section and
find ourselves in partial disagreement. We recommend entertaining common stock complaints alleging sacrifices of enterprise value; but, in order to
reduce costs to the venture capitalist and diminish the holdup threat, we
would substitute good faith for intrinsic fairness as the standard of review.
In addition, we recommend respect for venture capital deals that expressly
contract out from under the duty.
Baird and Henderson acknowledge that senior security holders in control
have imperfect incentives, and thus can be expected not only to fail to
maximize the value of the common, but also rationally to sacrifice enterprise
value.359 Even so, Baird and Henderson, analogizing to an enforcing lender,360
356
357

Id. at 1332-33.
See Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that an employeeshareholder waived fiduciary duties in his shareholders’ agreement); Baird & Henderson, supra
note 2, at 1319 n.50 (“A minority shareholder in a close corporation, by that status alone, who
contractually agrees to the repurchase of his shares upon termination of his employment for any
reason, acquires no right from the corporation or majority shareholders against at-will discharge.”
(citing Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (N.Y. 1989))).
358 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). Opting out is a topic of controversy in Delaware law today, but provisions of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act favor freedom of
contract and make fiduciary duties a function of the parties’ choices. Edward P. Welch & Robert
S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. C ORP. L.
845, 864 (2008) (“[P]arties forming a Delaware limited liability company or a Delaware limited
partnership are specifically authorized by statute to agree that the managers . . . will not owe any
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the members or limited partners.”); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 17-1101(d) (2005) (“[A partner’s duties to a limited partnership] (including fiduciary duties) . . . may
be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership agreement”); id.
§ 18-1101(b) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of
contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”); id. § 18-1101(c) (“[A
member’s duties to a limited partnership] (including fiduciary duties) . . . may be expanded or
restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement . . . .”).
For the view that fiduciary duties are hardwired into all Delaware business forms as a function
of the constitutional vesting of Chancery Court jurisdiction, see Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s NonWaivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 713-18 (2011).
359 See Baird & Henderson, supra note 2, at 1331 (“The business was worth enough to pay the
preferred shareholders more than ninety percent of what they were owed if sold immediately.
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would have the contract paradigm trump the corporate paradigm as a
structural proposition.361 The common have given up contingent control
rights—rights with the potential to “destroy firm value”—to the venture
capitalist.362 On the other hand, the common and their managers emerge with
“just the right incentives . . . to operate the firm efficiently in the first place.”363
Significantly, Baird and Henderson neither invoke the contract paradigm
absolutely nor advocate a complete retreat from fiduciary scrutiny. Although
they would eliminate intrinsic fairness scrutiny on a Trados-style fact
pattern,364 they pose a hypothetical on which such scrutiny should proceed.365
Here, the venture capitalist dominates without controlling the board.366 It
encourages profligate spending even as the company turns down opportunities
for additional financing, assuring the other board members that additional
financing on better terms is readily available.367 When the company runs out
of cash and is desperate, the venture capitalist secures a bridge loan and
takes, for its pains, bargain warrants that almost dilute the common out of
existence.368 According to Baird and Henderson, if the common can show
that the board turned down legitimate deals on an insufficient process basis
while dominated by a conflicted director, a fiduciary action should lie.369
But wherein lies the distinction? Baird and Henderson do not elaborate
further. There are two possible ways to distinguish the cases: good faith or
implied waiver.

From the perspective of the preferred stockholders, the additional energy and monies spent on
finding a buyer would not be well spent. They faced all the downside from waiting, while someone
else (the principal common shareholder) would enjoy most of the upside.” (footnote omitted)).
360 Id. at 1332-33.
361 Id. at 1314 (“At first cut, we should respect the choices investors and directors make, even
if they seem to create situations where the board acts in ways that appear to destroy firm value.”);
id. at 1332-33 (arguing that the “fact that [contracted control rights] are ubiquitous and have
persevered in a highly competitive industry is enough to give corporate law pause before
disrupting them”).
362 Id. at 1332.
363 Id. at 1332-33.
364 Id. at 1331-33.
365 Id. at 1332-33 n.106 (preserving scrutiny in certain cases with self-dealing).
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Id. The authors suggest that the case could overcome Orban v. Field, Civ. A. No. 12820,
1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997), a case the Trados court did not follow. See In re Trados Inc.
S’holder Litig., Civ. A. No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (noting
that in Orban the court assumed that the business judgment rule did not apply, whereas “the issue
on the motion to dismiss [in the instant case] is whether plaintiff has rebutted the presumption of
the business judgment rule”).
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Let us first try good faith. The hypothetical poses a bad faith venture
capitalist who, motivated by the chance of personal gain, sacrifices enterprise
value at the expense of the other claimants. If we take the value-maximizing
$60 million version of Trados and stipulate that the venture capitalists
believe they have made the best possible deal, it is a case of good faith,
distinct from Baird and Henderson’s hypothetical. Unfortunately, however,
the distinction lacks traction. If we switch to the $40 million version of
Trados and stipulate that the venture capitalists are aware of a better deal or
recklessly disregard chances to get a better deal, then the venture capitalists
are no more in good faith than the venture capitalists in the hypothetical.
Yet Baird and Henderson would block scrutiny.
Therefore, implied waiver holds out the better distinction. The common
can foresee a below enterprise value sale by a venture capitalist in control
looking for an exit when the deal is made. We accordingly could imply a
waiver of scrutiny in the deal structure. Underhanded domination of the
board on a going-concern basis to beat down the company to a fire sale price
is sneakier, more contrived, and less easily foreseen. A waiver of scrutiny
accordingly is less easily implied. Scrutiny arguably is blocked in the first,
foreseeable case, but not in the second, unforeseeable case.
With waiver as the theory, we must confront the resulting problem of
contract interpretation. Baird and Henderson in effect imply a waiver of
objection to a sale as a structural proposition. As a theoretical matter, once
the waiver is implied, the contract is completed with respect to a future sale
of the company. With a complete contract, fiduciary duty has no place.
This goes against the doctrinal grain. In the context of limited liability
companies where opting out of fiduciary duties is an active possibility, the
opt-out must be explicit.370 A question arises at this point: Should drag-along
rights, in their pre-Trados form, be read to effect the waiver? Here, in
relevant part, is the language from the NVCA Model Voting Agreement.
The shareholder agrees
to execute and deliver all related documentation and take such other action in
support of the Sale of the Company as shall reasonably be requested by the
Company or the Selling Investors in order to carry out the terms and provision of this [section], including without limitation executing and delivering
370 See, e.g., Kelly v. Blum, Civ. A. No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24,
2010) (“[U]nless the LLC agreement . . . explicitly expands, restricts, or eliminates traditional
fiduciary duties, managers owe those duties to the LLC and its members and controlling members
owe those duties to minority members.”); see also id. at *10 n.70 (asserting that drafters of limited
liability company agreements “should be expected to provide . . . clear and unambiguous provisions
when they desire to expand, restrict, or eliminate the operation of traditional fiduciary duties”).
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instruments of conveyance and transfer, and any purchase agreement, merger agreement, indemnity agreement, escrow agreement, consent, waiver,
governmental filing, share certificates duly endorsed for transfer (free and
clear of impermissible liens, claims and encumbrances) and any similar or
related documents . . . .371

Under a literal reading, the waiver is there; indeed, the signatory agrees to
deliver a waiver tailored to the occasion. If we ratchet up the drafting
burden, however, the waiver does not succeed because the signatory gets no
special notification of a surrender of fiduciary protection, a notice that
arguably should be enshrined in block capitals and initialed in the margin.
It is a judgment call. For much the same reasons articulated by Baird
and Henderson at a structural level,372 we would hold the NVCA language
to effect the waiver and block a fiduciary action by a drag-along signatory,
even in the $40 million case. Absent a shareholder agreement, however, we
would not block a Trados claim respecting a merger below enterprise value.
We would, however, adjust the standard of review.
E. Standards of Review
We agree with Baird and Henderson that the Trados fact pattern calls for
a considered accommodation between the corporate and contract paradigms.
We have seen that rigid corporate treatment facilitates holdups by underwater
common and destabilizes heavily negotiated transactions. Control having
been given up at arm’s length, interested director approval should not by
itself trigger intrinsic fairness review. At the same time, absent a drag along,
it is not clear that the common in a venture capitalist–controlled investee
has bargained away its right to complain of a sacrifice of enterprise value.
We seek a point of accommodation on the corporate side of the paradigmatic divide. In our view, an adjustment of the standard of review will work
better than an across-the-board contractual bar to suit.
There are four possible standards of review when a Trados plaintiff complains of a below enterprise value sale: (1) intrinsic fairness, burden of proof
on the defendant; (2) intrinsic fairness, burden of proof on the plaintiff; (3)
good faith, burden of proof on the defendant; and (4) good faith, burden of
proof on the plaintiff. Trados appears to apply standard 1 by allowing the
plaintiff ’s allegations by themselves to put the burden to prove intrinsic

371
372

Model Voting Agreement, supra note 335, § 3.2(c).
See supra notes 359-63 and accompanying text.
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fairness on the defendant.373 Standard 2 applies when defendants take
procedural steps to qualify the transaction in question—independentdirector approval in the case of a manager self-dealing transaction, and
negotiation by an independent directors’ special committee in the case of a
parent–subsidiary merger. Standard 3 asks for less than fairness by reviewing
only for reckless disregard for the corporation’s interests. We have noted
here its invocation in preferred stock cases, reformulated as a reckless
disregard for the interests of the preferred stockholders, and recommended
its employment when a common majority imposes a merger allocation on a
class of preferred. Standard 4 is the business judgment rule, which always
yields to a plaintiff who meets the burden to show bad faith. While it might
seem at first blush that business judgment treatment in a Trados case
amounts to rejection of fiduciary scrutiny and corporate treatment, that is
not the case. To impose standard 4 is to reject the contract paradigm: given an
effective waiver of fiduciary duty, none of the standards would apply.
For us, the choice lies between standards 3 and 4. Putting the burden of
proof on the defendant under standard 3 puts procedural pressure on the
venture capitalist to examine alternatives and justify its choice. Switching
the burden of proof to the plaintiff under standard 4 eases the pressure but
enhances the chance that a value-destructive merger could survive a motion to
dismiss, subject to an appraisal.
The precedent favors standard 3, which the court employed in Orban v.
Field,374 the leading Delaware preferred-in-control case prior to Trados. As
in Trados, venture capitalists in control of a company in moderate distress
arranged a sale.375 The acquirer, for tax reasons, insisted on ratification by
90% of the common stockholders.376 Unfortunately, an entrepreneur on the
scrapheap had more than 10% of the common votes and attempted to
leverage those votes to extract a substantial holdup payment.377 The venture
capitalist–controlled board responded with a series of transactions that
diluted the entrepreneur’s holdings to less than 10% of the stock.378 The
entrepreneur sued for breach of the duty to maximize for the common, but
made no claim that the merger sacrificed enterprise value.379

373

2009 WL 2225958, at *9. We say “appears” because the matter was decided on a motion to

dismiss.
374
375
376
377
378
379

No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997).
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *7-8 & n.23.

1900

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1815

Chancellor Allen rejected the claim. A board seeking to realize enterprise
value could act against its common stockholders, provided it could show
that it acted reasonably and in good faith.380 As the merger “appeared
reasonably to be the best available transaction,” the plaintiff had no claim.381
Orban is an easier case than Trados, for there was no claim that enterprise
value was sacrificed; but we think it could be extended. The possibility of
relaxed review puts the controlled board on notice that the company must
be shopped and that outside confirmation respecting the quality of the price
is necessary. Thus armed, it will sustain its burden on summary judgment.
V. TRAVERSING THE PARADIGMATIC DIVIDE
The law of preferred stock emerges much changed in the wake of James,
ThoughtWorks, and Trados. Promises to preferred are harder to enforce.
Fiduciary protection in situations of vulnerability, elusive before, now
retreats even further. Yet contracted control rights are less effective than
before. Preferred stock, always ambiguous, is now more problematic than
ever. We have described and analyzed the issues the cases raise in terms of a
paradigmatic choice between contractual and corporate treatment. This
Section expands on our theme, considering patterns in the courts’ choices,
possible alternatives, and normative stakes.
A. Doctrinal Overlap
We start with some doctrinal observations. Disputes about preferred involve paradigmatic overlap, which imports conceptual instability. Resolving the
dispute requires referencing one paradigm or the other. A court explaining and
justifying a decision tends to make exclusive reference to whichever paradigm
it has chosen. The one-sided explanation imports coherence in the context of a
single opinion, but such opinions should be read and applied with caution.
We demonstrate the need for caution by pushing the approach taken in
each of the cases to its logical conclusion. The James court’s move to contract
treatment, applied literally, implies an open field for dummy mergers that
opportunistically recapture financial rights sold to preferred stockholders.382
We do not think Delaware law would allow that result, and accordingly infer
a good faith limitation regarding mergers and merger allocations. The
380 See id. at *8 (“A board may certainly deploy corporate power against its own shareholders
in some circumstances[,] . . . but when it does, it should be required to demonstrate that it acted
both in good faith and reasonably.”).
381 Id. at *9.
382 See supra Section II.C.
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ThoughtWorks court’s move to corporate treatment, applied literally, implies that
a preferred issuer of means can indefinitely forestall a payment obligation.383
We do not think Delaware law would allow that result either. The corporate
treatment in Trados, applied literally, invites holdouts and value-sacrificing
decisions and overrides existing drag-along rights.384 We think the Delaware
courts, squarely faced with such results, would contain the reach of the case.
In the long run, preferred stock always involves paradigmatic overlap—it is
structurally unavoidable.
B. Delaware’s Approach
The score in our three cases is corporate, two (ThoughtWorks and Trados),
to contract, one ( James). But any apparent inconsistency is quickly dispelled
by reference to the results: the preferred always lose.
The court’s disposition to favor the common is unsurprising: Delaware
sells a product, the buyers of which tend to be holders of common stock or
their management representatives. Senior security holders, conversely, have
historically fared badly in the Delaware courts;385 drafters of debt contracts,
therefore, overwhelmingly choose New York law.386 With preferred stock
provisions there is no option to split jurisdictions: Delaware for governance,
New York for financial promises. The financial terms must go into the
charter and take the law of the state of incorporation as it comes.
There are also important mitigating points. A general disposition to favor
the common long predates the Delaware courts’ emergence as the focal
point for the law of preferred stock.387 At the same time, preferred stockholders do not always lose in Delaware;388 neither does Delaware single out the
383
384
385

See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section IV.B.
See, e.g., Shenandoah Life Ins. Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., Civ. A.No. 9032, 1988 WL
63491, at *409-10 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1988) (ruling that a refunding limitation covering indirect,
cheaper borrowing did not apply to a simultaneous borrowing); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873,
881-82 (Del. Ch. 1986) (refusing to find that a debt-exchange offer with an attached coercive-exit
consent violated the contractual duty of good faith).
386 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
335, 354-55 (2007) (“[N]early all bond indentures and underwriting contracts designate New York
law as the governing law.”).
387 See supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
388 See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 844 (Del. 1998) (holding that
preferred shareholders had the right to participate in a merger class vote provision against a
dummy merger); Protas v. Cavanagh, Civ. A.No. 6555-VCG, 2012 WL 1580969, at *11-12 (Del. Ch.
May 4, 2012) (rejecting a waste claim stemming from a closed-end fund’s redemption of auction
preferred stock); Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 A.3d 928, 938-42 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(reading a corporate certificate to require mandatory redemption and holding that in an appraisal
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preferred for rough treatment. A case like ThoughtWorks is, at its foundation, a
control contest, and when control is contested, Delaware courts tend to
favor the discretion of the incumbent board of directors.389 While we
contest the result in Trados, we acknowledge that the court’s application of
intrinsic fairness scrutiny is in line with Delaware’s treatment of minority
stockholders more generally. The Delaware merger cases conduct an experiment
in fiduciary protection for preferred that is unique among the states, and
leave the door to fiduciary scrutiny open after James.
Still, we are left with corporate treatment when corporate treatment
benefits the common and contract treatment when contract treatment
benefits the common. The results stand in tension, triggering questions.
Why, in particular, does the court refuse to extend majority–minority
protection to the preferred minority against an imposed merger price in
James390 yet force such protection on a preferred majority imposing a merger
price in Trados?391
We suggest a couple answers. First, the Delaware courts are unlikely to
view themselves as wavering between contract and corporate treatment from
case to case. Rather, they see their decisions as consistently contractual in
preferred cases: if the preferred want a given result, they should contract for
it specifically; if they fail to do so, the default corporate paradigm dictates the
result. The preferred in ThoughtWorks could have procured upstream convertibility into a note; in James, either a class vote or liquidation treatment would
have done the trick; in Trados they could have contracted for drag-along
action a court may properly consider a nonspeculative, contractually mandated redemption set to
occur six months after the merger when valuing preferred stock); Fletcher Int’l, Ltd. v. ION
Geophysical Corp., Civ. A. No. 5109-VCP, 2010 WL 2173838, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2010)
(applying a covenant requiring the consent of preferred shareholders to an issue of securities by a
subsidiary of the issuer); MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, Civ. A. No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271,
at *15 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (“[P]referred shareholders have standing to bring a derivative claim
absent some express restriction or limitation in the articles of incorporation . . . .”); Matthews v.
Groove Networks, Inc. Civ.A. No. 1213-N, 2005 WL 3498423, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2005)
(sustaining the application of a liquidation provision directing merger proceeds to the preferred);
In re FLS Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 12623, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *3-4
(Del. Ch. 1993) (rejecting a nonpecuniary settlement of preferred rights respecting a merger
payout); Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., Civ. A. No. 7366, 1985 WL 21145, at *1, *5 (Del.
Ch. May 9, 1985) (denying a motion to dismiss a preferred fairness claim challenging a leveraged
restructuring); Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 653, 660 (Del. Ch. 1975)
(rejecting a common stock challenge to the validity of two board elections of a preferredcontrolled board).
389 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (explaining that
board decisions in the context of a takeover attempt “should be no less entitled to the respect they
otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment”).
390 See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
391 See supra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
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rights. Second, the difference between James and Trados is the difference
between a merger allocation made by a disinterested board ( James) and an
interested board (Trados).
While the drafting burden response resonates nicely with prevalent
views on the application and interpretation of financial contracts, we have
some concerns. As applied in ThoughtWorks and Trados, it looks like a game
played by secret rules. The drafter in ThoughtWorks tried hard to achieve
enforceability, but despite the manifest intent of the parties, missed the
technical trick—a trick not without enforceability problems of its own.
Trados made drag-along rights intrinsically ineffective. As for James, the
contractual alternatives are well established, but come at a price to preferred
issuers. To insist on them as the exclusive means of protection against
opportunism is to skew the bargaining space. It is accordingly not at all
clear that courts should assume preferred stock contracts are complete. A
presumption limiting preferred to explicit contractual protection is normatively robust but should be applied reasonably (without the “gotcha” aspect)
and with sensitivity to facts.
A distinction emphasizing the independence of the directors on the cases’
respective boards also has normative traction. The disinterested, independent
director has risen to such prominence as a solver of corporate problems as to
become the universal solvent in conflict of interest cases, and that is a good
thing. But there is also a structural problem. In Trados we see the disinterested director in a new, quasi mandatory role. Formerly, a controlled board
was assumed in majority–minority cases. The question was whether control
and differential results turned an otherwise unobjectionable decision into a
shareholder-level breach of duty. If the controlled outcome was uneven,
intrinsic fairness scrutiny followed. Trados, however, skips a step in the
sequence. Since a controlled board is not disinterested, its decision by itself
triggers fairness scrutiny without a preliminary inquiry into the evenness of
the outcome. In this exercise, the minority shareholder bore the burden of
proof. The result is an easy complaint—perhaps too easy. At the same time,
insistence on a majority disinterested board cuts against the practice. The
venture capitalist template incorporates a different solution to the problem—
the five-seat board with a tiebreaker fifth director. Were the Trados sale
approved by such a board, the tiebreaker’s approval should suffice as a
process matter.
C. Consistency as an Alternative
Perhaps consistency has a virtue here. Let us compare regimes that
strive for consistent treatments, either all corporate or all contract. A
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corporate regime would give us ThoughtWorks and Trados but would change
the result in James, demanding a veto-bearing committee for the preferred
on pain of intrinsic fairness scrutiny. On the other hand, a contract regime
would enforce the promise in ThoughtWorks and dismiss the complaint in
Trados, leaving James in place.
We are not entirely satisfied with either set of results. Across-the-board
corporate treatment changes the Delaware outcomes to yield intrinsic
fairness scrutiny in James, but overrides the risk allocation in two venture
capital deals. We think that fairness review in Trados is overkill and likewise
see no need for intrinsic fairness scrutiny in James. Forced to choose, we
would more heavily weight respect for considered risk allocations than
solicitude for the convenience of either the going concern or the interests of
underwater common stockholders. This framework would enforce the
redemption promise in ThoughtWorks and dismiss the self-dealing challenge
from the common in Trados. Meanwhile, the preferred in James had an
appraisal option and so were not without a remedy.
In the end, however, we do not think that paradigmatic consistency is a
viable alternative given a subject matter on which two paradigms come to
bear. Nuanced mediation across the paradigmatic divide will work better.
Consistency here lies in taking a considered look in both directions when
difficult conflicts arise. Contract should be the major theme, but only on the
understanding that completeness should not be assumed.
D. Value Maximization and Paradigmatic Conflict
When contract trumps corporate, notions about value maximization motivate the choice. Transactions are maximizing trades. The issuer gets capital
to invest based on a stated return on stated terms and trades off future
financial and control risks for reduced present financial obligation. Legal
interventions that undercut these bargained-for risk allocations chill capital
raising and, in the long run, raise the cost of equity capital at the shareholders’
expense. Legal interventions that extend fairness protections to contract
counterparties can do the same thing: when the relationship is contractual,
the contract itself is the best vehicle for protecting counterparty interests.
Similarly, concerns about value motivate the choice when corporate
trumps contract. Generally, senior security holders do not maximize
enterprise value; residual interest holders do. When self-interested seniors
liquidate their investment and extract return of invested capital, they can
harm the value of the going concern. When seniors take control with a view
to capital extraction they disrupt productive relationships amongst managers,
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employees, and firm specific capital. The corporate legal system owes them
no special assistance in these pursuits.
The two paradigms’ normative associations, thus stated as binary opposites, are descriptive of the conflicts presented in the cases. But the conflicts’
description tends to be unhelpful for their resolution. The simple incentive
depiction of seniors as conservative and risk-averse, and common stockholders
as productive risk-takers does not necessarily apply to the investments at
issue in ThoughtWorks and Trados.
With startups, every investor takes a lot of risk; there is no conservative
way to participate. Given a conflict, there is no basis for an ex ante presumption that one or the other possesses the “correct” incentives. Indeed,
where the venture capitalist has control and power to remove the entrepreneur, we get something approaching the incentive picture idealized in
agency theory—a manager forced by the stick of potential removal and
incentivized to produce by the carrot of a huge equity upside. It arguably
follows that the transaction that creates the incentive arrangement not only
has a strong claim to the solicitude of the contract norm, but that the
corporate norm also comes to bear on the facts to support the preferred.
The norms also can be seen in alignment in James, but their direction can
be reversed depending on the characterization of the facts. At first glance,
both norms point to the result in the case—the explicit contract does not hold
out any protection for the plaintiff (a result presumably contemplated by the
parties), and the corporate paradigm likewise offers no clear-cut fiduciary
protection. The normative posture changes once the contract is seen as
incomplete: now judicial intervention on the preferred’s behalf supports
both the deal and the long-term interests of common stockholders.
These complications bring us back to the overlap point. Neither notion of
value maximization is an effective universal trump. The implications of both
need to be kept in mind on a case-by-case basis. It thus follows that the
common stock–value maximization norm needs to be contained in this
context. Given two classes of equity, the interests of which conflict, enterprise
value maximization works better as the default norm.
CONCLUSION
We would modify the rules of each of James, ThoughtWorks, and Trados.
Our modifications draw on both the corporate and contract paradigms.
Merger allocations to minority preferred should be subject to minimal
scrutiny under the good faith rubric, with the burden of proof on the
defending board. Approval by genuinely disinterested directors acting in
the absence of any threat of lawsuits from the common should satisfy this
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burden. We would entertain appraisal exclusivity as an alternative approach
if Delaware’s corporate code allowed appraisal of preferred issues on a per se
basis. Where appraisal is available, exclusivity should be the presumptive
choice, absent a showing of bad faith.
Payment enforcement is intrinsically problematic due to legal capital and
fraudulent conveyance constraints—constraints which can be ameliorated but
not avoided through the ruse of upstream conversion to a promissory note.
These legal barriers should be etched clearly and narrowly, otherwise, the
promise to pay is negated. We accordingly would delimit the meaning of
“funds legally available” to the literal terms of the background regime and
put the burden on the issuer to show that payment would cause a violation.
Cases where controlling preferred stockholders sell the company are, as
a practical matter, venture capital cases. We think the treatment should be
tailored to the transactional context in light of the risk allocation effected in
venture capital deals and the resulting incentive structure. It follows that
scrutiny should be blocked where the entire class of common has waived the
objection in a shareholders’ agreement. Scrutiny should be available at the
behest of nonwaiving common holders given a plausible allegation of a
sacrifice of enterprise value. The standard of review should be good faith,
with the burden of proof on the board.

